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This dissertation examines the United Nations’ efforts to clear 
landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Sudan. 
Based primarily upon seven months of fieldwork with the UN Mine 
Action Office in Sudan in addition to interviews in the United States 
and Europe, this research utilizes Michelle Murphy’s concept of 
“regimes of perceptibility” to delineate two simultaneous yet conflicting 
ways of approaching and addressing environments in Sudan 
contaminated with mines/ERW. This dissertation brings an STS 
analysis into policy and decision-making discussions by using regimes 
of perceptibility to highlight possible strategies for addressing the 
threat of mines/ERW to local communities. 
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INTRODUCTION: LANDMINES AND SUDAN 
 
 
Figure 1: A United Nations Mine Action Office official stands in front of an Iranian 
No. 4 antipersonnel landmine near the village of Haldet Sharq in Kassala state, 
Sudan. March 2011. 
 
It’s hard concentrating in the Saharan heat. The strong sun can 
make it all too easy to lose your focus, and in some regions of Sudan, 
the uniform desert landscape lulls you into its monotony, with your 
thoughts, movements blurring together. It would not be apparent 
traveling across the country for the first time – or returning after 
spending several years away – that people had suffered through 
decades of civil war. Nor would it be immediately clear that landmines 
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and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) litter the landscape. But 
given this often invisible reality, how do you know where it’s safe to 
walk? It is a simple question, or seemingly so; yet in places that 
witnessed protracted conflict, a simple act such as a step cannot be 
taken for granted. 
Because it is almost impossible to know where mines and other 
ERW such as mortars, cluster bombs, and unexploded ammunition 
are buried from looking at the landscape, Sudanese communities and 
authorities have turned to outsiders who come with large-scale 
technologies to detect and clear mines/ERW. With approval from the 
United Nations in Sudan and the Sudanese authorities, the outside 
organizations compete for commercial tenders and grants or come into 
the country with funding secured from foreign donors to clear those 
explosive hazards. There are a wide range of other rationales and 
motives for requesting and soliciting assistance, from profit, foreign 
policy interests, and self-promotion, among others, but ostensibly, the 
confirmed presence and potential for harm from mines/ERW is one 
part of such efforts. 
There are numerous ways to confront the notion, or rather, the 
“reality” that just a few inches below the yellow sand and earth could 
be hundreds of antitank mines, about the size of a dinner plate and 
capable of destroying an armored vehicle, let alone a civilian car or a 
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person riding a camel. Moreover, surrounding the antitank mines 
could be antipersonnel mines, small enough to hold in one hand and 
designed to blow off a soldier’s leg and placed in close proximity to the 
antitank mines to prevent disarmament. These mines are successful in 
that regard as professional civilian deminers in Sudan and across the 
globe are among the victims of these mines.  
Traditionally, almost all of the efforts to clear mines/ERW – 
which insiders have termed “mine action” –  have been conducted by 
top-heavy institutions. These institutions rely on a wide variety 
solutions, including material technologies and individuals with 
particular expertise. Expatriate managers, heavy and specialized 
equipment, fleets of Land Cruisers, emblazoned insignias, 
standardized procedures, and expertise with mines/ERW that comes 
from both military training and clearance experience in other countries 
are salient features of mine action organizations. 
All of this stuff, though, does not actually guarantee 
effectiveness, even though much of it is extremely expensive: 
landmines can remain after a clearance team has supposedly cleared 
land. Nor does it guarantee cost effectiveness: a large portion of 
cleared land – in some cases an overwhelming majority – does not in 
fact have any mines/ERW in the first place. Given that clearing one 
square meter in Sudan costs between US$3 and US$17, international 
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donors and the organizations that solicit foreign aid perceive clearing 
“empty” land as cost prohibitive at best and wasteful of limited 
resources at worst. But, the possible human risks to mines/ERW 
remain a concern. In that regard, a landmine has accomplished one of 
the objectives of those who laid it: denying use and travel across an 
area of land, even without being detonated. Or even being materially 
present. Such issues are just a few of many confronting communities, 
the government, and international organizations as they contend with 
contaminated landscapes across Sudan and other mine-affected 
countries.  
This dissertation explores various efforts to address the problem 
of mines/ERW in Sudan. I focus on the UN’s response to landmines as 
it works with other social groups and utilizes an array of technologies, 
each with a history and politics that are introduced into the 
environment. Little of the literature on mine action has critically 
examined the actual practices through which mine action is defined 
and carried out, and I seek to address this lacuna. By examining three 
core activities of mine action in Sudan – conducting a nationwide 
Landmine Impact Survey, providing mine-risk education to Sudanese 
communities, and clearing mines/ERW across the country – I show 
how different groups have distinct perspectives and approaches to the 
problem of mines/ERW in the environment of Sudan. To give one brief 
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example: clearance organizations seek to avoid clearing land that does 
not contain any mines/ERW in order to preserve scarce resources (viz. 
funding, although ensuring total clearance is difficult). However, local 
communities and humanitarian aid organizations that travel across 
the country would prefer absolute guarantees of safety and 
comprehensive clearance, even when this means “clearing” what 
proves to be “empty” land. 
In my analysis, I draw on Michelle Murphy’s concept of “regimes 
of (im)perceptibility,” which explains 
what phenomena come into being for us, giving objects 
boundaries and imbuing them with qualities. Regimes of 
perceptibility populate our world with some objects and not 
others, and they allow certain actions to be performed on those 
objects.1 
 
I use regimes of perceptibility not only to analyze and illuminate what 
these actors say and do, but also to show that the very things they are 
seeing and responding to are contingent on the actors’ history and 
politics. Moreover, when different mine action organizations and the 
local communities who live with mines/ERW interact, so too do their 
histories and their ways of seeing – and not seeing – the contaminated 
landscapes of contemporary Sudan. For policy and decision makers, 
the international framework or implementation plans for addressing 
                                                 
1 Michelle Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty: 
Environmental Politics, Technoscience, and Women Workers (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2006), 24. 
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these landscapes are contingent on which regime of perceptibility in 
mine action they adopt. 
 
Understanding the Place of Sudan  
To understand some of the wider implications and 
considerations of the landmine/ERW challenge in Sudan, a few key 
dimensions of Sudan’s recent history are worth bearing in mind. 
Sudan is the subject of a fair amount of academic and journalistic 
attention (the latter motivated by the on-going Darfur conflict and the 
South’s recent independence in July 2011), and my purpose here is 
not to retread the work of other scholars so much as it is to provide a 
context for understanding critical aspects of this dissertation and 
highlighting constitutive elements of the issues at hand. 
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Figure 2: The previous boundaries of Sudan which included the North and South 
until July 9, 2011. Map from CIA World Factbook.2 
 
Modern Sudan emerged as an autonomous, postcolonial nation 
in 1956 when England and Egypt ended their joint “condominium” 
rule over the country (condominium rule refers to the arrangement 
between England and Egypt in which Egypt appointed a governor-
                                                 
2 Oscar Anthony Balloveras, “Sudan” Wiki, Geneseo Food Resarch, May 5, 2011, 
https://wiki.geneseo.edu/display/food/Sudan. 
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general with colonial approval to oversee Sudan in 1899). World War II 
was a significant factor in decolonization with England weakened and 
Northern Sudan’s pro-independence nationalist movement gaining 
momentum. At the same time England sought a way to extricate itself 
from Sudan given the civil war that had begun 1955 and pitted the 
North against the South. South Sudan has perpetually struggled 
against the North’s influence and control: its location along the Nile 
headwaters is highly sought after and Northern Arab slave traders 
targeted darker skinned Africans. 
The First Sudanese Civil War spanned nearly two decades from 
1955 to 1972 and left an estimated 500,000 dead. In 1972, the North 
and South reached a peace deal with the Addis Ababa Agreement in 
which the South earned limited political autonomy and was 
temporarily freed from the prospect of Islamic sharia law.3 However, 
there was no meaningful resolution to the other sources of contention 
that led to the brutal civil war, such as the North’s appropriation of 
natural resources – principly Nile water flow – and the lack of 
agricultural development in the South. It was not until 1979 that 
Sudan’s large oil reserves were discovered by Chevron4 
                                                 
3 Sharia law is a moral and legal code derived from Islam’s Koran and the teachings 
of the prophet Mohammed, interpreted to varying degrees of literalism. See “BBC - 
Religions - Islam: Sharia,” September 3, 2009, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/beliefs/sharia_1.shtml. 
4 Richard Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2010), 54. 
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A little more than a decade later, in 1983, the North and South 
resumed conflict when then-President Jafaar Nimieri unilaterally 
declared all of Sudan under sharia law, a hostile provocation 
deliberately targeted to antagonize the South. Given the Christian 
majority of the South, Nimieri’s 1983 edict sparked more than two 
more decades of war, with the battles during the Second Sudanese 
Civil War (1983 – 2005) focused on four areas: 1) the central Nuba 
Mountains in Southern Kordofan state (strategically important as a 
highlands and a natural divider between the North and South), 2) the 
Abyei area also in Southern Kordofan state (long contested by 
indigenous communities and seasonal animal herders, but not 
historically a site of mass violence until recently), 3) the eastern border 
with Ethopia and Eritrea in Blue Nile and Kassala states, and 4) the 
South. An estimated two million people died during this conflict and 
another four million people were displaced from their homes.5 The 
overwhelming majority of deaths were civilians who died as a result of 
war-exacerbated droughts and starvation. 
                                                 
5 “UNMIS Background,” United Nations Mission in the Sudan, accessed August 23, 
2012, https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml. 
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Figure 3: 1) Nuba Mountains, 2) Abyei, 3) Eastern border, 4) South Sudan.6 
                                                 
6 Ezilon Maps, “Political Map of Sudan and Sudanese Country Map,” 2009, 
http://www.ezilon.com/maps/africa/sudan-maps.html. 
1
2
3
4
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The high death toll was also facilitated by the availability of 
weapons in a strife-ridden country. Since Sudanese independence, all 
manner of Soviet arms (or weapons made outside of the USSR based 
on Soviet designs) made their way to both the North and South: tanks, 
artillery, heavy guns, missiles, small arms/light weapons, and 
landmines.7 It is also worth noting that from 1983 to 1988 (the only 
time in modern Sudan’s history without civil war), the United States 
provided approximately US$120 million of American arms, munitions, 
and equipment to Sudan to counter Ethiopian and Libyan forces 
backed by the USSR as a part of the U.S. containment strategy; when 
the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Ethiopia began providing arms to the 
South Sudanese People’s Liberation Army.8 Britian, Bulgaria, China, 
France, Norway, Poland, and Saudi Arabia are also among the many 
countries that have provided military support to various groups in 
Sudan after independence, in line with their respective ideological 
commitments and commercial interests.9 Since the 1990s, Libya and 
China were the main suppliers of weapons to Sudan (both 
Soviet/Russian weapons as well as Libyan and Chinese weapons 
                                                 
7 Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, “Sudan - Foreign Military 
Assistance,” Library of Congress Country Studies, June 1991, 
http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+sd0153). 
8 Robert Collins, A History of Modern Sudan (Cambridge  UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 203. 
9 Ibid., 253. 
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based on Soviet/Russian designs), mostly to the North and to the 
South as well (China’s involvement with Sudan since the 1970s always 
included military assistance).10 
By the late 1990s and early 2000s, various international efforts 
by countries including the United States and Norway along with the 
United Nations and the East African Intergovernmental Authority on 
Drought and Development began to gain traction in de-escalating and 
ending the war between the Government of Sudan’s Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF) from the North and the South’s Sudan People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA).11 A series of peace building measures beginning on July 
20, 2002 culminated in a Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by 
the North and South on January 9, 2005.12 
 With the formal end of hostilities, the United Nations established 
its largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the history of 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 231. 
11 SPLA/M is the accepted shorthand to denote both the armed forces that fought 
the civil war and the political body that ostensibily represents the people for whom 
the armed forces fought. In reality, there is almost total overlap between the armed 
forces and the political body; commanders and soldiers function also as political 
leaders. 
12 Eric Reeves, “A United Nations Peace Support Operation for Sudan: Urgent Needs, 
Lethargic Planning,” Www.sudanreeves.org: Sudan Research, Analysis, and 
Advocacy, November 14, 2003, http://www.sudanreeves.org/2004/12/17/a-united-
nations-peace-support-operation-for-sudan-urgent-needs-lethargic-planning-
november-14-2003/; Eric Reeves, “US State Department Policy on Sudan,” 
Www.sudanreeves.org: Sudan Research, Analysis, and Advocacy, November 7, 2005, 
http://www.sudanreeves.org/2006/01/03/us-state-department-policy-on-sudan-
november-7-2005/. 
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the organization: the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).13 Its 
primary goal was to facilitate an eventual referendum on South 
Sudanese independence, initially planned for six years after the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. Humanitarian assistance 
and other relief also constituted the UNMIS’s work. Such work 
targeted the millions of internally displaced people across Sudan. At 
the end of 2010, the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated 4.5 to 5.2 million people 
had been removed from their homes; even after Sudan’s reduction in 
size and population with Southern independence, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees officially considers more than 2.4 million 
Sudanese as internally displaced persons.14 
When I began this dissertation project in 2009, “Sudan” referred 
to a single country; South Sudan was semi-autonomous and still a 
part of Sudan. After holding a referendum on whether to remain a part 
                                                 
13 “UNMIS Facts and Figures,” United Nations Mission in the Sudan, accessed 
August 24, 2012, 
https://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/facts.shtml. The total cost 
of the UN peacekeeping mission from its early stages beginning in July 2004 till the 
complete disposal of all assets in June 2012 totaled an estimated US$5.76 billion. At 
peak deployment levels, UNMIS was comprised of more than 10,000 uniformed 
soldiers, military observers, and police, nearly 1,000 international civilian staff, 
3,000 local civilian staff, and 500 United Nations Volunteers. Over the course of the 
mission, the UN recorded 60 fatalities without listing the cause of death: 23 were 
soldiers, 3 police, 3 military observers, 8 international civilians, 22 local civilians, 
and 1 listed as “other.” 
14 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, “Country Page: Sudan,” December 31, 
2011, http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/sudan; United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, “Sudan: 2012 UNHCR Country Operations Profile,” 
accessed November 5, 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e483b76.html. 
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of Sudan in July 2011, South Sudan became an autonomous nation-
state (I discuss below how this referendum came to be held). At the 
risk of committing a slight anachronism, for the sake of consistency 
throughout this dissertation I use “Sudan” to refer both to 
 the North, dominated by the Arab Muslim majority who are 
centered in riverain Khartoum. This majority actively 
excludes and marginalizes the Fur in the west (Darfur), the 
Beja and other smaller groups such as the Rashaida in the 
east, and the Nuba in the central region, and numerous other 
smaller groups such as Rashaida herders in the east;15 
 the South where ethnic Dinka who practice Christianity and 
animism are the largest ethnic and political group among 
dozens of ethnicities and tribes. International organizations 
and major powers oftentimes back the Dinka, tribal 
differences among the 25 Dinka groups make such support 
less solid than outsiders intended.16 
                                                 
15 Central Intelligence Agency, “Sudan,” The World Factbook, September 21, 2012, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html; Sara 
Pantuliano, Comprehensive Peace? Causes and Consequences of Underdevelopment 
and Instability in Eastern Sudan (International Rescue Committee, September 2005); 
Richard Rottenburg, Guma Kunda Komey, and Enrico Ille, The Genesis of Recurring 
Wars in Sudan: Rethinking the Violent Conflicts in the Nuba Mountains / South 
Kordofan (University of Halle, Germany, October 2011). 
The Fur are non-Arabized Muslims who traditionally rely on sedentary agriculture. 
The Beja are primarily nomadic camel herders and breeders and are also non-Arab 
Muslims. The Rashaida are financially better-off than the previous groups, in part 
because they are not discrimminated against by fellow Arabs and their history as 
smugglers, initially of cattle. The Nuba are the most heterogenous group, and the 
singluar term “Nuba” belies wide historical, cultural, social and political differences. 
The primary reason for one label for a people who are divided into more than 50 
language and dialect groups is by virtue of their present location in the central and 
strategic Nuba Mountains. For more detailed descriptions of Sudan’s population 
groups and their relation to the central state, see Douglas Hamilton Johnson, The 
Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars (James Currey Publishers, 2003). 
16 Central Intelligence Agency, “South Sudan,” The World Factbook, September 4, 
2012, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/od.html; 
Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 51–53. 
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Figure 4: The current boundaries of Sudan as of June 2011 upon South Sudan’s 
independence. Map from CIA World Factbook.17 
 
                                                 
17 Central Intelligence Agency, “Sudan.” 
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Figure 5: The newly created nation of South Sudan as of June 2011. Map from CIA 
World Factbook.18 
 
Much of Sudan’s post-independence history is described in the 
mine action literature and documents in a concise yet clichéd 
shorthand. Funding proposals by UNMIS and concept notes19 by 
international aid organizations explain the extent of Sudan’s conflict 
                                                 
18 Central Intelligence Agency, “South Sudan.” 
19 A concept note is a proposed project an organization presents to a donor. The 
organization lays out the scope of the work it claims to be able to do and the cost of 
performing that work. If the location, type of work to be performed, and cost align 
with the donor’s interest, the donor then funds the organization. 
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as being the “Arab North versus Christian and animist South,”20 with 
generic statements along the lines of “more than two decades of 
conflict between the North and the South, ending with the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.”21 Journalist Jina Moore describes a 
similar trope in writing about contemporary issues as  
nearly every story I published from Rwanda in my three years 
reporting there included a reference to the 1994 genocide. 
Dredging up suffering can win a busy audience’s attention, but 
it’s a limited kind of attention. It’s the attention of the kind-
hearted stranger from a distance, the reader who stops eating 
his breakfast or reading her stock quotes to remember just how 
bad it is in other places.22 
 
Such strategic reduction also serves humanitarian-identifying 
organizations as they seek to maintain apolitical neutrality. Delving 
into Sudan’s recent history and exploring the specific details of the 
civil war would arguably present opportunities for the inevitable value 
judgments that arise in deciding how to frame the conflict in a 
narrative and the diction used in such a narrative (the most powerful 
example being the policy debates around the term “genocide”). By 
reducing decades of conflict into a handful of vague standardized 
sentences, humanitarian-identifying organizations seek to avoid any 
                                                 
20 Jina Moore, “The White Correspondent’s Burden,” Boston Review, August 2, 2012, 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR37.4/jina_moore_africa_journalism_colonialism.ph
p. 
21 I do not intend to single out mine action actors here as being ignorant or 
uninformed. Mine action actors are no better or worse than other groups involved in 
Sudan, and the general level of their knowledge is fair and understandable given 
both their work in the country and the constraints on their time. 
22 Moore, “The White Correspondent’s Burden.” 
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controversy that might impede their efforts or official permission to 
operate. Indeed, “outsiders…have only looked at the areas or 
particular aspects of Sudan that have reflected their own agendas and 
interests.”23 As a scholar, I too have interests: the primary one is to 
expand on the recent mine action efforts and situate the present 
within a broader set of social-technical interactions. That is, beyond 
the physical objects, tools, and equipment associated with clearing 
mines/ERW, I want to tie the assumptions, values, and history of 
these things into the picture. 
Despite the politics of history and historical narratives, it is 
worth digging deeper into the complex and contested processes that 
contributed to decades of civil war in Sudan. In his book The Root 
Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, Sudan scholar Douglas Johnson 
identifies two prevailing yet opposing explanations for the conflicts 
between North and South Sudan: centuries of exploitation and slave-
raiding on the part of Northern “Arabs” against Southern “Africans;” or 
outside imperialist interventions creating artificial divisions across a 
Sudanese Islamic country which did not divide the nation in two along 
“African” and “Arab” lines. Yet, as Johnson argues, “religion, local 
perceptions of race and social status, economic exploitation, and 
colonial and post-colonial interventions are all elements in the Sudan’s 
                                                 
23 Cockett, Sudan, 3. 
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current civil war, but none, by itself, fully explains it.”24 Johnson 
argues for a deeper historical understanding beyond colonialism’s 
unequal legacy, including  
the exploitative nature of the central state towards its [natural 
resource] rich, but uncontrolled hinterland, the coercive power 
of the army in economic as well as political matters, the 
prerogative of the leader in redistributing revenues to the 
peripheries, (and) the ambiguous status of persons who are not 
fully part of the central heritage.25 
 
These eighteenth- and nineteenth-century developments within Sudan 
are what constituted legitimate power and governance in Sudan. 
According to Johnson, then, pre-colonial divisions contributed to 
long-lasting and currently unsolved conflict. These divisions were 
predicated on multiple social divisions and then embedded into 
territorial boundaries and administrative structures and policies. Self-
identifying as Arab did not preclude or end conflict, but it was a 
dimension of inclusion in or exclusion from the state and its protection 
as well as participation/integration in the economy. Johnson writes: 
While international church groups [primarily Christian] focus on 
the religious issue as exclusively defined by the freedom to 
worship, and Western politicians see religious affiliation in terms 
of ‘minority rights’, the economic aspects of religious, (sic) and 
racial oppression in the Sudan are largely ignored, masked as 
they are by the language of development.26 
 
These longstanding issues around the construction of power and 
                                                 
24 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 1–2. 
25 Ibid., 7. 
26 Ibid., 75. 
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international responses to subsequent oppression play out in the 
present as The Economist’s Africa Editor Richard Cockett illustrates in 
discussing how present “governance” tends to interpret the past: 
The British might have been responsible for erecting the barriers 
between North and South Sudan in the first place and for 
treating Southerners as second-class citizens. But here, as in 
other respects, the Muslim politicians who succeeded the British 
in Khartoum merely took their cue from their former colonial 
masters. Perhaps even more so, for the Muslims of the North, 
themselves on the fringes of the Arab world, had their own 
reasons to be dismissive of Southern claims to equal rights and 
economic opportunities.”27 
 
Cockett’s point omits Johnson’s historicity in that the British colonial 
legacy was itself predicated upon existing marginalization between 
Khartoum as the central city and Sudan’s vast hinterlands, but his 
claim about Sudan’s recent history still holds. Indeed, the “paradox of 
Khartoum, of a core of wealth and optimism surrounded by rings of 
extreme poverty, injustice and political exclusion, is also the paradox 
of Sudan.”28 The late geographer Neil Smith’s theory of “uneven 
development” captured this paradox as he sought to call attention to 
how different places burden costs and reap the benefits of capitalist 
development in unequal fashion.29 
 Causes are clearly contested. Nonetheless, one significant legacy 
                                                 
27 Cockett, Sudan, 41–42. 
28 Ibid., 19. 
29 Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space, 
3rd ed. (University of Georgia Press, 2008), 99. 
  21
of the history of Sudan’s conflicts is that all the landmines and other 
explosive remnants of war laid by the Sudan Armed Forces and Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army initially laid against combatants now pose a 
serious threat to civilians and humanitarian aid workers. Unlike 
countries such as Cambodia and Laos, mine action programs are not 
being established in Sudan decades after the bombardment ceased. 
While some mines/ERW remained from the first civil war from 1955 to 
1972 (and possibly even from World War II), the majority of the 
mines/ERW are from the most recent civil war from 1983 until the 
2002 ceasefire. Mine action in Sudan began almost immediately after 
the North and South laid down their arms after the long-burning 
conflict. The relatively recent mine action interventions therefore 
provide a methodological opening to examine the constructive 
processes that constitute mine action in contemporary Sudan. Had 
such processes been underway for decades (as in the case of other 
mine/ERW-affected countries), identifying and analyzing the decisions 
that established mine action in Sudan would be much more difficult. 
 
The Rise of Professional Mine Action 
My purpose in laying out some institutional history about mine 
action in this section is to outline the crucial dynamics at play in 
Sudan. Such history and politics shape how the UN, commercial 
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contractors, international NGOS, and the expatriate staff that manage 
these organizations actually work in Sudan. A critical part of this 
history is how the mine action community has tried to professionalize 
itself, seeks to present itself as professionals to other actors 
(particularly policymakers and donor nations), and frequently invokes 
the language of professionals to establish their own legitimacy. 
The first humanitarian, non-military efforts to clear and remove 
landmines were in Afghanistan by the nongovernmental organization 
The HALO Trust (HALO). In 1988, HALO began using men with 
technical experience with mines through previous military training to 
clear the countless mines Soviet forces used against Afghans, most 
notably in Kabul and Parwan provinces.30 One year earlier, the UN had 
attempted a program under the auspices of its emergency relief effort 
Operation Salaam for military (de)miners to train Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan in mine clearance; while 13,000 men gained the necessary 
skills, they lacked the infrastructure – equipment, vehicles, 
administrative support, and coordination – to employ those skills. 
Thus by 1989, the UN moved away from training local Afghans 
towards on-the-ground coordination, ceding training to smaller NGOs 
whose staff had more experience with clearance from earlier military 
                                                 
30 Survey Action Center, Landmine Impact Survey - Afghanistan: Executive 
Summary, 2005, 3, http://www.sac-
na.org/pdf_text/afghanistan/AFG_ExecSummary_Engl.pdf. 
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training in their previous occupation. Other mine/ERW-focused NGOs, 
most notably Mines Advisory Group, emerged in Afghanistan at this 
time as well.  
That humanitarian demining taking place first in Afghanistan is 
notable, given there were several countries across the globe which 
were suffering the same fate to the same extent. Mike Croll, Rae 
McGrath, Matthew Bolton, and others who have written deeply about 
mine action all chronicle the condition of Southeast Asia and sub-
Saharan Africa. McGrath points out that Afghanistan in the late 1980s 
provided “a classic good-versus-bad story for the Western media – 
invasion by a hugely superior (and communist) external force being 
resisted by brave but poorly armed local fighters with colourful history. 
The facts were, as ever, somewhat more complex, but why spoil a good 
story with detail?”31 With the experience of Afghanistan in hand, mine 
action organizations began expanding their areas of operations in the 
late 1980s and into the 1990s to other mine/ERW-affected countries 
in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa where mines/ERW have 
been a longstanding humanitarian issue.32 This work is particularly 
                                                 
31 Rae McGrath, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: a Resource Book (London, 
UK: Pluto Press, 2000), 15. It is worth remembering that the United States supported 
the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan under the Reagan Doctrine, in part by 
supplying weapons. Besides the immediate consequence of contributing to the 
landmine/ERW issue, the implications of American involvement reverberate into the 
current war. 
32 Southeast Asia’s mine/ERW contamination in large part is a part of the United 
States’ explosive legacy across the region. The U.S. has released its Vietnam War-era 
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notable because it initially departed from earlier efforts towards 
clearing mines/ERW. In the past, mine clearance was carried out by 
militaries, often working in the context of combat, and far short of the 
present holistic approach of mine action. Even in post-World War II 
Europe, mine clearance and reconstruction was overseen by various 
militaries.33 
 In 1992, six leading NGOs – Human Rights Watch, Medico 
International, Handicap International, Physicians for Human Rights, 
Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, and the Mines Advisory 
Group – came together to establish the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL). All six NGOs had experience working with survivors 
from mines/ERW across the globe, and when the Cold War ended with 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the NGOs saw the potential for a global 
ban on landmines.34 Such a ban could be a step towards building 
world peace, so the thinking went for these organizations. In addition, 
collectively, the NGOs had experience in Afghanistan as well as other 
mine/ERW-affected countries in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan 
                                                                                                                                            
military records of its bombing missions to assist national authorities and NGOs in 
countries like Cambodia and Lao establish a baseline for resource planning and a 
starting point for where to begin clearance. 
33 Sayed Aqa, “Mine Action: Success and Challenges,” Journal of Mine Action 9, no. 1 
(August 2005), http://maic.jmu.edu/Journal/9.1/Focus/aqa/aqa.htm; Mike Croll, 
Landmines in War and Peace: From Their Origin to the Present Day (Barnsley, U.K.: 
Pen and Sword, 2009), 137. 
34 Jody Williams, “The International Campaign to Ban Landmines - A Model for 
Disarmament Initiatives?,” Nobelprize.org, September 3, 1999, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1997/article.html. 
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Africa like Angola, experience, they argued, that bestowed expertise 
with the different aspects of mine action: global advocacy, victim 
assistance, mine-risk education, and clearance. However, only one 
founding member of the ICBL – Mines Advisory Group, headquartered 
in Manchester, England – had direct experience clearing mines/ERW, 
as the other organizations were not principally clearance organizations 
but instead worked primarily towards victims’ assistance. The relative 
weight of one clearance organization’s input into the ICBL compared to 
the input of several organizations without such expertise would have 
future long-term consequences as the ICBL, as both a moral symbol 
against civilian harm as well as a policy prescription on warfare, would 
have to be balanced with how clearance organizations conduct their 
work in the field. Some mine action practitioners – particularly those 
on the ground – see the Mine Ban Treaty as too idealistic and 
aspirational and divorced from reality and operational constraints. 
Thus, mine clearance organizations thus seek a balance between the 
high standard for signatory nations set by the Mine Ban Treaty to be 
mine-free, which the ICBL advocated for strenuously, and the material 
and environmental contingencies across various mine/ERW-affected 
countries that make mine-free an arguably cost-prohibitive 
proposition. (I will return to this issue throughout this dissertation). 
 Several developments and events made 1997 a watershed year 
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for mine action. The first was the culmination of five years of 
widespread global advocacy by the ICBL: the establishment of the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and 
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, known as 
both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Ottawa Treaty (where the treaty was 
signed in 1997), as international law. Before Mine Ban Treaty was 
ratified and came into force, “it was estimated that there were between 
15,000 and 20,000 new casualties [worldwide] caused by landmines 
and unexploded ordnance each year. Which means there were some 
1,500 new casualties each month, more than 40 new casualties a day, 
at least two new casualties per hour.”35 The same year the Nobel Peace 
Prize was co-awarded to Jody Williams and the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines, signaling international recognition of the 
landmine/ERW issue and the resulting advocacy. Although more than 
150 countries have ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 40 
countries, including Burma, China, Iran, Israel, Russia, and the 
United States still fail to observe the Mine Ban Treaty.36 Even with the 
Mine Ban Treaty in force, 66 countries and 7 areas not internationally 
                                                 
35 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “The Issues: Mine Ban Treaty,” 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, accessed January 11, 2012, 
http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/The-Issues/Mine-Ban-Treaty. 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Mine Ban Treaty: States Not Party,” 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, accessed August 24, 2012, 
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/MBT/States-Not-Party. 
36 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “The Issues: Mine Ban Treaty.” 
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recognized (e.g. Kosovo and Palestine) reported a total of approximately 
5,500 casualties from mines/ERW in 2011. Almost three-quarters 
were civilians, half of whom were children.37 
Given the number of countries that have not signed the Mine 
Ban Treaty and what some mine action actors state is an unacceptable 
casualty rate, the ICBL currently continues its advocacy work. One of 
the ICBL’s principal activities is publishing annually Landmine 
Monitor which provides profiles of every mine/ERW- affected country 
(beginning in 2009 the ICBL also began publishing Cluster Munition 
Monitor). The profiles for each country are written and compiled by 
hired researchers who spend six months each year traveling to 
interview key officials both in-person and via email. From its website: 
Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is the research and 
monitoring initiative of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). It 
is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and 
the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It assesses the 
international community’s response to the humanitarian 
problem caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and reports on state 
implementation of and compliance with relevant international 
legal instruments.38 
 
Equally important for the field of mine action was the 
publication of the first issue of The Journal of Humanitarian Demining 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Press Releases: Research 
Opportunity: Join the Monitor’s 2012 Research Network,” Landmine and Cluster 
Munition Monitor, 2009, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Press-
Room/Press-Releases/monitor-2012-researchers-call. 
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also in 1997. “The Journal” (as it is referred to colloquially by many 
mine action practitioners and actors) would be renamed The Journal 
of Mine Action a year later, and then The Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action a decade after that. Mine action and its related issues and 
activities cross many disciplinary and professional boundaries, yet the 
journal is the only publication dedicated to the study of mine action. 
While the journal’s readers are located in more than 150 countries, it 
is only printed in English.39 The first issue of the journal detailed 
briefly U.S. and UN humanitarian demining efforts. By the second 
issue, the journal contained articles on global outreach and technology 
initiatives. However, the growing professionalism of mine action during 
the 1990s did not necessarily solve persistent questions regarding 
technology, efficiency, and improvement. In other words, even though 
mine action practitioners may have established the field as legitimate, 
the technologies employed by mine action organizations and how well 
those technologies worked were still topics of inquiry both by insiders 
and outsiders to the professional ranks.  
Perhaps the largest institutional change that emerged in 1997 
was the formal establishment of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) 
                                                 
39 Some mine action commentators like Matthew Bolton claim that the close 
relationship between the publisher – James Madison University’s Center for 
International Stabilization and Recovery – and primary financial sponsor – the U.S. 
State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement – gives the State 
Department as one of mine action’s principal donors too much control. See Matthew 
Bolton, Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance: Governance, Politics and Security in 
Afghanistan, Bosnia and Sudan (London, UK: I.B. Tauris, 2010), 77–78. 
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and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) one year later. These two institutions have become the two 
most prominent mine action institutions and mutually reinforce each 
other’s position. UNMAS posits itself as the international lead 
organization for mine action while GICHD describes itself as a “centre 
of excellence” that provides technical expertise that helps guide mine 
action activities. GICHD also maintains the International Mine Action 
Standards and develops and supports the standard database system 
used by virtually every national mine action authority. 
These two large organizations justify their existence in part by 
pointing to high initial estimates of the number of mines/ERW in 
affected areas and the need for large-scale measures, centralized 
planning, and coordination, which these organizations can provide. 
Moreover, mine action has also become an increasingly foundational 
part of post-conflict recovery and peace building in many countries,40 
and the UN readily stated that issues such as large scale 
humanitarian food aid distribution and laying the infrastructure 
foundation for Sudan’s 2011 nationwide referendum voting all 
required top-down coordinated mine action. Given perpetually limited 
resources – namely international donor funds and aid – such 
                                                 
40 Michael Hands, “Destroying Mines and Building Peace: A Study of Mine Action, 
Post-conflict Development and Security, in Sudan” (MA in Post-War Recovery 
Studies, University of York, 2010). 
  30
coordination attempts to ensure that mine action is both efficient and 
strategic by both “clearing areas right” and “clearing the right areas.”41 
At times, the NGOs and commercial firms that conduct the 
actual clearance describe the physical act of demining as simple and 
straightforward; one manager stated to a documentary film crew 
“people have turned demining into a black art, it’s really very simple. 
We could teach all of you how to demine in three days.”42 For these 
groups, removing or neutralizing a mine/ERW in the ground may seem 
simple and direct and it is not in this case, but the UN and other 
higher level authorities in mine action have created extensive 
requirements that entail a whole path-dependent infrastructure: 
management, support staff, equipment, standards, regulations, and on 
and on, all of which raise costs.43 Such requirements serve both 
individuals’ and organizations’ need to secure funding necessary to 
perpetuate themselves while also simultaneously creating and 
addressing different conceptions of risk management. 
Thus, a singular action – the movement of sweeping a metal 
                                                 
41 Håvard Bach, “Clearing Areas Right; Clearing the Right Areas,” The Journal of 
ERW and Mine Action 13, no. 2, Annual Issue: Land Cancellation and Release 
(August 2009), http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/13.2/focus/bach/bach.htm. 
42 Brian Liu and Mary Wareham, Disarm (Indiepix, 2009). 
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detector – is laden with different meanings: the removal and disposal 
of a potentially fatal threat, an occupational responsibility that leads to 
a good salary, facilitating efficient aid delivery, the creation of a post-
conflict peace dividend. The ability of clearance practitioners to claim a 
high level of their expertise – even while readily acknowledging their 
own limits – is very much a power generating maneuver that can be 
analyzed. 
For better and for worse, more than two decades of such mine 
clearance actions across the globe reveals that large portions of areas 
that undergo clearance in fact contain no hazards. For instance, one 
NGO, Handicap International, found mines/ERW in only one third of 
the area it cleared in Mozambique in 2008. Another NGO, Mines 
Advisory Group, located mines in less than half of the areas it cleared 
in 2007 in Cambodia, widely seen as one of the most mine-affected 
countries in the world. In these cases, nothing is “cleared.” One expert 
affiliated with Survey Action Center (the producers of the Landmine 
Impact Survey discussed in chapter one) estimated that “less than 5 
percent of [Suspected Hazardous Areas] prove to have any mines in 
most countries, and many clearance operations find none at all.”44 In a 
country like Sudan where the average cost from 2007 through 2010 to 
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clear a square meter was approximately US$10 (decreasing from 
US$17/square meter in 2007 to US$3.50/square meter by 2010), 
clearing an American football field can cost US$60,000 and take up to 
140 manpower days.45 Given that Sudan was the largest country by 
area on the African continent before Southern independence – 
approximately four times the size of France – 140 days for a single 
football field means that clearing all the mines/ERW in Sudan would 
be a virtually interminable task. 
Consequently, concerns like these in Sudan and across the 
globe have led mine action practitioners to develop “land release.” 
Land release is a recently codified approach to mine clearance that 
shifts clearance techniques away from wholesale clearance of areas 
suspected of having mine/ERW contamination through expensive 
technologies to a strategic tactic where areas are deemed to have little 
to no risk by initially using less-costly methods and escalating the 
response only as deemed necessary, thereby reserving precious 
financial and other resources for areas believed to be high risk. I will 
address this issue in more detail in chapter three. 
                                                 
45 Armen Harutyunyan, “The UNMAO -Northern Region (Presentation to GICHD)” 
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At this point, I want to note that while cost-savings are a priority 
for mine action, a less expensive activity than mine/ERW clearance is 
not always the preferred solution. For example mine-risk education, a 
category that encompasses a wide variety of activities including public 
outreach, education, and information dissemination to local 
communities is much less expensive than demining activities, as a 
team of three educators with printed materials does not require the 
same support as a dozen deminers with all their necessary equipment 
in a command-and-control structure. Yet, despite its financial 
advantages, mine-risk education suffers from a high degree of 
professional criticism. 
In the context of Sudan, the majority of funding for mine action 
came from the budget for the UN peacekeeping mission, which from 
2005 through the first half of 2011 was the UN’s largest in its history. 
For the UN, mine action was a prerequisite for other humanitarian 
efforts: safe passage across the country’s major routes and the ability 
to build infrastructure require mines/ERW be cleared. For traditional 
donor nations such as the United States, Norway, and Italy, funding 
mine action was part of a country’s support for humanitarian concerns 
and its foreign policy as well as a means of reaching a policy goal: 
regional stability, supporting a strategic ally (Norway has been long 
committed to South Sudan as it has struggled against violent 
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oppression from the North), and/or maintaining a historical interest in 
a region (e.g., Italy’s interest in eastern Sudan is due in part to the 
proximity of Eritrea and Ethiopia, former Italian colonies). 
Mine action in Sudan thus supports the point Sudan scholar 
Douglas Johnson and many others have made: “the direct involvement 
of UN agencies and other NGOs in the support of development projects 
and provision of services formerly the responsibility of the civil 
administration further distanced the government from its citizenry.”46 
Mine action exacerbates this abdication, in part, by choosing to avoid 
addressing a central dilemma in post-civil war Sudan: “[international 
agencies] are called upon to alleviate the effects of the disaster-
producing activities of their major counterparts: the government of the 
Sudan and the Southern [independence] movements.”47 The North and 
South claim they cannot afford large-scale mine action, and 
consequently almost all mine action is funded by international donors: 
Canada, the European Union, France, India, Italy, Japan, Norway, 
Qatar, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United Nations, and United 
States have collectively given hundreds of millions of dollars. Such 
outside intervention has the unintentional effect of hindering the 
North and South from truly coming to terms with their legacy of 
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47 Ibid., 145. 
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conflict, as outsiders take on the task of clearing mines/ERW rather 
than the Sudanese militaries responsible for those explosive remnants 
of war. Thus, as Johnson sadly notes, “the pattern of the war indicates 
that resource depletion and economic subjugation are the objectives of 
war, not just its incidental consequences.”48 The material and social 
consequences of mines/ERW – driving people from their homes and 
lands and preventing basic livelihood practices – are painful 
illustrations of Johnson’s point. 
Arguably the most cited work on mines/ERW is Mike Croll’s 
1998 The History of Landmines, revised and republished in 2008 as 
Landmines in War and Peace: From their Origin to Present Day.49 Like 
many others involved in clearance, Croll is a former British Army 
Bomb Disposal Officer who used his training and experience to move 
into humanitarian demining. Before discussing Croll’s main argument 
in his text, it is worth noting his previous career handling explosives 
for a military. I discuss this issue in greater depth below, but Croll is 
emblematic of many of the mine clearance professionals in Sudan (and 
elsewhere) who draw on their military experience to establish their 
expertise in humanitarian mine action. There are indeed clearance 
professionals who do not have military engineering backgrounds, but 
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their training and qualifications follow narrowly prescribed 
requirements for explosive ordnance disposal certifications. Unlike 
Steven Epstein’s AIDS activists who developed their own lay expertise 
to address the issues they thought established authorities and experts 
were incapable of handling, mine clearance experts have largely 
remained self-selecting, with few outside the profession seeking 
entry.50  
Yet at the same time, Croll addresses a long held point about 
clearance, and less directly, mine action as a whole: mines/ERW are a 
horror for an individual while less so for the globe. In other words, 
there are not very many mine/ERW survivors/victims relative to the 
world’s population.51 A ready anecdote within the mine action world is 
that roads are more dangerous than minefields in that there are many 
more traffic accidents than there are mine/ERW accidents. By 
extension, other issues facing mine-impacted countries – poverty, 
disease, maternal and infant mortality, etc. – are more pressing than 
mine action. This disjuncture between actual deaths and injuries 
versus media and political attention thus raises the obvious question: 
“so why does mine action attract proportionately so much more 
                                                 
50 Steven Epstein, Impure Science: AIDS, Activism, and the Politics of Knowledge 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996). 
51 Croll, Landmines in War and Peace, 155–156. 
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money?”52 Croll points to three factors: the West/global North (who 
constitute the majority of the international aid community) feels guilt 
for being a source of mines; the intense shock that images of 
mine/ERW victims produce; and the attention of high profile 
personalities and celebrities that propagate such shock.53 
The ICBL and its supporters offer a less cynical account for the 
general success of its work, both banning landmines and supporting 
mine action efforts like mine-risk education. Such success is the result 
of “global civil society” taking a strong stance on what has been 
successfully framed as a moral issue: clearing the explosive remnants 
of war that threaten innocent civilians when the militaries that lay 
mines and produce ERW fail to do so on their own accord. 
 
Research Questions and Supporting Frameworks 
I situate my dissertation within the two initially parallel and 
eventually intersecting histories of modern Sudan and professional 
                                                 
52 Ibid., 156. 
53 The 2004 edited volume Landmines and Human Security has forewards by Her 
Majesty Queen Noor of Jordan, The Honorable Lloyd Axworthy (a former Foreign 
Affairs Minister of Canada who led the mine-ban movement), Lady Heather Mills 
McCartney and Sir Paul McCartney, and U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (a longtime 
advocate against landmines). The 2008 edited volume Banning Landmines includes a 
foreward from Archbishop Desmond Tutu. The most famous advocate for the Mine 
Ban Treaty, however, remains Princess Diana. See Richard A. Matthew, Bryan 
McDonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford, Landmines and Human Security: 
International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2004); Jody Williams, Stephen Goose, and Mary Wareham, eds., Banning 
Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2008). 
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mine action to address two questions: What technologies does UNMAO 
– as the focal point for all mine action activities in Sudan – utilize to 
understand and manage Sudan’s contaminated landscapes? How do 
mine action groups use these technologies in practice and on the 
ground? The choice of technologies has consequences for how 
mine/ERW clearance is conducted and which groups have the power 
to impart their vision for how the post-conflict environment should be 
rebuilt and developed. These questions speak to the issues of trust 
and expertise through technologies, both material and social, which 
are centrally relevant in science and technology studies.54  
Moreover, what tensions arise between “local” and “expert” 
understandings of mines/ERW? It is not just so-called experts who 
understand mines/ERW: “people who have lived with mines for a long 
time possess considerable knowledge of landmines and the risks they 
pose. When people take risks, it is not out of negligence or stupidity 
but out of a considered assessment.”55 That is to say, local in the 
sense of being particular to one specific region or community can in 
some ways convey one type of mine/ERW knowledge. There are 
                                                 
54 For two noteworthy texts on trust and expertise, see Theodore Porter, Trust in 
Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995); Sergio Sismondo, “Science and Technology Studies and an 
Engaged Program,” in The Handbood of Science and Technology Studies, ed. Edward 
Hackett et al., 3rd ed. (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008), 13–33. 
55 Kristian Berg Harpviken, “The Future of Humanitarian Mine Action: Introduction,” 
Third World Quarterly 24, no. 5 (October 2003): 779. 
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differences, however, in the types of understandings “experts” and 
local communities develop about mines/ERW. For local communities, 
Mine Ban Treaty activists, and policymakers who decide to allocate 
foreign aid for mine action, mines/ERW become “black-boxed”56 and 
opaque objects, in both material and metaphorical senses. For these 
groups, the difference between one type of mine and another is 
meaningless so long as both pose a threat to life and livelihood. Yet, 
such a difference, for example, between an Iranian copy of an Israeli 
No. 4 antipersonnel landmine and a Russian TM-57 antitank mine is, 
however significant for the mine clearance team tasked by the UN 
Mine Action Office to remove both types of mines in a contaminated 
area. As I will discuss in chapter two, some mine action groups will 
selectively “blackbox” mines/ERW in their discourse with target 
audiences as an exercise of power through “expertise” demonstrated 
with a variety of technologies. This raises the question, then, of 
whether the affordances of the technologies employed in mine action- 
as well as the arguments deployed about these technologies – are 
sufficient to win assent from those who are intended to be the 
recipients of the technologies.  
To unpack and delineate such issues, I utilize Michelle Murphy’s 
                                                 
56 Bruno Latour, “A Collective of Humans and Nonhumans: Following Daedalus’s 
Labyrinth,” in Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), 183. 
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concept of a regime of (im)perceptibility.57 As noted earlier, Murphy 
defines such a regime as “the way a discipline or epistemological 
tradition perceives and does not perceive the world.” The conjunction 
of perceiving and not perceiving rests on the fact that defining what is 
perceptible and “real” necessarily dictates what is imperceptible and 
“unreal” (hence the usage of “(im).”) In articulating the regimes of 
perceptibility of women workers in postwar office buildings, scientific 
experts, and others, Murphy pays particular attention to historical and 
material interactions within specific environments by her various 
actors, framing the “arrangement of discourses, objects, practices, and 
subject positions that work together within a particular discipline or 
knowledge tradition” as an assemblage that creates a regime of 
perceptibility.  
According to Murphy, not only is the way in which social groups 
view things and phenomena heterogeneous, but what those groups 
reconcile is equally multiplicitious, “composed of many histories, of 
‘ands,’ that link in ways intended and unintended, drawing out some 
attributes and not others, thereby setting the conditions of possibility” 
for what is observed.”58 This is Murphy’s expansion of earlier work in 
the history and philosophy of science which focused on historical 
                                                 
57 Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, 10. 
58 Ibid., 14. 
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ontology: how objects of technoscientific inquiry became recognizable 
in contingent contexts. Murphy’s expansion moves beyond descriptive 
and historical levels of analysis into contemporary politics and 
activism. 
 Thus, in a similar vein, there are thematic similarities between 
Murphy’s chronicling of women workers contending with scientific 
experts about chemical exposures and Sudanese and foreigners 
struggling to clear hidden mines/ERW as rapidly and cost-effectively 
as possible. In Sudan, my actors work to make mines/ERW not just 
visible to human eyes but also a concept that other people, experts 
and laity alike, can define and understand in their own ways.59 
A key element of regimes of perceptibility that is readily 
applicable to this dissertation is Murphy’s attentiveness to materiality 
and bringing material matter into being, both of which are deliberate 
exercises of power. Such attentiveness to material things is neither a 
rejection of social construction nor a move to essentialize an object’s 
qualities. Rather, it is Murphy’s emphasis that power’s effects emerge 
from how individuals and groups organize “objects, actions, and 
subjects” and not just through the “realm of the discursive.”60 
Moreover, “regimes of perceptibility” accentuates the tension in what 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 5. 
60 Ibid., 181. 
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different actors see and do not – or cannot – see within a given 
physical and historical context. 
I draw on Murphy’s scholarship to articulate two primary 
regimes of perceptibility at work across mine action in Sudan: one I 
term the “clearance-oriented regime” and the other the “activist-
oriented regime.” The clearance-oriented regime is rooted in mine 
action’s early history and approach of military techniques to clear 
mines/ERW in combat or wartime that were then applied to 
humanitarian efforts to remove mines/ERW that threaten civilians 
post-conflict. Clearance-oriented actors generally valorize “technical” 
interventions, which they define as involving technologies like metal 
detectors and armored machinery, as the only effective way to address 
mines/ERW. The activist-oriented regime emerges from mine action’s 
later emergence as a global advocacy movement in the 1990s. Activist-
oriented actors focus less on actual mines/ERW in the ground and 
more on the social and economic impacts these explosives may have 
on people by being present in the land people use. 
Actors working in both regimes situate themselves squarely 
within the field of mine action, but there is a critical distinction in how 
they relate to and utilize local knowledge in producing broader 
knowledge about mines/ERW. The activist-oriented regime readily 
black-boxes mines/ERW, in that mines/ERW are simplistically 
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reduced to being threats to be avoided. The specifications, history, and 
complexities inherent to these explosives remain unspoken and 
avoided, and mine action groups under this regime successfully 
engage with local Sudanese communities to do the same. On the other 
hand, mine action work under the clearance-oriented regime does not 
black-box the mines/ERW that may be present in the environment, as 
the types, location, and knowable lifespan of mines/ERW are all 
relevant to their removal and destruction. Conversely, local knowledge 
about mines/ERW perceived to be in the area is taken by clearance-
oriented actors is far less useful than what these actors discern for 
themselves about the mines/ERW in the ground. 
Indeed, science and technology studies scholars have long been 
attentive to how material objects – human created or not –become 
objects of inquiry and the focus of attention. In one particularly 
illustrative example, Bruno Latour analyzes successive steps in the 
construction of technoscientific knowledge during a field expedition in 
the Amazon by composing what he termed a “photo-philosophical 
montage.”61 The following passage captures Latour’s argument: 
In the naturalist’s collection, things happen to plants that have 
never occurred since the dawn of the world. The plants find 
themselves detached, separated, preserved, classified, and 
tagged. They are then reassembled, reunited, redistributed 
according to entirely new principles that depend on the 
                                                 
61 Bruno Latour, “The ‘Pedofil’ of Boa Vista: A Photo-Philosophical Montage,” 
Common Knowledge 4, no. 1 (1995): 145–187. 
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researcher, on botany that has been standardized for centuries, 
and on the institution that shelters them, but they no longer 
grow as they did in the great forest. The botanist learns new 
things and she is transformed accordingly, but the plants are 
transformed also. From this point of view, there is no difference 
between observation and experience: both are constructions.62 
 
At first glance, the contexts of pedology – soil study – and mine action 
may have only cursory similarities in dealing with the ground beneath 
our feet. Yet, the ways that mine action actors survey communities 
and their land, organize standardized reports removed from their local 
contexts, and transform these data into charts and graphs in 
PowerPoint slideshows all reflect the litany of constructions that 
Latour lists. Upon all of these activities and choices made by mine 
action actors and organizations, “the most incomprehensible thing in 
the world would be for the [perceived mine] pattern [or any 
contaminated area] to remain incomprehensible after such 
rearrangements.”63 In other words, Sudan’s contaminated landscapes 
are orderly to those who create such an order, and such ordering is 
done in specific ways. Moreover, the landscape makes sense because 
surveyors and other mine action officials have organized it as to make 
it “legible”64 and in accordance with a particular worldview and 
perspective. 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 154–155. 
63 Ibid., 167. 
64 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 2–3. 
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Not surprisingly, constructing technoscientific knowledge about 
a “new” landscape inevitably produces new politics that come up 
against existing political realities. This is especially true in a 
postcolonial nation with a large multinational peacekeeping presence 
within its borders. Richard Rottenburg provides a powerful illustration 
of such realities emerging from Sudan’s recent history and current 
situation in what he terms a “therapeutic domination hypothesis.” The 
hypothesis draws on three features of contemporary geopolitics which 
Rottenburg identifies as follows: 
change in the objects and functions of ‘neoliberal’ governance; 
the rise of so-called ‘dysfunctional’ states on the African 
continent and the internal forms of violent conflict that have 
been caused by and have caused their so-called ‘failure’…and 
the world-wide success of universalist discourses of human 
rights, now with specific foci on public health and welfare.65 
 
These changes in geopolitics and the setting in which countries and 
institutions interact creates a space for a field like mine action to 
become established in a country like Sudan. These features are in 
descending order of prominence in mine action discourse, and 
following the therapeutic domination hypothesis precede how mine 
action discourse frames people – in this case, Sudanese civilians – 
                                                 
65 S. Seth, “Putting Knowledge in Its Place: Science, Colonialism, and the 
Postcolonial,” Postcolonial Studies 12, no. 4 (2009): 382; Richard Rottenburg, “Social 
and Public Experiments and New Figurations of Science and Politics in Postcolonial 
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primarily as victims of war who require an outsider’s urgent rescue.66 
Rottenburg’s point on universalist discourses of human rights is 
instantiated in Sudan’s contaminated landscapes in the 
standardization of impacted communities through mine action’s 
technologies. Yet the human rights discourse belies the notion some 
mine action actors from affluent nations hold that Sudan’s disastrous 
civil wars justify further international intervention. What qualifies 
some expatriate mine action actors to hold management positions in 
both offices and field sites is a tacit understanding that mine action 
experience elsewhere is applicable to Sudan. In other words, these 
actors maintain that the technical knowledge of clearing mines/ERW 
can travel as seamlessly as a light blue UN passport. Such a claim 
poses the question, though, of how readily such technical knowledge is 
taken up in different contexts. 
 Rottenburg’s point on how emergencies can entail exceptions is 
one emphasized by other global anthropologists, notably Didier Fassin 
and Mariella Pandolfi. They make the case that 
during the 1970s and 1980s…a new paradigm was gradually 
being put in place, a paradigm that asserted the right to 
intervene – or at least allowed it to prevail over the respect of 
sovereignty – in the name of lives to be saved and populations to 
be protected. This paradigm is what we propose to call the 
‘military and humanitarian government’ of the world. Thus, 
contemporary interventionism is new in that it is legitimized in 
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terms of a moral obligation, rather than a political principle – or 
more precisely (for morality has always had a place in the 
justification of war), it is new in that the politics of military 
intervention are now played out in the name of humanitarian 
morality.67 
 
While Fassin and Pandolfi use examples such as the Indian-Pakistani 
conflict and the creation of Bangladesh as well as NATO intervention 
in Kosovo to make their argument, their point has applicability to the 
UN Mission in Sudan and its constitutive UN Mine Action Office. The 
government of Sudan has largely been successful at preventing other 
countries and the UN from waging its campaign against individuals 
and groups it deems to be enemies. While UNMIS was indeed staffed 
with 10,000 peacekeeping soldiers from across the world, the mission 
has never acted as forceful deterrent. No external power held a gun to 
a north Sudanese soldier. There has never been a no-fly zone created 
to stop the north’s aerial bombers (which are deliberately painted the 
same shade of white as the planes the UN uses for food drops). On one 
hand, the legacies of colonialism and foreign interventions partly 
motivate the government’s resistance efforts. At the same time, the 
government of Sudan does not want its violent, iron-fisted suppression 
challenged or impeded. Such considerations along with the perceived 
threat and harm of mines/ERW brings about the fact that “of course, 
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aid workers on the ground often know that more is involved and are 
often aware that immediate emergencies have histories…nonetheless, 
the very idea of the emergency emphasizes the immediacy of each 
occurrence and derives a significant part of its capacity to command 
attention and mobilize resources from this sense of immediacy.”68 
 STS and postcolonial scholars are attentive to such “functional” 
ahistoricity, and as historian of science Suman Seth notes 
representations of the (West’s) past are crucial to development 
discourse, for they prove that ‘progress has, in fact, taken place.’ 
The ‘developed’ West, that is, has been where ‘underdeveloped’ 
nations are now and hence is the source of information on how 
to proceed to a developed future. That past, however, is almost 
always put forward as a depoliticised one, presented ‘in the 
‘‘measured tones’’ of the ‘‘stylized facts’’ of economic abstraction.’ 
Yet the very political present of development’s current effects 
serves to open up for inspection the violence that made the 
West’s development possible at all.69 
 
There is indeed a strong current of the global West/North’s 
representation of itself to Sudan in mine action. Mine action actors 
tend to tell stories to themselves and lay audiences along these lines: 
“Look at Europe after World War II. The whole place was littered with 
mines and unexploded ordnance. But they focused on cleaning it up 
and got most of the job done.” What is not mentioned, however, is that 
much of the clearance in Europe was done by forced prisoner of war 
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labor. Moreover, despite the hundreds of millions of mines deployed 
and subsequently cleared over vast amounts of land, “perhaps the 
most surprising aspect was that the post-war demining experience did 
not result in the development of more efficient equipment or 
procedures.”70 
At the same time, many mine-action actors cite Europe as proof 
against the mine-free standard; that is, Sudan cannot reasonably 
expect to be mine-free if countries in western Europe still periodically 
experience mine/ERW accidents. If western Europe is still contending 
with mines/ERW more than half a century postwar, Sudan will have to 
find ways to manage its own mines/ERW in the decades to come as no 
donor nation will provide 50 years of foreign assistance to Sudan. 
Moreover, through local law enforcement and military Europe has the 
standing capacity to defuse situations of mines/ERW being uncovered, 
a capacity that Sudan lacks but is ostensibly “developing” with 
international/foreign assistance. Seth’s conclusion that “new forms of 
unequal power-knowledge are co-produced…(in) international ‘crises’ 
in health and environment” 71 points to an opening to examine the 
regimes of perceptibility that facilitate such production of power. 
 
                                                 
70 Sadly, this historical point contrasts with the fact that “considerable investment 
was poured into the development of new generations of mines incorporating the 
latest technology,” Croll, Landmines in War and Peace, 100. 
71 Seth, “Putting Knowledge in Its Place,” 379–380. 
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Methods and Nota Bene 
 I conducted the research that forms the basis of this dissertation 
as a participant observer with the United Nations Mine Action Office in 
Sudan from November 2010 through May 2011. Following an initial 
visit to Sudan in October 2009, I approached the UN Mine Action 
Service office in New York City with my dissertation proposal in early 
2010, and they were sufficiently interested in what I wanted to study 
to offer logistical support (all research expenses were supported by 
other sources, primarily the National Science Foundation). I 
experienced a considerable amount of bureaucratic delay between 
reaching an agreement with the UN Mine Action Service and actually 
arriving in Sudan, although the UN was ultimately able to facilitate 
obtaining an entry visa into Sudan and a residence permit from the 
Sudanese government once I was in the country. 
Before departing for Sudan, I conducted interviews with mine 
action officials at their offices in the United States and Europe and at 
two international mine action symposia. In addition to the interviews 
themselves, many of the people I interviewed directed me to important 
mine action documents and literature. This material not only helped 
me situate the interviewees but also partially prepared me for my time 
with the UN Mission in Sudan.72  
                                                 
72 Upon my return from Sudan and before returning to Cornell, I spent 14 weeks as 
an intern at the U.S. State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. 
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Once “on the ground,” an official affiliation with the UN provided 
me with a UN identification badge, driver’s license, and access to a 
Land Cruiser. Additionally, I had logistical and emergency support and 
could travel around the country to spend time near and in minefields 
and dangerous areas without having to apply for travel permits from 
the Sudanese government (the government of Sudan required foreign 
nationals not affiliated with the UN to secure permits to move across 
the country). I also spent a significant amount of time assisting with 
various desk operations and used these opportunities to engage with 
national and expatriate UN Mine Action Office staff. 
In exchange for UNMAO’s access and support, I assisted with 
some of the office’s operations, both in the headquarters office in 
Khartoum and in the field offices across the country. While some of 
the tasks I completed were administrative (e.g. compiling information 
for record keeping), others were more “practical,” such as assisting 
quality assurance monitoring of clearance and mine-risk education 
organizations and supporting mine/ERW accident investigations. 
Throughout my time in Sudan, I was subject to UN curfews (no 
                                                                                                                                            
This office is the U.S. government’s primary point of contact for mine action, 
providing nearly US$2 billion since 1993 for mine/ERW clearance, mine-risk 
education, victims assistance, and physical security and stockpile management of 
foreign governments’ arsenals. While I did not work directly on Sudan as an intern 
(the American financial contribution to Sudan’s overall mine action efforts is a 
relatively small percentage, and the office’s staffing requirements were in a period of 
transition), the internship was an immensely positive experience that illustrated the 
paradox of the current U.S. position of not signing the Mine Ban Treaty while still 
being a globally leading donor nation. 
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travel after sunset and limited overnight stays in the field) and security 
restrictions (all travel must be pre-authorized, and no access to Darfur 
and Abyei under UN security regulations because of the volatile 
situation of armed groups active in those areas and periodic attacks 
on UN and NGO personnel). Once in the country, for better and for 
worse, it was clear to almost everyone I encountered that I was a part 
of the peacekeeping mission, which arguably changed how others 
interacted with me. During the six-year Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement period from 2005 to July 2011, the UN peacekeeping 
mission was staffed with thousands of international civilians. On one 
encounter with a landmine survivor, my UN identity produced a strong 
negative reaction, as the survivor perceived all UN staff to be aligned 
with Northern Sudanese national authorities (the UN’s peacekeeping 
mission in the country required formal permission from the 
government of Sudan). 
In this dissertation, I use “UN” and “UNMAO” seemingly 
interchangeably. UNMAO is clearly part of the UN, but there are times 
when the office’s actions and decisions are not so much a decision by 
the whole United Nations as it is by one office. While UN decisions 
affect UNMAO, the converse is not always the case, even though 
UNMAO ostensibly represents the UN. Some of the office’s actions as a 
specific mine action organization are limited to mine action and not all 
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of the UN’s activities and domains of engagement. 
 Photographs are a key component of my dissertation, and I was 
consistently aware of my (invisible) presence within the space of action 
being represented. STS has a long and rich tradition recognizing and 
deconstructing that such photographs enable virtual witnessing,73 at 
the expense of allowing the people in the images to protest or speak. I 
rely on my field experiences and interactions with those represented 
that what I present is ultimately consistent with my actors. 
 
A road map 
 I structure my dissertation by focusing on three key mine action 
efforts: socio-economic surveying, mine-risk education, and clearance. 
While each of these chapters makes a specific point about a particular 
mine action activity, they also speak to the larger argument about how 
mine action groups work within the activist-oriented or clearance-
oriented regime of perceptibility which subsequently establishes what 
these groups see and do not see as a part of their efforts in Sudan’s 
contaminated landscapes. 
In chapter one, I discuss two different approaches and 
methodologies for surveying mine/ERW-affected areas which are a 
source of conflict between different mine action organizations. Beyond 
                                                 
73 Steven Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance: Robert Boyle’s Literary Technology,” 
Social Studies of Science 14, no. 4 (November 1, 1984): 481 –520. 
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a difference of expert judgments, these different approaches emerged 
from divergent histories within the establishment of mine action. 
I further articulate in chapter two how the clearance-oriented 
regime actively maintains and circumscribes others by drawing on its 
position of authority and laying claim to mine action expertise. The 
case of mine-risk education organizations and their efforts illustrates 
how expertise, authority, and power are created and dynamic, not 
inherent and static. 
Chapter three centers on mine/ERW clearance, the largest 
dimension of mine action, in terms of longest history, amount of 
funds, and attention within and outside the field. By the way clearance 
organizations and oriented actors are able to normalize accidents, I 
show that the regime of perceptibility for this community can obscure 
contingencies and nature’s agency. 
The conclusion looks at the state of the Sudans after South 
Sudan’s independence and the resumption of hostilities between the 
North and South shortly after the latter’s independence in July 2011. 
To varying degrees, mine action activities continue across the two 
countries, and I close with what this dissertation offers to STS and 
policy and decision makers who work in mine action. 
In their now classic text Leviathan and the Air-Pump, Steven 
Shapin and Simon Schaffer made the point that in analyzing 
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competing and distinct knowledge claims, “we need to play the 
stranger, not to be the stranger” (emphasis in original).74 In playing a 
stranger and seeking to understand the various interactions between 
relevant social groups and consequences of those interactions, it is my 
goal to present clearly an account of complex and multifaceted actors. 
Using regimes of perceptibility as a conceptual tool allows me to trace 
how seemingly conflicting aspects of mine action co-exist. This tool 
counters the potential to cast my actors in black and white one-
dimensional terms and enables me to articulate how actors change 
over time, even short periods.75 
 
                                                 
74 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
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CHAPTER 1: SURVEYING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS  
OF MINES/ERW 
 
“In sum, the role of survey is perhaps the most challenging and 
most critically debated aspect of mine action.”1 
 
Introduction 
Given the histories of Sudan and mine action, the 2002 ceasefire 
between the North and South presented the mine action community – 
and the international humanitarian community writ large – with an 
opportunity for access. A respite in one of the most infamous conflicts 
on the African continent was not to be missed, and UN-funded mine 
clearance commenced almost immediately. The response by the mine 
action community reflects a pattern common to other humanitarian 
endeavors in which many of the practitioners in the field see the 
priorities of action and planning as structurally opposed: “do you want 
to talk, or do you want to do something about it?” Moreover, mine 
action in Sudan and elsewhere has largely conducted “rapid response” 
clearance, while simultaneously or subsequently conducting detailed 
surveys. 
Such “rapid responses” were a part of the UN’s first mine action 
efforts in Sudan which prioritized clearing roads of mines/ERW to 
                                                 
1 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of the Role of 
Survey in Mine Action (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
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facilitate humanitarian aid delivery. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement moved Sudan from temporary ceasefire to peace and 
simultaneously initiated the UN’s peacekeeping Mission in Sudan with 
a key part of the mission being the establishment of the UN Mine 
Action Office (UNMAO).  
One of the new office’s first efforts was to contract a nationwide 
Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) from the Survey Action Center, a major 
American-based NGO in mine action based in Takoma Park, Maryland. 
A LIS is a survey of communities in a country which report whether 
mines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) affect their lives and 
livelihoods by counting the number of recent victims and noting 
blocked access to socio-economic resources such as water, farmland, 
or schools. Survey Action Center had conducted 16 other LIS’s of 
mine/ERW-affected countries between 1999 and 2005. 
After the “emergency phase” mode of mine action operations in 
Sudan between 2002-2005 before formal peace was established, the 
LIS provided an opportunity to measure the extent of the country’s 
mine/ERW contamination. Additionally, the UN used the context of a 
mine/ERW emergency to justify mine/ERW clearance of roads and 
areas known to have had heavy conflict prior to establishing a national 
baseline. Early UN estimates of 500,000 to 2 million mines located 
mostly in the South were overshadowed by the Sudanese government’s 
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claims of 2 to 3 million mines/ERW over 800,000 square kilometers, 
approximately a third of the country’s land area.2 Whether or not the 
UN, mine action organizations, or international donors were persuaded 
by these figures, the need for more information was one concern that 
all stakeholders shared. Such information could facilitate UN 
peacekeeping mission planning as well as provide donors with an idea 
of how much financial support UNMAO would require for its work. 
Unsubstantiated estimates might encourage larger contributions, but 
it could also discourage donors from engaging with an issue they 
deemed to be too large and unfeasible to solve. Thus, there was an 
undefined line between conveying accurately the extent and therefore 
the importance of the mine/ERW problem while being cognizant that 
too large a figure might overwhelm requests to potential donors.3 
                                                 
2 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
1999: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 1999), 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
3 This concern is related to economic concerns of rent-seeking, understood as "all of 
the various ways by which individuals or groups lobby…for taxing, spending and 
regulatory policies that confer financial benefits or other special advantages upon 
them at the expense of the taxpayers or of consumers or of other groups or 
individuals with which the beneficiaries may be in economic competition."  Paul M. 
Johnson, “Rent-seeking Behavior,” A Glossary of Political Economy Terms, 2005, 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/rent-seeking_behavior. For a discussion 
of rent-seeking in mine action, see Bolton, Foreign Aid and Landmine Clearance, 43. 
During the 1990s, the UN overstated – arguably intentionally – figures and 
projections of HIV/AIDS transmission and infection rates in part to generate 
financial support for its efforts. See Craig Timberg and Daniel Halperin, Tinderbox: 
How the West Sparked the AIDS Epidemic and How the World Can Finally Overcome 
It (New Haven: Penguin, 2012), chap. 16. 
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UNMAO had funded international NGOs and commercial firms 
for surveys across Sudan, but these surveys focused only on roads or 
certain regions of the country. The LIS was the only nationwide survey 
conducted and, as I discuss below, was a qualitatively different survey 
from previous efforts. From its initial planning to the management 
team’s departure, the survey began in August 2005 and ended in July 
2009 at cost of US$4.3 million. Despite the fact that UNMAO 
contracted the LIS and had a direct role in the survey process, the 
office and many other mine action groups in Sudan perceive the data 
from the survey as inadequate and problematic at best.4 
I argue in this chapter that the limited acceptance and use of 
the LIS is the result of competing regimes of perceptibility – an activist-
oriented regime and a clearance-oriented regime – which 
simultaneously direct mine action towards divergent end goals. The 
role of surveys in mine action is contested among key stakeholders in 
part because of the perspectives of the various groups that came 
together in mine action’s early history. Whereas early mine action 
focused on expanding military techniques to clear mines for civilian 
                                                 
4 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Guide to Land Release: 
Technical Methods (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining, April 2011). The results of Landmine Impact Surveys have led UNMAO, 
GICHD, and other prominent groups in mine action to codify and adopt a policy of 
“land release” (discussed further in chapter 5). See Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining, A Guide to Land Release: Non-technical Methods, 2nd ed. 
(Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 2008), 
http://www.gichd.org/publications/subject/land-release/a-guide-to-land-release-
non-technical-methods-2. 
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aid, the field later expanded its focus to the communities affected by 
mines. While some advocates of the LIS claim the critiques of the 
survey are the result of limited resources allocated to the survey 
process, I show that the thrust of LIS criticisms is couched in 
competing conceptions of objectivity. This clash emerges from how the 
LIS rests uneasily between two regimes of perceptibility and thus 
comes to represent the tensions between them. 
The survey itself is an explicit quantifying metric by a 
professionalized discipline, and what is being quantified creates 
tension within other parts of mine action and UNMAO. The metrics 
employ number of mines, area of land contaminated, or numbers of 
people and communities impacted. Each of these elements begins a 
path dependency with particular political entailments. In other words, 
the objects and figures of interest in mine action surveys have political 
consequences. Such consequences lead the various groups within the 
mine action community to argue over which of those objects and 
figures ought to be the center of the survey. Geographer Charles 
Mather points to the cadastral politics of surveys in mine action as “an 
attempt to shift decisionmaking and priority setting from local 
methods used by NGOs to ‘objective’ and rational techniques 
championed by UNMAS.”5 In this shifting process, the “local” opposes 
                                                 
5 C Mather, “Maps, Measurements, and Landmines: The Global Landmines Crisis 
and the Politics of Development,” Environment and Planning A 34 (2002): 239–240. 
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“objectivity” which has a universal appeal evident to all except those 
living with mine/ERW contamination.  The LIS’s place in mine action 
reveals a contestation among mine action stakeholders over what 
kinds of objectivity are necessary for their respective visions of effective 
mine action. 
In this chapter, I develop the terms “activist-oriented regime” 
and “clearance-oriented regime” to distinguish between different 
approaches to mine action. The “activist-oriented regime” centers on 
actors whose involvement in mine action emerged from the period in 
the 1990s when they organized to advocate for the Mine Ban Treaty. I 
designate them as “activist-oriented” because of their self-described 
activism, which eventually led to nation states to acquiesce to their 
calls for a landmine ban. “Clearance-oriented regime” refers to the way 
some actors frame mine/ERW issues based on their direct experience 
on the ground clearing these explosives and/or managing such 
operations. While these terms are blunt and inevitably reductionistic, 
they nonetheless capture the different histories of mine action and 
how such histories form an assemblage to shape the different regimes 
of perceptibility at work. In this chapter, I trace the development of 
surveys in mine action, describe the LIS process in Sudan, and 
analyze the LIS results from the perspective of the two different 
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regimes in order to highlight what each regime can perceive and 
subsequently respond to across the environment. 
 
An Overview of Impact Surveying 
“Following the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty in Ottawa in 
December 1997, it became very clear that the scope and impact of the 
worldwide landmine problem needed to be defined and quantified.”6 
 
 Throughout the growth of mine action as a large-scale 
humanitarian aid effort, the development of surveying and surveying 
technologies took different forms in response to contingencies such as 
geographical location, organizations’ institutional practices, number of 
personnel and a wide range of other factors, all shaping the history of 
mine action surveying. What initially began with two British NGOs 
established by former military personnel in Afghanistan grew to 
include several other organizations conducting mine action operations 
across the world. Surveying in Sudan began 15 years into the 
development of global mine action standards and practices, and I will 
delineate the salient ones here. 
 When mine action began in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, the 
first steps of removing and clearing mines/ERW from a suspected or 
known contaminated area were a well-intentioned response to a 
dangerous situation. Shortly after clearance activities began, however, 
                                                 
6 Survey Action Center, “About Us - Overview,” 2004, http://www.sac-
na.org/sac_overview.html. 
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conducting surveys to define which areas needed to be cleared of 
mines/ERW became a distinct activity within mine action. In other 
words, the emergence of survey as a standard part of mine action 
followed from clearance being established as the first mine action 
activity and the subsequent prioritization of clearance as a mine action 
intervention. 
It would not be until March 1997, when the United Nations 
issued the first International Standards for Humanitarian Mine 
Clearance Operations, that survey (along with other components of 
mine/ERW clearance) became codified and distinguished between 
different levels of survey: Level One (general) survey; Level Two 
(technical) survey; and Level Three (completion) survey. A Level One 
survey establishes general locations of suspected or mined areas by 
interviewing the local population. A Level Two survey delineates the 
perimeter of minefields using clearance technologies (viz. human 
deminers, mine detection dogs, or armored machines that plough the 
ground, all discussed in further detail in chapter 3). A Level Three 
survey recorded the precise areas that clearance teams cleared, and 
unlike the first two levels, this survey is retrospective in nature. 
 These surveys focused on finding mines/ERW to facilitate 
assessments of how mine/ERW-contaminated a country was. Prior to 
Landmine Impact Surveys becoming established in mine action, three 
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notable surveys made an explicit alternative effort to examine how 
mines/ERW not only threaten people’s bodies but their lives and 
livelihoods as well. These surveys were Mines Advisory Group’s The 
Report of the Afghanistan Mine Survey (1991), Handicap 
International’s Living with UXO in Laos (1997), and Afghanistan’s 
Mine Clearance Planning Agency and UN Office for the Coordinator of 
Humanitarian Affairs’ Socio-Economic Impact Study of Landmines & 
Mine Action (1999).  
The efforts of mine action surveyors in the 1990s to focus on 
socio-economic impacts drew from survey approaches utilized in rural 
community development and public health rapid assessments in the 
1980s, assessments that hitherto had largely escaped the attention of 
early mine action professionals.7 One critical result of mine action 
surveyors drawing from these other survey methodologies is that mine 
action professionals expanded their perception of mines/ERW. The 
sheer quantity of mines/ERW did not necessarily positively correlate 
with or directly cause negative impacts on a community. One key 
implication was that helping the greatest number of people could 
trump clearing the most mines. A more general point was the focus of 
these surveys shifted from a technical perspective that focused on 
                                                 
7 For a detailed history of surveying in mine action see Geneva International Centre 
for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of the Role of Survey in Mine Action, 
particularly chapter 1. 
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material mines/ERW to a socio-technical perspective that included the 
community and environment surrounding the explosive objects. This 
is not to imply that one approach to mine action is more 
“humanitarian” than the other, but instead illustrates how seemingly 
common terminology and invocation of a widely recognized goal of 
“surveying” requires an active constructive effort towards definition 
and enactment of exactly what work is done. 
Perhaps with some degree of irony, these earlier rapid 
assessments grew from critiques of large quantitative surveys that 
sought precise information that ultimately failed to provide surveyors 
with actionable information. Such large quantitative surveys were 
extrapolated from field visits that obtained superficial information from 
individuals who were readily available and willing to talk with 
outsiders. While such informants may make the task of surveying 
easier, they offer a very limited and particular perspective. 
Furthermore, such surveys are also susceptible to other “distortions,” 
which surveyors and standard-setters acknowledge, such as the limits 
of knowledge from the local community, which may be newly resettled, 
and group interactions where existing power structures mediate the 
given knowledge. Moreover, there is also the possibility of an 
affirmation bias: participants may provide answers they think 
surveyors want to hear. The additional irony is that all of these 
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concerns are potentially applicable to the socio-economic mine action 
surveys which were introduced later. 
 While socio-economic impact surveys, and consequently, socio-
economic impacts were not the primary focus of mine action during 
the field’s formative stages, the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 brought 
mine/ERW-affected communities into the forefront of mine action. The 
goal of the treaty was not just to clear mines/ERW that pose a hazard 
to people, but to help people by clearing mines/ERW. In other words, 
not all minefields impact people, and not all mines have the same level 
of impact. Developing this point even further, a mine need not be 
physically present to affect an individual or community’s behavior. If 
someone or a group of people think mines/ERW are present in an 
area, there is the high probability that the land will be avoided and lie 
unused. 
 To quantify which people, where, and how many were being 
affected by landmines, UNMAS, GICHD, and several of the early 
humanitarian NGOs with mines/ERW experience formed the Survey 
Working Group (SWG) in May 1998. SWG’s objective is “to facilitate 
the prioritizing of human, material and financial resources supporting 
humanitarian mine action at the national, regional and global level 
through the completion of Level One Mine/UXO Survey.”8 SWG 
                                                 
8 Landmine Monitor, Global Landmine Survey Programme, 1999, http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/1999/appendices/gls.html. 
  67
initially set out to conduct Level One surveys in other known 
mine/ERW affected countries; however, SWG felt that the recent shifts 
towards socio-economic impacts from the perspective of mine/ERW 
affected communities left Level One surveys and their focus on 
generalized descriptions of mine/ERW locations “antiquated.”9 Thus 
began SWG’s efforts to develop a new type of mine action survey that 
would eventually be spearheaded and overseen by the Survey Action 
Center. 
 To establish the Landmine Impact Survey as an instrument for 
mine action information gathering, SWG established and approved a 
series of protocols to conduct the LIS.10 These protocols govern the 
structure and sequence of an LIS in a specific country, and have been 
expanded and modified by SWG over time. It is worth noting the 
variable length of these protocols suggests what dimensions of 
surveying SWG considers most important or least desired to be left to 
individual interpretation and ad-hoc implementation. Of the ten 
protocols in place during the Sudan LIS, eight of them are 
approximately ten pages long. The protocol for data analysis is fifty-
four pages, the majority of which contain an overview, conceptual 
considerations, and an operating manual for how data is to be 
                                                 
9 Robert Eaton Interview by Benjamin Wang, Takoma Park, MD, February 17, 2010. 
10 Survey Action Center, “Resources - LIS Protocols,” accessed March 7, 2010, 
http://www.sac-na.org/resources_lisprotocols.html. 
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analyzed, drawing from examples from completed LISs. The protocol 
for minimum data requirements and questionnaire stretches to one 
hundred forty-two pages, detailing all of the information which LIS 
surveyors must gather. 
This protocol also includes an annotated questionnaire that 
serves as a template for an LIS. The questionnaire is predominantly 
focused on local information and knowledge from interviewed 
communities, only some of which surveyors and team managers can 
verify and cross-reference, such as the economic base of the area or 
the intensity of conflict. Other data will also primarily come from the 
surveyed community itself. In response to other non-mine action 
community surveys, the LIS sought to engage with communities 
regardless of population size. Despite local communities generally 
lacking mine action expertise or an understanding of military strategy, 
LIS protocols instruct surveyors to accept a community’s information 
as likely to be accurate. While surveyors give local communities full 
credibility, the surveyors also recognize the limits of local perspectives 
by using multiple sources such as national and local authorities or 
any existing military records.  
Some mine action actors call such community-based 
information as “non-technical.” Rae McGrath, co-founder of Mines 
Advisory Group, makes this point about Level One surveys, and it is 
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arguably also applicable to the LIS. McGrath begins with terminology 
rejecting the term “survey” in favor of “assessment” for Level One or 
Impact information. The difference is in connotation, and arguably, 
primacy: “it is unfortunate that the Level One process has been termed 
‘survey’, which tends, among some non-specialist circles, to suggest a 
technical content [types of mines/ERW, locations, possible purpose 
during combat, etc.] whereas the emphasis is actually on socio-
economic based assessment [which are based on community impacts 
rather than the material explosive]. The two processes are linked, but 
Level One assessments offer no substantial or reliable prime data for 
the purposes of designing wide scale eradication programmes.”11 
McGrath’s point speaks to a persistent issue within mine action about 
establishing “technical” expertise. “Technical” expertise rests, however, 
on the power to define mines/ERW as either “technical” or “socio-
economic,” and those “experts” who set such definitions put 
“technical” and “socio-economic” rhetorically far apart from each other. 
Even as Survey Action Center developed specific methodologies 
for the LIS – which the organization frames as a professionalizing 
measure to introduce quantification as an appeal to rational 
objectivity12 – the efforts to turn such community-based surveys into a 
                                                 
11 McGrath, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance, 87. 
12 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of the Role of 
Survey in Mine Action, 12. Landmine Impact Surveys have three explicit objectives: 
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technocratic process maintained the shift in surveying from the 
material mines/ERW to the socio-economic impact caused by such 
explosives. At the same time, invoking quantification is a move to 
standardize mine/ERW-affected communities across the world, a move 
necessitated by the tensions arising from the scarcity of resources. 
More specifically, international donors demand a level of efficiency 
with their financial aid and calculating such efficiency requires a 
degree of “universal” quantification.13 
In light of such demands, SAC intended the development of LIS 
protocols and standards to help local communities and be cost-
effective to donors. Yet, such methodologies are inherently active 
exercises of power by mine action organizations. Surveying casts a new 
light on how communities manage the threat and/or presence of 
explosives on their land. Groups like SAC do not necessarily view their 
methodologies as deliberate acts of power. Yet setting standards for 
how communities in other countries are to be classified does 
demonstrate SAC’s ability to structure the survey process with vast 
                                                                                                                                            
“(a) define the scale and socio-economic impact of landmine contamination, (b) 
provide a reliable national database to be used in future mine action planning and 
priority setting to address impact, and (c) establish baseline data for measuring 
overall performance of mine action programmes individually and worldwide.” 
13 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Guide to Mine Action - 
Edition 2010 (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 
2010), 214, http://www.gichd.org/publications/a-guide-to-mine-action. On this 
point, GICHD openly states “in the face of uncertainties arising from inadequate data 
and understanding, key actors such as the major donors and the national 
government are loath to delegate authority to any organisations or subordinates that 
they do not already trust.” 
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implications on the ground. One concrete example is a community 
that reports being highly impacted by mines/ERW, but may not 
necessarily be a high priority for clearance (I discuss in detail how 
“high/low impact” and “high/low priority” are formulated and the 
political implications of such designations in the next section). One 
distinction between a high impact community and a high priority 
community is that a high impact community might have had 
numerous casualties from a bus hitting an antitank mine on a road, 
but such an accident might be framed as exceptional and not 
indicative of a wider problem, and thus viewed by operations as not 
being a high priority. Another distinction between “impact” and 
“priority” emerges from the fact that impact classification is 
independent of population. Thus, a high priority task of clearance in a 
community might affect a greater number of people than a smaller 
community that reports a higher impact. 
This ability to designate a community as high impact or high 
priority rests in part on SAC’s declaration of its authority based on its 
experience and expertise in mine action. However, one of the many 
challenges that emerged in 1999 with the first LIS of Yemen and 
continued through the LIS of Sudan in 2009 (the last LIS completed, 
to date) is keeping communities instead of minefields at the center of 
attention and concern. This shift began an on-going effort to redirect 
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mine action’s focus and institutional aims. But such a shift does not 
come without cost, conflicting opinions, individual or institutional 
resistance. 
 This tension is not lost on mine action groups. Charles Downs, 
an adjunct professor of international public management at New York 
University and consultant to SAC and GICHD, writes in an assessment 
of mine action surveys, “depending on their roles, some stakeholders 
are more interested in some data than others – this is the source of 
many of the current debates and progress regarding mine action 
survey. To meet the different needs of various stakeholders, a national 
programme eventually requires all the information in the various types 
of surveys.”14 
 Despite this call for more mine/ERW information – which might 
be more accurately described as mine/ERW information within 
different contexts – a Landmine Impact Survey, and particularly the 
Sudan Landmine Impact Survey, is laden with the expectation of 
definitively revealing the extent of the country’s mine/ERW 
contamination. An article in the Journal of ERW and Mine Action from 
August 2006 (then called the Journal of Mine Action) describes the 
establishment of the Sudanese National Mine Action Authority. 
Written by Qadeem Khan Tariq, the UN Development Programme–
                                                 
14 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of the Role of 
Survey in Mine Action, 7. 
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Sudan Senior Technical Advisor for Mine-Action Capacity 
Development, the article begins: “The Republic of Sudan is one of 
Africa’s most heavily landmine/explosive-remnants-of-war-affected 
countries. The true extent of the landmine/ERW problem in Sudan 
largely remains unknown as a country-wide Impact Survey has just 
recently been initiated to measure both the scope and impact of the 
situation.”15 Landmine Monitor, the authoritative annual publication 
by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, frames the LIS as 
being almost singularly authoritative, as no other surveys or 
methodologies across multiple mine/ERW-affected countries exist. 
After the Sudan LIS was completed in 2009, the top of the summary 
section in the 2009 Landmine Monitor states: 
Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of 
war (ERW), primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed 
struggle between the government of Sudan and non-state armed 
groups in the South, mainly the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army. A Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 
16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the UN Mine Action 
Office (UNMAS) estimating that total residual contamination 
covered 107 km2.16 
 
The LIS is the only survey listed in the top summary of the 2009 
                                                 
15 Qadeem Khan Tariq, “Sudan Launches National Mine Action Authority,” Journal of 
Mine Action 10, no. 1 (August 2006), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/focus/tariq/tariq.htm. 
16 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2009: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2009), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
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Landmine Monitor entry for Sudan, which is indicative of authority, if 
not the trust, ceded to the LIS by the major annual mine action 
publication. 
In the section on Sudan’s mine/ERW problem, the previous 
year’s edition of Landmine Monitor states: “The precise extent of 
contamination remains unclear, with UN and national authorities 
previously estimating that 19 of 25 Sudanese states were 
contaminated. However, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), which is 
being conducted on a state-by-state basis, and a number of ad hoc 
assessments, have given a better indication of the problem.”17 It is 
worth noting the tension between the discourses of certainty and 
uncertainty: before the LIS’s completion, the level of contamination is 
unknown to a large degree, yet the UN and national authorities 
estimated significant prevalence of mines/ERW. 
 What makes the Landmine Monitor’s acceptance of the authority 
of the Landmine Impact Survey particularly notable is that Landmine 
Monitor is written for both internal and external audiences. Perhaps 
the fact that non-experts will read such publications allows the LIS to 
be cast in such a way to satisfy demands for an answer to “How much 
mine/ERW contamination is there in Sudan?” What is also worth 
                                                 
17 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2008: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2008), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2008&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
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noting is that the Landmine Monitor’s authority derives in part from 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines’s position as the 
unifying activist and advocacy organization in mine action. Landmine 
Monitor’s attentiveness to the LIS is in line with the larger goals of the 
ICBL. Once the LIS was established, Landmine Monitor’s authority 
over knowledge of mine/ERW contamination and impacts deferred to 
the survey. 
Thus, the question “how much mine/ERW contamination is 
there in Sudan” allows for at least two different measurements of 
contamination, and, as discussed above, the LIS attempts to answer 
the question first in terms of communities and then by area. 
Furthermore, the way the LIS can be presented to both internal and 
external audiences exemplifies what Anya Zilberstein terms “empirical 
imprecision.”18 Because the LIS is an attempt to satisfy multiple 
demands and inquiries, the LIS maintains an intentional and 
persistent lack of precision, even given its extensive methodologies and 
protocols. 
In the following section, I describe the processes by which SAC 
and its implementing partners conducted the Sudan LIS. 
 
                                                 
18 Anya Zilberstein, “An Inexact Science: The Natural History of Colonial 
Environments,” in Ways of Knowing, I (presented at the Bringing STS into 
Environmental History, Trondheim, Norway, 2010), 3, http://sts-
eh2010.miljohistorie.net/zilberstein/. 
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Conducting the Landmine Impact Survey 
 
Prior to SAC’s LIS, Sudan Landmine Response, a national NGO, 
conducted what was called a “mini-Landmine Impact Survey” of the 
Nuba Mountains area of South Kordofan state from 2003-2004. While 
the survey did identify communities that self-reported mine/ERW 
impacts, UNMAO did not include the results of the survey in its official 
database, Information Management System for Mine Action. UNMAO’s 
exclusion was because “the data was thought to be rather general” and 
“further area reduction techniques are needed to better define the 
boundaries of a mined area.”19 This reasoning is notable as it points to 
an unstated level of specificity that UNMAO requires in surveys, even if 
those surveys rest on community reported impacts rather than 
mines/ERW and the amount of land over which mines/ERW are 
found. 
In 2003 SAC conducted an advance survey mission after the 
civil war’s ceasefire, during the period when the UN and national 
NGOs were conducting limited mine action activities. The mission 
established preliminary details that could affect the eventual execution 
of the survey, such as the availability of informative contacts, 
navigating dirt roads during annual rains, and other considerations 
                                                 
19 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2006: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2006), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2006&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
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and constraints. Within a year of the January 2005 Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, SAC signed a memorandum of understanding with 
Sudanese and South Sudanese authorities, and by March 2006 SAC 
established its infrastructure and logistics to survey Eastern Equatoria 
state in South Sudan. 
The LIS was slated to survey nineteen of Sudan’s twenty-five 
states; the six excluded states were far from the conflict and thus not 
included (although there are occasional reports of World War II-era 
ERW being found in those states).20 The LIS survey teams for sixteen 
of the nineteen states were contracted from Mines Advisory Group, one 
state was surveyed by Handicap International, and SAC surveyed the 
two remaining states. A state-by-state approach, various organizations 
working in different parts of the country, and donor funding 
mechanisms all contributed to SAC working with multiple 
implementing partners to produce the survey. 
Once SAC established a presence in Sudan, LIS survey teams 
traveled across the country from 2006 through 2009, state by state, to 
determine if communities had a recent mine/ERW victim, if the 
community was aware of mines/ERW on their land, and if community 
members were prevented from accessing natural resources or 
                                                 
20 Upon South Sudanese independence, Sudan was reduced to 17 states. I use 
“state” here simply to refer to a political subdivision (as in the United States), rather 
than invoke a Max Weber or James Scott-type formulation. 
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infrastructure because they believed the land to be unsafe. These 
survey teams were comprised of Sudanese nationals trained in 
interview techniques according to SAC’s protocols; they were not 
deminers and equipped to conduct any actual clearance. Some LIS 
surveyors would later find positions as mine-risk education team 
members (discussed in chapter four). While surveyors were national 
rather than international staff, many came from distinct and distant 
areas from where they were working. With the wide diversity of 
Sudan’s ethnic groups, the socio-cultural differences between the 
surveyors and communities may have been an influencing factor in 
social interactions and subsequent information conveyance, just as it 
is with international staff’s interactions. While “foreign-ness” on the 
part of international expatriates and local communities is expected, I 
was surprised to learn from Sudanese nationals in mine action 
organizations that they experienced a similar level of strangeness in 
their interactions across the country (I provide details of such 
interactions in the next chapter, as some Landmine Impact Survey 
team members later became mine-risk education facilitators). While 
prejudices between Northerners and Southerners may have been the 
most extreme, Sudan’s wide geography is in part a function of colonial 
boundaries that inscribe conflict upon a wide diversity of communities 
and peoples by placing antagonistic groups within the same 
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administrative area. International expatriates were not the only ones 
who found some of Sudan’s people in the hinterlands “strange” and 
“different.” 
When a survey team interviews a group of people in a village, the 
team investigates three issues: 1) if there have been any victims of 
landmines or unexploded ordnance within the past 24 months; 2) 
what types of explosive contamination are present; 3) and what such 
contamination blocks in terms of socio-economic resources, such as 
water sources, pasture, and schools or other institutions. SAC 
designated these three categories to measure the impact that 
landmines have on both physical safety and community livelihoods, 
therefore reflecting the shift from clearing the highest number of 
mines/ERW to those with the greatest livelihood hazard. Factoring in 
the social and economic dimensions of community life that are 
constrained by landmines reflects how the LIS focuses on not just fatal 
effects of landmines and minefields but how they have an adverse 
effect on people’s lives in an arguably more ubiquitous way. 
The protocols and standard operating procedures for an LIS 
make it clear that survey teams should make a good effort to interview 
a wide selection of community members to include village leaders, 
those in lower social positions, men, women, children, and people in 
different occupations. While the protocols and practitioners all 
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recognize these groups as having different experiences and knowledge, 
there is no specific guidance on what constitutes “a wide selection,” 
and the complications of logistics and circumstance can at times leave 
surveyors with only a handful of individuals (men more often than 
women) who are available to answer the surveyors’ inquiries. While 
conflicting claims of the location of landmines and of which areas are 
unsafe are inevitable, the protocols provide little guidance as to how to 
resolve these unavoidable inconsistencies.21 The guidelines for 
interviewers simply state, “Resolving conflicting information is a 
challenge. In Yemen, male interviewees often exaggerated the number 
of animals killed by mine/UXOs, whereas women tended to be more 
correct. If there is huge disagreement in all communities (as in the 
Yemeni case), the survey shouldn’t use that indicator for scoring.”22  
                                                 
21 Unfortunately for me, I was not able to find a satisfactory answer how LIS 
surveyors reconciled conflicting accounts from different community members. The 
records in Khartoum are the “final” product of the surveyors evaluation of differing 
claims. As such, the process by which the “final” records were produced has been 
“black-boxed” to me. 
22 Survey Action Center, LIS Operational Protocol P05 v 3 - Guidelines for 
Interviewers in the Community Visit (Survey Action Center, 2003), http://www.sac-
na.org/pdf_text/lisprotocols/P05_Interviewers_030415.pdf. Surveyors can 
corroborate the figures of animals killed by mines/ERW by looking for animal 
carcasses and counting the number of explosion craters. At this point of my research 
and without access to field notes from the Sudan LIS, I cannot say how the survey 
teams made such contingent judgments. 
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Figure 6: A photo from the published LIS that reads “COMMUNITY INTERVIEW, 
KAPOETA TOWN, EASTERN EQUATORIA [South Sudan] (2006).”23 This photo is not 
necessarily representative of all community interviews as not every community had a 
large number of informants. Photo from LIS.  
 
Across Sudan, local hierarchies shape how the surveyors 
interacted with the communities with one surveyor emphasizing the 
need to “always ask the head person, man or woman; can’t make 
conflict with community leaders!”24 In some areas, religious and 
cultural customs dictated strict gender segregation, and the resulting 
LIS survey data were thus based on a handful of men speaking for a 
                                                 
23 “United Nations Mine Action Office (Sudan) - 2010 - Landmine Impact Survey - 
Republic of Sudan.pdf,” n.d., 21. 
24 Elfadil Ismail Koura, “Interview, Kassala, Sudan,” March 27, 2011. 
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whole area. Other challenges arise regarding population samples being 
representative of collective local knowledge.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: A screen capture from the database entry for an LIS report of a community. 
Data from November 2006. 
 
Situated along the Sudan-Ethiopia border, Kurmuk, Blue Nile 
State is one of the country’s most impacted communities with 32 
recorded victims. The pre-war population was an estimated 10,000, 
and at the time of survey was halved as many fled the fighting. From 
that population of 5,000 people, the LIS interview group lists 8 men, 
two under 30 years old, and all of them having the same occupation 
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(Figure 7). The individual surveyors were not listed by name in the LIS 
data, and my attempts to find an explanation from someone on the 
survey team were unsuccessful. Speaking with others familiar with the 
LIS, I surmise that one explanation for a sample of 8 men representing 
5,000 people who remained in the area is that Kurmuk was a heavily 
contested area between Northern and Southern forces (Southern forces 
attacked the North through Ethiopia, thus the North attempted to 
fortify Kurmuk as a first line of defense). Mines/ERW were certainly in 
the area, and with thousands of people living relatively close to one 
another and in proximity to the military camps, the local population 
undoubtedly could list numerous impacts. According to the surveyors’ 
logic – and the mine action actors in Sudan – LIS data for this one 
area would confirm their existing knowledge. 
In the Eastern States, the prevailing, gendered view among 
surveyors based on their encounters with local men in the area is that 
women rarely move from their homes and their limited experiences 
with socially permissible activities preclude them from being sources of 
information. Moreover, women generally do not answer questions while 
they might ask them: some of the male surveyors see the women’s role 
as “just staying home and relaxing.”25 While survey data from other 
impacted communities such as Um Durain in Southern Kordofan draw 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
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from groups with a majority of women (4 women and 3 men speaking 
for 500 hundred households with 3000 people), Sudan’s culture of 
patriarchy mirrors mine action’s, a point not brought up in the LIS.  
Although women are a part of some LIS survey teams, reflecting 
some of the gains in gender inclusion in mine action globally, such 
“gender mainstreaming” efforts run up against Sudanese norms that 
call for limited men-women interactions and few acceptable 
professions for women. For surveyors, their construction of a  
“representative” sampling of local knowledge is constrained by local 
customs and norms. The social interactions that surveyors (sometimes 
urbanized outsiders) can have with local communities, and 
particularly regions of Sudan that adhere to stricter Islamic and 
patriarchal norms, limits surveyors obtaining “good,” “objective” 
information for the LIS. Producing the LIS – an effort to render 
information from disparate sources systematic – demonstrates that 
even the protocols that mine action principals take as objective and 
rational are subject to debate and that their implementation is not a 
clear application of principles onto practices. 
One such practice in a survey team’s interview with a 
community is the collective mapping exercise. More than any other 
part of the LIS process, community mapping produces a “local” 
perspective. “Local” is perpetually subjective and not a fixed 
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descriptor, and in one sense, a community map is local, relative to 
outsider, internationally-managed, military-oriented clearance 
organizations. In light of the discussion above, however, “local” also 
contains a top-down element from outside organizations, as well as 
embedded hierarchical relations within the community, which by 
definition precludes “local” knowledge from being equated with 
comprehensive knowledge. In other words, “local” knowledge is not an 
immediate panacea to informational biases or situational lacunae. 
Regardless of which community members are available to meet 
with the LIS survey team, after greetings and introductions, protocol 
P05 “Guidelines for Interviewers in the Community Visit” calls for the 
survey team to ask the interview group “to draw a map of the 
suspected hazard areas (SHAs) that are affecting the community, along 
with major landmarks, roads and trails, bodies of water, and anything 
else that is relevant.”26 The community maps from the Sudan LIS were 
exercises in dictation; a member of the LIS survey team would 
transcribe what the interview group offered. This is a deliberate yet 
momentary reversal of expertise: the LIS survey team may claim 
specialized mine action knowledge, but the simple fact remains that 
these “experts” must ask local individuals where to begin finding 
mines/ERW. Thus, supposedly scientific knowledge ultimately 
                                                 
26 Survey Action Center, LIS Operational Protocol P05 v 3 - Guidelines for 
Interviewers in the Community Visit, 4. 
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depends on the local. 
Moreover, LIS surveyors do not have specific guidance on how to 
resolve differing and conflicting claims from locals about mine/ERW 
locations. One solution is simply walking toward the area(s) in 
question to establish if others in the community were suspicious of 
mine/ERW contamination. Another way to “resolve” the conflict is for 
the surveyors to err on the side of overstatement and mark any and all 
areas brought to attention as suspicious. This latter possibility is less 
of a resolution than pushing the question down the road for later mine 
action organizations to answer. 
Figure 8 shows how these maps indicate compass direction and 
note the coordinates of a community reference point (often a landmark 
such as a mosque or school), but they are clearly not intended to be 
drawn to scale. The Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHAs) are displayed 
on the map in relation to other landmarks, as intended, rather than as 
to-scale drawings of the SHA. In addition, it is worth noting that the 
LIS community maps very deliberately frames SHAs in relation to 
other social places, rather than “to scale” in current Western 
cartographic conventions. After the interview group conveys to the 
surveyors the SHAs known to them, the survey team would ask the 
interview group to lead them to a safe viewing point from which to 
visually inspect the SHA to record any salient descriptions of them.  
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Figure 8: A community map drawn during an LIS community interview in November 
2008. Eight individuals – seven men from the ages of 15 to 60 and older and one girl 
between the age of 5 to 14 – provided the information on the three Suspected 
Hazardous Areas shaded in red. Photo from April 2011. 
 
Community mapping by LIS surveyors following established 
protocols is readily related to STS studies of surveying and mapping 
technologies. Bruno Latour states, “Yes, scientists master the world, 
but only if the world comes to them in the form of two-dimensional, 
superimposable, combinable inscriptions. It has always been the same 
story, ever since Thales stood at the foot of the pyramids.”27 Latour’s 
description is a fair representation of the LIS survey process: 
                                                 
27 Latour, “The ‘Pedofil’ of Boa Vista: A Photo-Philosophical Montage,” 147. 
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quantification, standardization, and imposition of a coordinate system 
upon an area are all tools of modern technoscience. The historical and 
conceptual distance between mine/ERW-affected communities and the 
LIS surveyors working under formal protocols and on behalf of foreign 
donors accentuates such differences. As Timothy Mitchell notes, 
“expert knowledge works to format social relations, never simply to 
report or picture.”28 While LIS surveyors are sincere in their efforts to 
call attention to what SAC has termed “socio-economic blockages” – 
that is, socio-economic resources such as water, arable land, housing, 
or roads blocked by the presence of mines/ERW – they are 
simultaneously positioning themselves as the means by which the 
community can receive assistance. In other words, the very act of 
surveying does not merely describe but both tacitly and explicitly 
prescribes and formalizes particular viewpoints and objectives for mine 
action in Sudan. 
The survey teams give each community a score once all of the 
interview questions are answered and the SHAs have been mapped 
and visually inspected. If the community had at least one victim of 
landmines or unexploded ordnance within the past 24 months, the 
survey teams give it two points. If the community believes there are 
landmines in the area, the surveyors will give another two points, 
                                                 
28 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity, 1st ed. 
(University of California Press, 2002), 118. 
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whereas unexploded ordnance such as undetonated mortars merit one 
point (landmines are most likely obscured in the ground whereas 
unexploded ordnance is most likely visible above ground, as shown in 
the figure below). 
 
Figure 9: While landmines are generally obscured, unexploded ordnance (UXO) are 
often readily visible. Photo from UNMAO. Taken in March 2010. 
 
The two categories are universal for every LIS. The third category 
of “socio-economic blockages” can vary by country. The international 
mine action community has identified ten general types of socio-
economic blockages, which are codified in the LIS protocols as follows: 
1) irrigated cropland; 2) rain-fed cropland; 3) fixed pasture used year-
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round; 4) migratory pasture used seasonally; 5) drinking water; 6) 
water for other uses; 7) housing; 8) roads and paths; 9) other 
infrastructure; and 10) non-agricultural land. Survey teams give one 
point for each of the ten items that landmines or, as important, the 
perception of landmines has prevented a community from using. As 
LIS surveyors have neither the skill nor tools to conduct any clearance 
or find mines/ERW, most of the “points” are based solely on 
community reports, which may or may not correspond to material 
reality. Some mines/ERW may be readily visible, although this is not 
the norm. 
Robert Eaton, executive director of SAC, makes it clear that the 
scoring of communities in the LIS is descriptive, rather than a 
normative ranking of communities to determine clearance priority.29 
As he put it, “all we do is collect this data and give it to the national 
authorities. The Sudanese are Sudanese: that’s how things go.”30 In 
other words, SAC is “merely” capturing the situation on the ground, 
rather than advocating for a specific course of action beyond that of 
facilitating all mine action efforts (e.g., claiming pasture land ought to 
be cleared before the main road to a mosque). SAC does not want to be 
                                                 
29 Survey Action Center, “Resources - LIS Protocols”; Survey Action Center, LIS 
Operational Protocol P08 v 3 - Impact Scoring and Community Classification (Survey 
Action Center, 2003), http://www.sac-
na.org/pdf_text/lisprotocols/P08_Impact_Scoring_030415.pdf. 
30 Robert Eaton Interview by Benjamin Wang, Takoma Park, MD, February 19, 2010. 
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in the position to dictate priorities to national authorities, who, at least 
in the rhetoric of mine action, are the ultimate decision-makers. SAC 
(and other NGOs who may be working within a country) stress that 
they are there at the request of the government and that their work is 
limited to what the government has stated and agreed upon. Such 
defensive rhetoric reflects ongoing concerns about charges of 
colonialism, as well as a broader effort to maintain neutrality and 
issue-based objectivity.  
Once LIS surveyors have assigned communities a numerical 
score, they then interpret this number and designate an overall impact 
score of “high,” “medium,” or “low” in a three-tiered ranking. SAC is 
acutely aware that any classification schema “will necessarily remain 
arbitrary, no matter where the border values are set.”31 Even though 
they see these rankings as “arbitrary,” they produce a ranking to aid 
national authorities in the prioritization of clearance resources. 
However, it is also an explicit endeavor to create a means of 
comparison between communities, both within Sudan and 
internationally. Such comparisons attempt to systematize information 
about Sudan that might have been haphazardly collected in the 
immediate aftermath of conflict. As Latour notes, “once classified, 
specimens that came from different locations and times become 
                                                 
31 Scanteam Analysts and Advisers and Demex, Evaluation of the Global Landmine 
Survey Process: Final Report (Oslo: Scanteam; Demex, 2004), 3. 
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contemporaries of one another on the flat table, all visible under the 
same unifying gaze.”32 Although the production of the LIS is only 
possible after the achievement of some degree of social stability (viz. in 
the case of Sudan, after an established peace), it has the added 
characteristic of being a means of implementing a sense of order as 
well.33 
In resolving the conflicting claims made by local individuals to 
LIS surveyors drawing community maps, the LIS survey deliberately 
attempts to translate, rather than transform, local perception and 
knowledge. I use “translate” as Michel Callon proposes, as a process 
constituted by four moments: problematization through the definition 
of actors and obligatory passage points, interessement by which 
actors’ roles are defined, enrolment of actors into their roles, and 
mobilization of allies. In the mobilization stage where the LIS surveyors 
suffer the same fate as Callon’s three researchers in which neither 
group maintains the role of spokespersons.34 While SHAs are mapped, 
drawn, and incorporated into the UN’s mine action database, they are 
not taken by UNMAO or clearance organizations as being wholly 
                                                 
32 Latour, “The ‘Pedofil’ of Boa Vista: A Photo-Philosophical Montage,” 153. 
33 There have been few studies of landmine affected communities in Sudan, but one 
question that has been asked in other national settings is the degree to which local 
communities trust the declarations of national authorities or groups that are 
perceived to be outsiders. 
34 M. Callon, “Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the 
Scallops and the Fishermen of St. Brieuc Bay,” in Power, Action and Belief: A New 
Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Law (London: Routledge, 1986), 199. 
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representative of the problem of mines/ERW. In his narrative, and 
equally applicable to mine, Callon points out “the social and natural 
‘reality’ is a result of the generalized negotiation about the 
representativity of the spokesmen.”35 While the LIS surveyors 
demarcate and inscribe SHAs to speak for local communities and for 
the activist-orientation in mine action, the contested premise of their 
“representativity” halts any further advancement of the LIS in mine 
action planning. 
 
What the Landmine Impact Survey Reveals 
 
By June 2009, the LIS teams had surveyed nineteen of Sudan’s 
twenty-five states over a three-year period at a cost of U.S.$4.3 million. 
LIS team members describe their efforts during the three years with a 
degree of pride. One member thought of the LIS as “the very definition 
of small, rapid response survey, roll up your sleeves and do what 
needs to be done efficiently, using the same tents and laptops from 
day one to the last day.”36 Whether or not this is a fair representation 
of LIS efforts, such a characterization is a conscious counter to the 
perception that groups like the UN or other international NGOs are 
excessively bureaucratic, slow-moving, self-serving, and ultimately 
have little to show for their large expenditures. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., 211. 
36 Mustafa Bawar, “Interview, Khartoum, Sudan,” November 28, 2010. 
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Figure 10: A visual summary of the LIS. Map from LIS. Published in 2010.37 
 
 
                                                 
37 United Nations Mine Action Office, Landmine Impact Survey - Republic of Sudan, 
2010, 8. 
  95
As data were published on SAC’s website and distributed to 
mine action organizations in Sudan when each area was completed, 
the results of the LIS did not come as a surprise to mine action 
groups. Fifteen out of sixteen states have 296 impacted communities 
in 48 counties that are populated by 1.8 million people, not including 
the 680,000 estimated displaced people who may eventually return 
(Figure 5).38 Eight percent (25) were designated high impact, 29% (85) 
medium, and 63% (186) low. All of the high impact communities and 
71 of the 85 medium impact communities were in the South Sudanese 
states of Central Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria and the Sudanese 
states of Southern Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Kassala. These states were 
where a significant portion of the civil war was fought. Central and 
Eastern Equatoria are where the major Southern Sudan cities are 
located. The Southern forces also had bases in Ethiopia and Eritrea, 
hence the landmine contamination in Blue Nile and Kassala, which 
border those countries, respectively. At the same time, three states 
had only one affected community, and no communities were found in 
the state of Sennar. Using statistical analysis by Lawrence Moulton (a 
professor of international health and biostatistics at Johns Hopkins), 
SAC estimates that the LIS identified 90% of affected communities.39 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 21. 
39 Lawrence Moulton, “Annex XI - Estimation of Prevalence of Mine-Affected 
Communities,” in Landmine Impact Survey - Republic of Sudan, 2010, 151–152. 
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However, the LIS of the Eastern States region, particularly Kassala, 
was limited by the Sudanese government’s restrictions on travel and 
access to communities in the area: conflict in the Eastern States ended 
well after the ceasefire between the North and South, which 
contributed to the government wanting to limit access.40 In the LIS, 
surveyors attempted to verify 36 existing Dangerous Areas in 
UNMAO’s database, nearly one-third “were located in areas that were 
inaccessible to the survey teams.” As the survey spanned from April to 
June 2007,41 such inaccessibility was not due to the rainy season; the 
Khartoum government wanted to limit outsider’s visibility to the 
conflict it continued to wage. 
The LIS executive summary describes the number of 
communities affected before offering the following conclusion regarding 
on the amount of land contaminated by mines/ERW: 
The LIS identified 605 Suspected Hazard Areas (SHAs) with an 
unofficial estimate of 106 km2 in total extent. SAC stresses that 
this measure of area is not an estimate of the area occupied by 
landmines/UXOs in Sudan but rather a careful documentation 
of areas that are blocked to community use by mines or fear of 
mines. Experience has shown that more lengthy general and/or 
                                                 
40 During my time with UNMAO, there were discussions to re-survey Kassala, and 
the U.S. State Department issued a grant of $600,000 to Mines Advisory Group for 
surveying Kassala after the LIS for the 2011 fiscal year (October 2010-October 2011). 
When I left UNMAO at the end of May 2011, UNMAO and most of the UNMIS 
peacekeeping mission were already in the process of ceasing operations and 
inventorying equipment to donate or take with them. Despite Sudan’s National Mine 
Action Center’s expressed desire to resurvey Kassala, the survey was never 
completed. 
41 United Nations Mine Action Office, Landmine Impact Survey - Republic of Sudan, 
134. 
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technical surveys will result in significantly reduced areas 
indicative of actual landmine pollution. From a community point 
of view the difference is academic – whether they are not 
planting crops or using water sources for fear of real mines or 
only fear alone does not matter.42 
 
Most notable about this summary is how the Survey Action 
Center explicitly frames the results of its survey within the terms of 
local communities’ relationships to their landscapes, almost to the 
exclusion of mines/ERW that may or may not be present. By focusing 
on local community perceptions, LIS surveyors and SAC effectively 
obscure the material realities of animals inevitably moving across a 
suspect environment or the movement of Sudan’s millions of internally 
displaced people traveling through areas that they do not know to be 
hazardous. 
A larger structural issue with the LIS beyond the material 
realities I just described is that the ten socio-economic blockages are 
not equally relevant across all of Sudan. Although, while the LIS 
protocols can readily accommodate changes to tailor socio-economic 
blockages and subsequent impact scoring calculations, Sudan, like 
most LIS countries, stayed with the default options.43 There is no 
indication that SAC coerced any LIS surveyed country to accept these 
default settings, but the wide application of these criteria points to the 
                                                 
42 Ibid., 8. 
43 Eaton, interview; Eaton, interview. 
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power of established standards. While the blockages are to remain 
consistent across the whole country, some areas have fewer potential 
blockages than others. For example, in many of Sudan’s arid areas, 
the category “access to drinking water” is highly relevant but “access 
to other water” does not apply. The unfortunate consequence is a 
community with a lower impact score by virtue of having less 
infrastructure than others may potentially be given a lower priority for 
relief and aid. The established standards inadvertently but very 
concretely affect both which areas are disadvantaged within the LIS 
framework and the level of intervention. 
Another result of the LIS was what SAC has termed, a “retrofit” 
of UNMAO’s official database. As LIS teams were already traveling 
across the country, they could visit Dangerous Areas already 
registered in the database and verify that the data entry matched what 
was on the ground in terms of coordinates or being verified by nearby 
communities (if a community could be located). This process of 
retrofitting was first conducted during the Afghanistan LIS and 
resulted in “approximately 50 percent of the [Afghan] 
database…discounted as being outdated and invalid. This section was 
replaced by an equal volume of new information.”44 The results in 
                                                 
44 Patrick Fruchet and Mike Kendellen, “Landmine Impact Survey of Afghanistan: 
Results and Implications for Planning,” Journal of Mine Action 9, no. 2 (February 
2006), http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/9.2/focus/fruchet/fruchet.htm. 
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Sudan continued this trend in a less dramatic but equally significant 
fashion. Of the existing 1,186 Dangerous Areas in the database at the 
time of the retrofit, LIS teams and UNMAO cancelled 38% (456) of 
those Dangerous Areas when local community leaders considered the 
Dangerous Area not to contain mines. The remaining Dangerous Areas 
matched LIS SHAs were “spot clearance” tasks of single items of 
unexploded ordnance, were not linked to a community, were not 
accessible, or lacked GPS coordinates in the database entry. While it 
may seem that SAC and UNMAO's concern is with getting the data 
correct, it is important to remember that all mine action organizations 
are perpetually concerned about the limited resources made available 
for their work. Thus, focusing on data is not about data in and of 
itself, but also the larger context of scare resources for what work 
remains. 
In my discussions with operations/clearance staff, database 
retrofitting was rarely brought forward or discussed. I find this 
surprising, given that this retrofit process embodies much of the 
quantifiable emphasis on information and data management that 
clearance operators value for its focused delineation of the scope of 
clearance. At the same time that the LIS was retrofitting data, 
however, it was also producing flawed and incomplete data. Despite 
data quality management protocols that were designed to prevent 
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errors by having all information checked and verified, a significant 
percentage of LIS survey forms contained blank fields. In other words, 
boxes and fields for SHA coordinates or the estimated size of SHAs 
were inexplicably empty. 
Armen Harutyunyan, formerly the Northern Region Operations 
Coordinator and now a Senior Technical Advisor to the Sudanese 
NMAC, has published an article in the Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action calling attention to the problem of data management in mine 
action globally.45 Harutyunyan notes that 35% of Dangerous Area 
Reports based on information gathered from the field and 
subsequently entered into UNMAO’s database in Sudan are missing 
key data: location, size, what marking is used to designate the area as 
dangerous, distance from nearest town, direction from nearest town, 
type of area, which organization reported the Dangerous Area, or who 
was the local source of information. The article never explicitly 
identifies the data as coming from Sudan’s database, and in the 
author biography section of the article, Harutyunyan does not identify 
himself as currently working in Sudan (although his affiliation in the 
author byline is given as United Nations Mine Action Service-Sudan). 
His intention is not a critique of the LIS, per se, as it is not clear how 
                                                 
45 Armen Harutyunyan, “Information Quality Management in Mine Action,” The 
Journal of ERW and Mine Action 15, no. 2 (Summer 2011), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/15.2/specialrpt/harutyunuan/harutyunyan.html. 
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much of the faulty data comes from either the LIS or other survey 
efforts. Nor is his intention to criticize the people who work in mine 
action in Sudan. The larger point is that mine action actors and 
organizations ought to treat data with as much care as they treat the 
actual ERW in the field. The LIS and its results are one part of that 
issue, according to Harutyunyan, as mine/ERW data form the basis of 
both major mine action interventions and policy decisions. 
Since the LIS’s last survey of Southern Kordofan state in early 
2009 (and Jonglei and Upper Nile states in South Sudan in mid-2009), 
UNMAO’s records show that clearance organizations canceled 
approximately half (47%) of all the SHAs recorded in the LIS in the 
North. The remaining SHAs (53%) contain an average of 1.88 discrete 
minefields of varying size and density. However, in the Eastern States 
of Sudan, where LIS surveying was limited by the government to 
access communities, UNMAO plans to cancel 75% of SHAs based on 
the patterns in its work since 2005,46 suggesting that UNMAO 
interprets the LIS as a significant overestimation and overstatement of 
mine/ERW contamination. 
LIS staff members readily acknowledge that SHAs demarcate 
areas of land that may be larger than actual contamination, but 
defend large SHAs as an unavoidable cost of the benefits the LIS 
                                                 
46 South Sudan has an even higher rate of cancelled SHAs; only 20% of are 
historically found to have minefields. (Citation: senior manager’s meeting) 
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provides. While SHAs might be larger than areas that actually contain 
explosive hazards, the LIS in fact depicts Sudan as having a much less 
severe mines/ERW issue than initially estimated. In other words, there 
are not as many SHAs as mine action organizations and other 
interested social groups estimated, but SHAs that are established 
historically overestimate the scale and scope of mine/ERW 
contamination. This point is one that operations and management 
acknowledge, particularly as new Dangerous Areas are being 
discovered. That said, the rate of new DAs does not qualitatively 
change the fact that SAC considers Sudan, as a whole, not to have a 
high impact from mines.47 
 
Conflicting Regimes for Surveying 
 
While the LIS has been a major instrument in mine action for 
more than a decade and SAC is supported by many of the major 
institutions in the field, the tensions between the LIS and clearance-
oriented actors concerning the survey’s place, function, and utility 
remain and affect the way mine action continues in Sudan. 
In 2003, SAC commissioned an official external evaluation of its 
Global Landmine Survey Process from two European consulting firms 
                                                 
47 Given the large area of the former Sudan (prior to South Sudan’s secessession), 
the extent of known mine/ERW contamination in concentrated areas across only five 
of Sudan’s twenty-five states has led to the whole country being viewed as not highly 
contaminated. 
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with developing and post-conflict country experience. The evaluation 
pointed to some notable achievements, such as establishing surveys 
based on adaptable methodologies and standards within a few years 
and keeping mine action visible to donors and national authorities. 
One criticism by the auditing consultants was that the LIS is “an 
externally driven and defined process that is poorly integrated into 
national tools and tasks.”48 
The issue of the broader applicability of the LIS to a national 
government’s post-conflict efforts – as well as the mine action field’s 
efforts to make more direct linkages to development efforts – has 
confronted SAC ever since. Both evaluating consultant firms and 
SAC’s own consultant noted “there is a need for [mine action] actors to 
come together to see how the LIS can be used for more rational sector 
resource allocations.”49 The knowledge of which populations in a 
country are mine/ERW-impacted, where SHAs are located, or which 
areas are found during the LIS to be mine/ERW-impact free are 
directly relevant to post-conflict recovery and development. Yet the LIS 
has not been taken up by aid and development organizations. For SAC 
and its auditors, the time and money spent producing the LIS could 
have additional value if the LIS were utilized by other organizations 
                                                 
48 Scanteam Analysts and Advisers and Demex, Evaluation of the Global Landmine 
Survey Process: Final Report, 2. 
49 Ibid., 3. 
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working in the LIS-surveyed areas. 
 This constructive criticism from 2003 was repeated in a 
November 2009 document SAC produced on “Integrated Mine Action 
with Development: Enhancing use of Landmine/ERW Hazard 
Information by Economic Development Actors.” This document 
attempts to shift SAC and its LIS from being singularly focused on 
mines/ERW and mine action toward integration within larger 
development plans in post-conflict countries. In other words, concern 
for mines/ERW in the ground is expanded to the socio-economic 
impact these objects cause and then to a larger scope of broad socio-
economic development in what are most often post-conflict areas. 
 One motivation for this more expansive framing of socio-
economic surveying is that funding for mine action is likely to decline 
with “donor fatigue,” a widely used term by NGOs to describe the 
seemingly inevitable declining attention and subsequent funding to 
their cause. Thus, SAC’s efforts to recast the LIS as able to contribute 
to economic development are a way to ensure adequate funding for 
this sort of surveying. While all humanitarian aid constantly faces the 
issue of costs and donor willingness, mine action’s attention to the 
issues stems in part from its rule of thumb that a single mine costs 
several dollars while clearing a square meter costs just as much, if not 
usually more. Considering the relative size of a landmine to a square 
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meter, the costs of clearance are recognized by all mine action groups 
are subject to constant attempts of efficiency improvement. 
Whereas LIS surveyors recorded local knowledge almost at face 
value, clearance teams are far more critical of locals’ claims, 
scrutinizing their accounts, and using clearance technologies to 
reduce the size of the area claimed to be contaminated. As LIS 
surveyors move from community to community rapidly and may be 
unfamiliar with some areas, their survey data are a proxy of sorts for 
local knowledge in mine action. (What happens when clearance teams 
arrive into a community and work for an extended period will be 
discussed in chapter 3). 
James Scott would see the disconnect between local concerns of 
mine/ERW contamination and mine action organizations’  skepticism 
as further evidence that the “state” (in this case, the UN and foreign 
donors) could not assimilate local interests “into an administrative grid 
without being either transformed or reduced to a convenient, if 
partially fictional, shorthand.”50 By contrast, the concept of regimes of 
perceptibility positions the clearance organization’s perspective as 
equally contingent upon history as on local interests and 
understandings. However, privileging “local” interests writ large as a 
corrective to UNMAO’s position of financial power and (at the time) 
                                                 
50 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 24. 
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access to development and aid resources does not ultimately address 
the existing structural inequities within Sudan’s indigenous 
populations. For example, subsistence herders and agriculturalists 
clash over land rights, and by virtue of being sedentary, 
agriculturalists more readily benefit from economic development 
activities. (Yet, at the same time Sudan expert Douglas Johnson notes 
how in the South, “the agricultural peoples…were among the first to be 
‘pacified’ by virtue of their accessibility and their limited ability to 
avoid government patrols).51 The LIS’s limited utility for UNMAO 
speaks to divergent regimes of perceptibility inherent in both the 
survey and a clearance-mindset. Although UNMAO will refer without 
qualification to the number of SHAs in Sudan and the number of 
affected people, UNMAO planning documents and other contexts point 
to the suspect nature of SHAs. In other words, UNMAO may selectively 
adopt a survey-oriented outlook, while at other times use a clearance-
directed perspective to conduct its work. 
The tension between communities’ perceived impacts and 
clearance teams’ perception of mine/ERW locations is, more precisely, 
about the power to determine what information is relevant. The mine 
action community as a whole stresses the role of “information,” and 
the claim “in many ways, mine action management is as much about 
                                                 
51 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 18. 
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information as it is about landmines” echoes through the professional 
and conversational discourse.52 Harutyunyan, again: 
unfortunately, the data-management function of mine-action 
operations has not received the same amount of attention [as 
quality assurance of clearance] when it comes to quality 
management of data. While this does not necessarily relate to 
the safety of operations, poor quality data collection, analysis 
and dissemination might lead to allocating additional resources 
to deal with the consequences of data-management problems.53 
 
Harutyunyan’s point about ensuring the accuracy of all mine/ERW 
data (e.g. that database entries for Suspected Hazardous Areas should 
have full geographic coordinates and approximate sizes) highlights the 
mine action field’s fixation on who has the authority and ability to 
collect the much needed information necessary for mine action efforts, 
and how that information is collected. 
SAC has attempted to position the LIS as a first point of 
authority, and a critical part of SAC’s definition of the LIS being an 
early stage obligatory passage point is relying on community reporting. 
That SAC’s requirements are far less intensive than “technical” work 
generally supports this claim, as LIS survey teams are able to move 
more quickly, unencumbered with all of the resources and support 
necessary for a clearance team. One survey team in a single Land 
Cruiser can cover more ground and speak with more people than a 
                                                 
52 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of the Role of 
Survey in Mine Action, 1. 
53 Harutyunyan, “Information Quality Management in Mine Action.” 
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four vehicle convoy carrying skilled deminers trained to follow 
stringent safety protocols in their work. At the same time, by 
acknowledging that other survey work must be done following the LIS, 
thus allowing for other forms of information to be used effectively in 
mine action, the possibility of effective clearance without the LIS 
arises. This ambivalence is one contributing factor to the LIS’s 
contested place in mine action. 
In a larger scale beyond individual SHAs, LIS proponents explain 
that one part of the LIS’s difficulties in the operational world is that it 
becomes a de facto plan to make up for UNMAO’s inability to plan 
quickly and effectively. These proponents point to the fact that UNMAO 
only established a strategic plan for mine action in 2009, several years 
after it began operations.54 As the LIS was completed state-by-state 
and finalized in 2009, the results of each state went into UNMAO’s 
central database and subsequent planning. 
SAC always intended for the LIS to be a first survey, what was 
previously termed a Level 1 survey, and throughout the survey, it has 
made clear that a “technical” survey conducted by deminers who are 
trained and equipped to find the physical boundaries of a mine/ERW 
area should follow. A technical survey is, however, still a significant 
                                                 
54 See Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan (Khartoum: United Nations Mine 
Action Office, 2009), http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/MUMA-
7UA4RF?OpenDocument. 
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undertaking, requiring the same infrastructure, resources, and assets 
as a full clearance operation. Yet, without a technical survey, 
clearance-oriented actors see the LIS as having very limited use. Some 
mine action groups frame the LIS process and the demarcation of 
SHAs as a step in a linear process towards a more accurate picture of 
mine/ERW contamination. Others, primarily those who identify 
themselves as having a high degree of technical demining knowledge, 
dismiss the LIS and other “non-technical” surveys and instead 
advocate for earlier sampling through manual or mechanical technical 
survey.55 
Whereas Timothy Mitchell’s great land map of Egypt “was not 
just a new way of representing an existing object…the map helped to 
constitute and consolidate [a] new institution…thus mapping played a 
role in producing the distinction between land as ‘mere object’ and the 
abstractions of law, taxation, and title,”56 the LIS is not afforded such 
status by clearance managers. The clearance managers’ criticisms 
demonstrate a degree of analytical sophistication in that they question 
the objectivity seen in numbers and charts. At the same time, these 
managers see their “technical” methods as provably objective, a point I 
                                                 
55 I observed this sentiment on many occassions in settings such as the Croatian 
mine action center’s annual demining symposium held for the international mine 
action community. Not surprisingly, individuals with experience with mechanical 
clearance assets were strong proponents of this technology’s use and deployment. 
56 Mitchell, Rule of Experts, 93. 
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take up in chapter three. The critiques of the LIS’s objectivity are not 
in themselves objective. The maps and figures are based on people 
(community members and surveyors) who lack “technical knowledge” 
making gestures towards an area, which, for clearance managers, is 
less credible than the facts in the ground, perceived by metal detectors 
and armored machines. 
As Theodore Porter notes, “the appeal of numbers is especially 
compelling to bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular 
election…objectivity lends authority to officials who have very little of 
their own.” This is especially applicable to outside organizations that 
come into Sudan with a contract from the UN but still need to 
demonstrate their competencies and abilities in country. However, this 
raises the issue of what is objectivity and who defines how such 
objectivity is constructed. Clearance operators see the objectivity as 
being a quantified subjectivity, replete with more precise 
measurements through specialized instrumentation and skilled 
techniques.57  
In an essay on colonialism, science, and postcolonial 
technoscience, Suman Seth highlights how “as part of the civilising 
mission, science played two contradictory roles in colonial discourse, 
at once making clear to the ‘natives’ the kind of knowledge that they 
                                                 
57 I will return to this issue in chapter three. 
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lacked (which omission justified colonialism itself), and holding out the 
hope that such knowledge could be theirs.” Considering the 
institutional structures of mine action and the organizations that 
conduct mine action activities, Seth’s characterization of 
technoscientific engagement between the global North and Sudan 
seems fitting, even in light of Sudan’s status as postcolonial state. The 
implementation of standards, funding for expensive mine action, and 
expatriate staff can all be framed as seeking to redress local ignorance 
and deficiencies. At the same time, “capacity building” of Sudan’s 
national authorities to engage in mine action without assistance is 
mere rhetoric, an invocation of development discourse’s ideal, and as a 
way of sustaining mine action “holds out the hope” for Sudan’s 
potential future as a “developed” nation. 
That said, the LIS occupies a particular space within mine 
action, one outside of the two roles described above: demonstrating to 
Sudan their deficiencies while promising that such deficiencies could 
be overcome. The LIS does not directly impose mine action knowledge 
as a reaction to local ignorance; on the contrary, survey teams are 
explicit in attempting to enlist local individuals and communities to 
help them in their work. The asymmetries of information and access to 
power and resources are challenges that any mine action survey, 
clearance, and to a lesser extent, mine-risk education team faces when 
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approaching a community. While these teams have the trappings of 
wealthy outsiders (UN emblazoned vehicles, equipment, insignia 
clothing, etc.), they rely heavily on local knowledge and ultimately local 
cooperation. Such mine action teams feel stymied at times when they 
perceive locals as uncooperative. When teams ask communities to 
indicate where mines/ERW or suspected hazardous areas may be, 
responses have sometimes been “you are the expert. You tell us,” “You 
should already know. You are the expert,” “we have already told earlier 
surveyors. Ask them.” (I will return to this issue in chapters 2 and 3.) 
At the same time, LIS surveyors do not encourage or promise 
local communities that mine action knowledge will be theirs; just the 
opposite. Extending McGrath’s point above that “non-technical” 
information from the LIS has no utility for clearing mines/ERW, mine 
action continually reinforces the point that non-mine action actors 
should not engage in any sort of clearance and cannot do so without 
injury or death. With the LIS, then, the most problematic way to 
interpret the survey is that those who develop and conduct the survey 
appeal to quantification and use the language of rational objectivity in 
such a way as to challenge the expertise embedded in the clearance-
oriented regime. 
 This chapter has examined some of the conflicts between LIS 
surveyors and clearance-oriented actors. The tension between these 
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regimes emerges in UNMAO and in the mine action community as a 
whole in the new, formally codified process of land release: an 
increasingly comprehensive process to deem land “safe” (I discuss this 
process in chapter three). In the next chapter, I will examine the 
interactions between local communities and those clearance-oriented 
actors when the latter eventually travel to the communities’ SHAs and 
begin their work of clearing mines/ERW and ultimately declaring the 
land “released.” 
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CHAPTER 2: “EXPERTISE” IN MINE-RISK EDUCATION 
 
 In order to travel across Sudan as someone affiliated with the 
UN peacekeeping mission, I was required to complete the UN’s two-day 
“Safe and Secure Approaches to Field Environments” course. This 
course was mandatory for all UN staff in-country to travel outside of 
Khartoum and consisted of one day in a classroom and one day 
outside for practical exercises to cover different modules: fire safety, 
radio protocols, hostage situations, etc. And mine-risk education. 
 While the course instructors came from across the globe with 
various law enforcement and military backgrounds, the mine-risk 
education material was provided by the UN Mine Action Office in 
Sudan. One of the key messages during this module was “if you see 
one landmine, stop! Do not move any further, and do not try to retrace 
your steps. You are in a minefield! Call out a warning to any nearby for 
them to stop, and try to contact help.” It struck me as a very cautious 
message: essentially a mine equals a minefield. All of the proper 
communications protocols and informing all relevant parties in 
advance about any of travel in accordance with procedures suddenly 
made a lot more sense. 
***** 
After I completed the training course and was able to observe 
UNMAO’s implementing partners in the field, I was a little surprised to 
  115
hear the same basic message told to a Sudanese community. Given all 
that I had been reading and learning about the concerns in mine 
action about overestimating the size of contaminated areas and 
consequent risks, I was surprised by mine-risk education’s seeming 
blanket statement that seemed to inflate the mine/ERW threat. For 
me, two parts of professional mine action were in tension with each 
other. As we saw in the last chapter, local communities were a key 
source of information, and the same cautious message that I had 
received could reinforce the perception that suspected hazardous 
areas actually contained the concentration of mines/ERW expected. 
 
Figure 11: A mine-risk education session. This photo appears regularly in UNMAO 
publications. Photo from UNMAO. Taken in May 2009. 
 
***** 
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The school was a box of a building in a rural part of Kassala 
where most structures were tent huts made of cloth, wood, and straw. 
Kassala state had limited coverage during the Landmine Impact 
Survey, but some organizations had recently begun to work in the 
area. One of them, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), had arranged with 
the community leader to use the school as a meeting place to conduct 
a mine-risk education session, and UNMAO’s officer for mine-risk 
education and a Sudanese quality assurance officer working for the 
government were going to conduct quality assurance of the NGO’s 
presentation to ensure MAG’s adherence to the established mine-risk 
education curriculum. 
 Like other mine-risk education presentations I had seen, this 
one followed a standardized format, covering mine/ERW identification, 
warning sign recognition, and appropriate responses and behaviors. 
Again, the same equation: a mine equals a minefield. 
 At some point, I noticed that one of the mine-risk education 
facilitators moving to the front of the classroom to take a picture, not 
of her colleague but of the men in the audience.1 The decision to take 
a picture of a group of men sitting and listening struck me, and such a 
picture would only have meaning in the context of what the men were 
                                                 
1 I am attentive to my place and position within this scene and throughout my seven 
months with UNMAO in coutry. One moment in particular illustrates the effect of my 
presence, and I discuss it later in this chapter. 
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seeing and hearing. However, their presence must signify something, 
or else the facilitator would not have gone through the effort of moving 
to the front corner. 
 
Figure 12: A mine-risk education session. Note the facilitator in the corner 
photographing the audience (as well as my position in reference to the 
photographer). Taken in March 2011. 
 
Introduction 
 As the international community began to recognize the threat of 
mines/ERW to civilians, awareness and educational campaigns 
became a part of the humanitarian response to this issue. These 
activities were far quicker and less expensive than surveying and 
clearance, and they could reach a large number of people easily. 
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Unlike clearance, these awareness and educational campaigns are not 
meant to make a material change in the environment. At the same 
time, these activities are intended for the local populations, as opposed 
to surveying which directly helps clearance organizations and planning 
authorities and only indirectly benefits local communities. 
 Since the first awareness and educational efforts began in the 
early stages of mine action in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
conceptualization of what practices are effective has undergone 
changes, analogous to the developments in survey and clearance. A 
main objective of awareness and educational campaigns is to convey to 
local communities and populations how to perceive and manage the 
risks and hazards from mines/ERW. These explosives are presumed to 
be in their local environment and therefore have potential 
consequences on their lives and livelihoods. Such awareness 
campaigns are not just educational: they are a form of knowledge 
production about the communities’ environments. As Steven Shapin 
and Simon Schaffer argued, producing “matters of fact” – in this case, 
establishing the perception of explosive hazards in the environment – 
does not require absolute or universal assent.2 Like the focus of the 
Landmine Impact Survey on the socio-economic impacts of 
mines/ERW, mine-risk education (MRE) embodies the activist-oriented 
                                                 
2 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, chap. 2. 
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regime in which mines/ERW remain black-boxed, to the consternation 
of clearance organizations who see first and foremost the 
contaminated landscapes – and not necessarily the people living on 
the land –differently. 
Mine-risk education has been in practice for nearly two decades, 
and throughout that time, other mine action organizations and actors 
have questioned its efficacy and effectiveness. Given the large numbers 
of people who “receive” mine-risk education (over 400,000 people in 
2011 in Sudan alone),3 the deceptively simple question “how many 
people could have been a mine/ERW casualty but were not due to 
mine-risk education” has yet to be answered definitely. In part, this 
question results from the lack of agreed metrics as the question rests 
on the difference between the source and the cause of accidents, or 
alternatively among different causes. While mines/ERW can be said to 
have “caused” an accident, so too did the need for water or firewood 
that led a person to walk across a contaminated area. Whereas 
clearance (including surveys) seeks the source of accidents, mine-risk 
education is an effort to reduce the risks people undertake.4 Mine 
action organizations such as the Geneva International Centre for 
                                                 
3 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor 
| Country Profiles | Sudan | 2010,” Landmine Monitor 2010, 2010, 
http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/find_profile/SD/2010. 
4 I thank Daniel Ahlquist, Laura Rickard, and Djahane Sahelabadi for pushing me to 
clarify my point in this paragraph. 
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Humanitarian Demining persistently call for establishing clear 
indicators to measure mine-risk education’s success in reducing the 
likelihood of a mine/ERW accident. These calls come particularly in 
light of the general problem of attribution, the inability to “attribute 
the results observed to the actions of [a mine action] programme.”5 
While there is an obvious financial dimension to establishing a cost-
benefit basis to attribution, there is also the larger aspect of simply 
identifying effective measures that reduce mine/ERW accidents. 
 Attribution as described above is a category of analysis for mine-
risk education organizations and mine action as a professional 
discipline, and it has wider relevance as the organizations portray their 
work to international donors and in the media (their own and in 
journalistic outlets). It also reveals an ambiguous tension within mine 
action: the simultaneous desire for quantification in some domains 
and qualitative metrics in others points to a selective choosing of 
measurement suited to different ends. This “attribution problem” in 
the context of mine-risk education thus illustrates a challenge within 
the activist-oriented regime and the move by mine action groups 
within this regime towards qualitative, rather than quantitative, 
accounts of their work. For STS, attribution in mine-risk education 
                                                 
5 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, ed., Mine Action: Lessons 
and Challenges (Geneva: Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, 
2005), 332, http://www.gichd.org/publications/mine-action-lessons-and-
challenges-2. 
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highlights the limits of imposing rational objectivity on the 
contingencies arising from an on-the-ground reality. It also 
demonstrates the limits of a social technology when confronted with 
materiality. 
 In this chapter, I first lay out the history of mine-risk education 
as a global endeavor, advocated in large part by UNICEF. I then 
discuss how mine-risk education became a part of mine action efforts 
in Sudan, with national NGOs able to adapt mine-risk education to the 
particulars of the various contexts across the country. I highlight the 
perpetual issues and discussions of postcolonialism pertinent to most 
of the mine-action activities covered in this section. Perhaps more than 
other mine-action activities, mine-risk education is subject to more 
criticisms from within, and I address how such criticism centers on 
the boundaries between “nontechnical” and “technical work.” The 
issue of the multiple constructions of mine-risk education emerges 
throughout the chapter, and I address it in the last section of the 
chapter. 
As I will discuss in this chapter, there are multiple dimensions 
to mine-risk education work which stem from the activist-oriented 
regime. The organizations and individuals involved in mine-risk 
education attempt to change people’s behaviors, rather than the 
hazardous environments in which these people find themselves. Such 
  122
change is through deliberate and simultaneously spoken performances 
for both the organization and audiences. The work of mine-risk 
education organizations enacts a narrative replete with images to be 
used for the organizations’ own purposes as well as for supporters, 
donors, and outside audiences. 
 
Establishing Global Mine-Risk Education  
 The opening scene of this chapter is a portrayal of the UN’s “Safe 
and Secure Approaches to Field Environments” course, and it is one 
representation of how the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 
define mine-risk education. Officially, IMAS defines mine-risk 
education as 
activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from 
mines and ERW, including unexploded sub-munitions by raising 
awareness and promoting safe behaviour. These activities 
include information exchange with at-risk communities, 
communication of safety messages to target groups, and support 
for community risk management and participation in mine 
action. The objective is to reduce the risk to a level where people 
can live safely, and to recreate an environment where economic 
and social development can occur free from the constraints 
imposed by contamination.6 
 
This definition and understanding of mine-risk education is the result 
of more than a decade of practices, organizations, and standardization 
                                                 
6 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 12.10 Mine/ERW Risk Education, 
Second Edition, 2010, 8, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/ima
s-international-standards/english/series-12/IMAS-12-10-Ed2.pdf. 
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efforts directed largely by the United Nations Children’s Fund. I will 
briefly describe this history before moving into how mine-risk 
education is conducted specifically in Sudan. 
Just as landmine clearance emerged as a separate humanitarian 
activity in Afghanistan in the late 1980s, so too did mine awareness for 
local communities begin there.7 Within a few years, as the threat 
mines/ERW pose to civilians became more widely recognized, such 
awareness initiatives by humanitarian organizations such as Handicap 
International and early mine action organizations, particularly Mines 
Advisory Group and Norwegian People’s Aid, developed in Angola, 
Cambodia, Northern Iraq, and Mozambique. Their efforts were 
simultaneously meant to raise awareness and function as a temporary 
solution to mine/ERW accidents until a clearance team arrived. 
 In documents published by the UN and Geneva International 
Center for Humanitarian Demining, accounts of these early awareness 
programs describe how  “initially, [such] approaches tended to be one-
way and largely non-participatory, using a variety of ‘small media’, 
such as posters, leaflets, billboards and T-shirts.”8 Such retrospective 
                                                 
7 For a detailed account of how mine-risk education became established, see Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Mine Action: Lessons and 
Challenges, 133–169; Sharif Baaser, Hugues Laurenge, and Eric Filippino, “Mine-
risk Education in Mine Action: How Is It Effective?,” The Journal of ERW and Mine 
Action 13, no. 1 (Summer 2009), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/JOURNAL/13.1/feature/Baaser/baaser.htm. 
8 United Nations International Mine Action Standards, An Introduction to Mine Risk 
Education, IMAS Mine Risk Education Best Practice Guidebook 1 (Geneva: United 
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characterizations are deliberately negative as they allow for more 
favorable portrayals of recent developments in mine-risk education 
and the current state of the field. 
As various organizations were developing mine clearance and 
mine awareness/risk education programs in various countries across 
the globe throughout the 1990s, the efforts of anti-landmine activists – 
most notably the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – were 
gaining traction in international law (discussed in the introduction). 
From the outset, the effort to regulate and ban landmines included at 
least some efforts at mine-risk education. In fact, the existence of such 
awareness programs was something anti-landmine activists brought 
into the negotiations of various international laws. 
The first legal instrument to address landmines was the 1996 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, which sought to regulate, rather than ban, landmines. On 
the issue of mine-risk education, the protocol contained “provisions on 
feasible precautions to protect civilians through the installation of 
signs and ‘warning activities.’ The negotiators in this instance were not 
only referring to those warnings at the time of the use of weapons, but 
also to awareness campaigns that could take place for the duration of 
                                                                                                                                            
Nations, 2005), 21, http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/1%20-
%20Introduction%20to%20Mine%20Risk%20Education.pdf. 
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the minefield’s existence.”9 
 International activists regarded the amended protocol as a 
failure and pushed for what would become the 1997 Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention (also called the Ottawa Treaty). Article 6, 
Paragraph 3 of the Convention reads: 
Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance 
for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic 
reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. 
Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international, regional or national organizations 
or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and their 
International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on 
a bilateral basis.10 
 
Thus, mine-risk education was a legal requirement of the Ottawa 
Treaty. However, it was not immediately subject to the same 
professionalization efforts that clearance was. For example, the first 
two iterations of International Mine Action Standards in 1997 and 
2000 did not address mine-risk education, and it was not until 2001 
that UNICEF began to develop mine-risk education standards. 
As the UN explains, one reason for this delay was that the 
different organizations engaged in mine-risk education did not readily 
                                                 
9 Gustavo Laurie, “An Analysis of MRE Provisions in Recent MA-related 
Conventions,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 14, no. 1 (Spring 2010), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/14.1/Notes/laurie.htm. 
10 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION 
AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION, 
1997, https://www.un.org/Depts/mine/UNDocs/ban_trty.htm. 
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exchange “best practices” or work together to improve their efforts. 
Such lack of information was less a deliberate lack of cooperation than 
the inevitable result of lacking time, resources, and established means 
of communication.11 In an attempt to rectify these problems, in 2000, 
the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the focal point for 
mine-related activities within the UN system, requested UNICEF to 
develop international standards for mine-risk education. UNMAS is the 
office within the UN Secretariat responsible for the development and 
maintenance of international mine action standards. UNICEF is the 
primary actor within the UN in undertaking mine-risk education. 
 UNICEF moved to create International Mine Action Standards 
for mine-risk education based on the perceived success of standards 
already in practice for manual clearance, and subsequently decided to 
produce MRE guidelines and national MRE standard operating 
procedures in the coming years. By October 2003, UNICEF had 
completed a set of eight MRE standards, which were formally adopted 
as IMAS in June 2004.12 
 The initial eight standards laid out both requirements and 
recommendations for virtually all aspects of mine-risk education: 
                                                 
11 United Nations International Mine Action Standards, An Introduction to Mine Risk 
Education, 23. 
12 A second edition of mine-risk education IMAS was released in 2010 and simplified 
the previous seven IMAS into one on “Mine/ERW Risk Education.” Little content 
changed between the older and newer editions. 
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program management, accreditation, monitoring, data collection, 
assessment, planning, implementation, and evaluation.13 In doing so, 
these standards also defined the different activities and institutional 
arrangements that collectively constitute mine-risk education. Because 
these standards emerged from the UN, it is important to remember 
that IMAS was intended in part to guide and direct mine action 
activities within a framework that privileges rational planning, 
recognizable to all stakeholders as supposedly universal and objective. 
The mine-risk education IMAS for “data collection and needs 
assessment” states at the outset “an essential part of any mine-risk 
education (MRE) programme or project is the needs assessment and 
the development of a data collection system, which allows an MRE 
organisation to plan, implement, monitor and evaluate its activities.”14 
Such an evaluation informs both on-going implementation as well as 
future mine-risk education projects. As described in the schematic 
diagram illustrating the project cycle in figure 13, such evaluation 
“review(s) the local mine and UXO risks, review(s) the community 
                                                 
13 The specific IMAS are IMAS 07.11 Guide for the management of mine-risk 
education; IMAS 07.31 Accreditation of mine-risk education organisations and 
operations; IMAS 07.41 Monitoring of mine-risk education programmes and projects; 
IMAS 08.10 General mine action assessment; IMAS 08.50 Data collection and needs 
assessment for mine-risk education; IMAS 12.10 Planning for mine-risk education 
programmes and projects; IMAS 12.20 Implementation of mine-risk education 
programmes and projects; IMAS 14.20 Evaluation of MRE programmes and projects. 
14 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 8.50 Data Collection and Needs 
Assessment for Mine Risk Education, 2003, iii, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/ima
s-international-standards/english/series-12/IMAS-12-10-Ed1.pdf. 
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needs, and refine(s) the MRE plan and its implementation.”15
                                                 
15 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 12.10 Planning for MRE Programs, 
2003, 14, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/ima
s-international-standards/english/series-12/IMAS-12-10-Ed1.pdf. 
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Figure 13: A flowchart depicting the sequential step of a mine-risk education program. Diagram from UNMAS. Published in 
2003. 
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A key part of these standards was a shift from mine-awareness 
campaigns to mine-risk education. As one mine-risk education official 
described, whereas mine awareness focused on “the sensitisation and 
awareness activities in mine action projects” in the form of large 
presentations and informational and media campaigns, mine-risk 
education now includes 
all the educational aspects aiming at changing risky behaviours 
of affected populations, which often need creative and concrete 
solutions to deal with severe socio-economic constraints. Also, 
they comprise a substantial shift in improving the quality and 
diversity of interventions. MRE shifted from a more information-
oriented approach, based mostly on quantitative indicators, to a 
more education-oriented one, based on qualitative indicators.1 
 
It is worth noting here how mine-risk education professionals see their 
field in mine action improving by shifting away from the quantitative 
information that is a hallmark of the clearance-oriented regime. Yet, 
while the mine-risk education field strives for education-oriented 
qualitative indicators, the International Mine Action Standard on 
mine-risk education planning provides general directives with little 
guidance on how to implement imperatives to “be culturally 
appropriate,” and “offset urban and gender biases and other biases.” 
While the IMAS are deliberately global in scope and intended to be 
supplemented with national level standards, the standards require an 
                                                 
1 Pia Cantini and Valentina Crini, “INTERSOS: Thinking Over and Practicing MRE in 
Iraq,” Journal of Mine Action 9, no. 1 (August 2005), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/Journal/9.1/Focus/crini/crini.htm. 
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knowledge and expertise about mines/ERW and public engagement to 
be enacted as intended in the wide variety of mine/ERW-affected 
contexts. 
Also codified in mine-risk education were “needs assessments” 
at the beginning of the “MRE project cycle” and “evaluation” at the end 
of the project cycle. Determining what mine-risk education material 
best suits a local cultural context is one reason for such assessments. 
This is a positive step as the mine-risk education field recognized that 
some of its efforts, while well intentioned, were problematically 
conducted and received. For example, in the 1990s, UNICEF, USAID, 
and DC Comics’ collective efforts to use Superman and Wonder 
Woman comic books for mine-risk education in Latin America and 
Eastern Europe perpetuated problematic depictions of white outsiders 
literally coming from above to rescue local children from picking up 
mines/ERW and hurting themselves. Perhaps more troubling was the 
misconception some of the children took from the comics: if they 
picked up a shiny metal object (that could be an explosive), a fantastic 
superhero would appear. It took only a few such accidents before 
UNICEF replaced these mine-risk education materials with something 
more culturally adapted. The characters in visual material now tend to 
resemble the racial-cultural audience (or at the very least appear to be 
familiar), and other material such as plays are produced and 
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performed by local actors. Such adaptations arising from assessments 
and evaluations fit within a framework of progressive improvement, 
but it is not clear how lessons learned during each project cycle 
remain in an organization’s collective memory or institutional 
knowledge. Furthermore, mine-risk education is not always a formal, 
regular, and discrete activity, and a mine-risk education facilitator 
seconded to a clearance team could be working on a more ad-hoc 
basis. 
The new IMAS for mine-risk education additionally established a 
community liaison role for mine-risk education teams to engage more 
directly with local communities. Teams would inform communities of 
clearance activities and explain what was occurring; at the same time, 
these teams would convey local information and reporting to clearance 
organizations and national authorities. From the perspective of the 
mine-risk education field, this type of outreach fosters a greater sense 
of local involvement. Furthermore, mine-risk education teams could 
verify data and gather information for a national mine action center. 
The rationale for using a mine-risk education team, rather than a 
clearance team, for this purpose is that the former is quicker and less 
costly. As some mine-risk education staff were previously surveyors for 
Sudan’s Landmine Impact Survey, this responsibility is thus possible 
for mine-risk education teams. 
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The mine-risk education field points to this liaison element and 
the broader trend towards community participation as positive 
developments: 
Such a community liaison approach appears to be the way 
forward for MRE. It is a reflection that education in the 
traditional sense has often overlooked many of these approaches 
and has not linked well with clearance organizations – 
particularly with regard to prioritisation and sharing the data 
gathered from communities. However, still too many 
programmes continue to undertake inappropriate “traditional” 
programmes of questionable value and impact.”2 
 
The passage above explicitly challenges the material focus of the 
clearance-oriented regime on mines/ERW on the grounds that such a 
regime proves difficult to connect clearance activities with the people 
and communities such activities ostensibly benefit. 
One pragmatic consideration in the “one-way” messaging-
community liaison divide is that the latter requires a high level of 
cultural competence in a wide variety of local contexts, something that 
international NGOs often initially lack when establishing themselves in 
a country. After several years of operations, however, this initial 
justification for continuing large awareness-raising sessions becomes 
increasingly tenuous. Anthropologist Andrew Gilbert points out that 
an “emergency” is an alibi for foreigners in one of three roles – 
observer, expert, and humanitarian – to ignore selective considerations 
                                                 
2 United Nations International Mine Action Standards, An Introduction to Mine Risk 
Education, 21–22. 
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(these roles are expanded below).3 Highlighting the risk of mines/ERW 
as a humanitarian emergency allows mine action organizations to 
direct public and donor attention to that particular risk, narrowly 
focusing on the potential harm and mitigating that potential at the 
expense of explaining exactly how such mitigation may happen. The 
“emergency” framework justifies mine-risk education organizations 
directing their efforts towards community liaison which is less 
intensive and time-consuming than clearance. Despite direction from 
the IMAS to move away from large quantitative measures (viz. using 
the number of people who attend mine-risk education sessions as the 
primary gauge of success and impact) towards qualitative metrics 
based in individual cases, there is little reporting of such qualitative 
community liaison.4 
 Nevertheless, although the global mine-risk education discourse 
promotes a move away from quantitative measures in mine-risk 
education, rational planning maintains a prominent part in the top-
down guidance and shaping of mine-risk education. In the summer 
                                                 
3 Andrew Gilbert, “Foreign Publicity, the Democratization Paradox, and the Limits of 
International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Seminar presented at the Judith 
Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Cornell University, Uris Hall, March 
15, 2012), 
http://peaceprogram.einaudi.cornell.edu/calendar/index.asp?date=3/15/2012. 
4 Unlike other mine action organizations, Mines Advisory Group terms its mine-risk 
education teams “Community Liaison teams” (CL teams). The message is that such 
Community Liaison teams can conduct mine-risk education, rather than vice versa, 
which is the norm in mine action. Mines Advisory Group’s website presents 
narratives of its CL teams’ various successes, but for obvious reasons the challenges 
and less successful endeavors the teams encounter are not published. 
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2009 issue of the Journal of ERW and Mine Action, two UNICEF and 
one GICHD staff wrote an article, “Mine-risk education in Mine Action: 
How is it Effective?”5 On the subject of community liaison, they write 
It is through this important function that mine-action 
practitioners engage with communities and seek their active 
participation in the mine-action process. Without proper 
community liaison, demining runs the risk of being an isolated 
activity dealing primarily with the land, but detached from the 
community for whom the land is actually being cleared. Many 
practitioners and stakeholders are aware of the extent to which 
land is cleared, but they do not have a solid understanding of 
the priority and impact on each segment of the community or 
the instances where land is unused after clearance due to a lack 
of confidence in the clearance process. 
 
As this quote shows, linking mine-risk education more closely to 
clearance activities raises the persistent issue in mine action of 
“technical” expertise. While “technical” expertise in mine action is 
assumed to be engineering experience clearing mines/ERW, the 
Journal article shows mine-risk education professionals attempting to 
frame their work as a necessary supplement to clearance. According to 
these mine-risk education professionals, clearance is necessary but 
insufficient to help communities. 
In practice, mine-risk education teams’ community liaison 
efforts reinforce the primacy of technical knowledge in mine action. 
The fact that most mine-risk education teams are from Sudanese 
NGOs (teams from international NGOs, in particular the Japan’s 
                                                 
5 Baaser, Laurenge, and Filippino, “Mine-risk Education in Mine Action: How Is It 
Effective?”. 
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Association for Aid and Relief, are all-Sudanese as well), while almost 
all clearance teams are from international NGOs and commercial 
contractors, reinforces this hierarchy of expertise and race, and the 
groups that are able to lay claim to it. Boutros Hobeika, UNMAO’s 
mine-risk education and victim assistance coordinator, states the most 
important points mine-risk education teams can convey to local 
communities are that the people are at risk of mine/ERW accidents 
and some behaviors and actions are safer than others. The technical 
details of what kinds of mines/ERW are present, the international, 
national, and organizational standards and procedures for clearance, 
etc. would not benefit the community as much as direct guidance on 
what areas are safe (or hazardous).6 Thus, Sudanese mine-risk 
education NGOs convey to local Sudanese communities whether 
outside clearance teams have made the land safe or not and instruct 
the communities how to manage in the meantime. 
 Mine-risk education teams direct such instructions to entire 
groups, but the field of mine-risk education as a whole classifies its 
target audience along five categories. While these categories are not 
                                                 
6 Boutros Hobeika, “Interview, Khartoum, Sudan,” May 5, 2011. My interview with 
Mr. Hobeika was conducted in English in which Mr. Hobeika developed fluency after 
Arabic and French. This statement attributed to him is my paraphrase of a direct 
quotation in the recording of our conversation. His words were “all you need to tell 
these people, ‘you are at risk. This is what you need to do,’ in simple terms, in their 
language if possible…it’s not the business of the community to know the technical, 
just ‘is it safe or not? Can I take my sheep there or not?’’ I paraphrase this quote to 
represent Mr. Hobeika’s intention and meaning – and all other actors in this 
dissertation –  most charitably. 
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officially codified in the IMAS, other documents from the UN and the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining classify 
mine-risk education audiences as follows: 
 “The Unaware (the person knows nothing about the dangers 
that mines or ERW represent – typical examples are refugees 
or young children); 
 “The Uninformed (the person knows that mines and ERW 
exist and are potentially dangerous but doesn’t know about 
safe behaviour – typical examples are the internally displaced 
or older children); 
 “The Misinformed (the person has been given the wrong 
messages or thinks, wrongly, that he or she knows about safe 
behaviour – typical examples are former soldiers); 
 “The Reckless (the victim knows about safe behaviour but 
deliberately ignores it – typical examples are adolescent boys 
playing with mines or other explosive devices); and 
 “The Forced (the victim has little or no option but to 
intentionally adopt unsafe behaviour – typical examples are 
adults in highly-impacted communities who need to forage 
for food or water for their families to survive).”7 
 
As these examples suggest, mine-risk education organizations’ 
use of seemingly universal categories in each country belies the 
complexity and contingency found in each particular context. One 
potentially problematic effect of such categorization is that activist-
oriented practitioners end up producing static categories divorced from 
local communities, a charge they actually level at clearance-oriented 
organizations. 
Indeed, in regions like Sudan’s Eastern States, which was 
experiencing the highest number of accidents, these categories are not 
                                                 
7 United Nations International Mine Action Standards, An Introduction to Mine Risk 
Education, 11–12. 
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mutually exclusive. The uninformed may include the newly settled 
(like refugees) but they may also include travelers who routinely drive 
across long distances. Moreover, such categories do not in fact cover 
every type of victim: people may be aware, informed, and cautious and 
still become victims. While these five categories are listed in global 
level documents, mine-risk educators recognize that in practice, it is 
with the first three groups that they can expect to effect the most 
change. Mine-risk education organizations admittedly can do little for 
the “forced” category. One reason is that mine-risk education teams 
lack the technical knowledge and capacity to address immediate 
mine/ERW concerns. As these teams are neither trained to be able to 
demarcate minefields nor equipped with personal protective 
equipment, even seemingly straightforward efforts like demarcating a 
minefield’s boundaries or destroying obviously visible unexploded 
ordnance falls outside the teams’ abilities. Another reason is that 
mine-risk education has no enforcement mechanism; in other words, 
mine-risk education cannot compel individuals to change their own 
deliberations and decision-making. Thus, some local communities 
remain “forced” to take a known risk to collect water or other 
necessary resources. 
Another problem that emerges from this five-fold classification is 
that its foundation presumes a knowledge gap between “experts” and 
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“laity.” This gap becomes apparent when mine action officials presume 
authority and profess to have appropriate knowledge about mines, 
even as one mine action official stated, “mines are victim-activated as 
well as victim-reported.” Many times local communities report an 
accident and the presence of mines/ERW, which then spurs mine 
action activities, including mine-risk education. But, such a pattern is 
one mine-risk education does not always or fully acknowledge. 
 Returning to Andrew Gilbert’s description of outsiders and 
expatriates in post-conflict areas assuming one of three particular 
roles: observer, expert, and humanitarian,8 foreigners as expert 
humanitarians come into an existing local hierarchy whereby their 
insignia-emblazoned apparel, new vehicles, and widely perceived high 
salaries all demarcate a higher social status in post-conflict settings. 
At the same time, though, these foreigners “still have to occupy the 
authority role convincingly” to maintain such a position.9 One way to 
assert authority is by declaring an area to be dangerous and 
highlighting risk to a population that has witnessed firsthand decades 
of civil war. The possibility of a tragedy resulting from ignoring mine-
                                                 
8 Gilbert, “Foreign Publicity, the Democratization Paradox, and the Limits of 
International Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina.” 
9 Lawrence, “Myth, Memory, and Manipulation: JFK and the Developing World.” One 
element of such a position may be racial, ethnic, or national difference. In mine 
action, these differences are more accentuated in clearance and less so in mine-risk 
education. That said, one prominent clearance organization in Sudan is MECHEM, a 
major South African firm that employs black South Africans and Zimbabweans for 
some team leader positions in clearance teams. 
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risk education seemingly ought to lead audiences to heed the message 
of the mine-risk education team. However, as will be discussed further 
below, mine-risk education assumes that mines/ERW are the greatest 
risk and override local people’s other concerns. While the mine-risk 
education field does acknowledge the scenario of “forced” people, the 
field does not afford “forced” people primacy and maintains its work 
can affect more people. 
 
Establishing Sudanese Mine-Risk Education 
“Such a community liaison approach appears to be the way 
forward for MRE.”10 
 
“UNICEF provided support to planning, implementation, and the 
management of RE at the state and national level. More than 400,000 
persons, primarily refugees, IDPs, and communities impacted by 
mines and ERW, received RE through UNICEF-supported programs in 
2010. This included 147,000 through community based presentations, 
over 150,000 children through school based RE and 103,000 through 
public campaigns.”11 
 
I turn now from global level discourse of mine-risk education to 
mine-risk education as conducted in Sudan. While there is a fair body 
of literature on mine-risk education written by mine-risk education 
practitioners for other practitioners, as well as case studies and 
analyses of individual countries, there has not yet been any published 
                                                 
10 United Nations International Mine Action Standards, An Introduction to Mine Risk 
Education, 21. 
11 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor 2011 
(Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2011), http://www.the-
monitor.org/custom/index.php/region_profiles/print_profile/377. 
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material examining mine-risk education in Sudan. This lacuna stands 
despite mine-risk education/awareness conducted in Sudan by 
national organizations since 1998. As the long-running civil war began 
to reach a ceasefire state in the late 1990s, international donors 
(principally UNICEF and also others, such as Save the Children USA) 
gradually increased their funding to Sudanese mine-risk education 
organizations. 
 Concurrent with the state of mine awareness/mine-risk 
education elsewhere in the world, the Sudanese NGOs initially spent 
the funds donated to them producing materials for “one-way” 
interactions: “role play(s), songs and games, posters, story books, and 
videos.”12 While Mines Advisory Group sent one Community Liaison 
Adviser to the South in 2001-2002, no such efforts existed in the 
North. At the same time, Landmine Monitor’s annual report from 2001 
(which covered the preceding year) used the heading “mine 
awareness,” which changed to “mine-risk education” in 2002, 
reflecting and reinforcing the global shift in this field of mine action.  
The 2002 ceasefire between the North and the South allowed a 
modest increase in humanitarian activities, including mine-risk 
education, and the UN’s response included a mine-risk education 
                                                 
12 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2002: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2002), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2002&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
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coordinator from UNICEF. For UNICEF, the timing of Sudan’s ceasefire 
and the development of the mine-risk education IMAS seemed a 
productive coincidence. With a greater mine action presence in 
country, the UN and a MRE Advisory Group it established “developed a 
plan and terms of reference for an assessment on mine-risk education 
to take place in the Nuba Mountains, Kassala and Juba areas. MRE 
provisional Guidelines and Standards [had] been developed as the 
basic requirement for accreditation of relevant partners in 
government-controlled areas.”13 This move towards professionalization 
in mine-risk education concurrent with the global professionalization 
movement in mine action broadly presented an opportunity to 
juxtapose the developments in Sudan with the rhetoric far removed 
from the ground. 
 By 2005, the North and South had signed the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, and the UN established its UN Mine Action Office. 
During the UN’s early mine action efforts between 2002 and 2005 in 
Sudan, however, UNICEF went through three mine-risk education 
expatriate advisors, with the penultimate advisor arriving in April 2004 
                                                 
13 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2003: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2003), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2003&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. To clarify, accreditation is the process by 
which UNMAO and its predecessor office would evaluate all mine action 
organizations, their teams, and the teams’ management to authorize them to work in 
an official capacity and thus be eligible for international donor funds and to tender 
for commercial contracts. 
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and departing in October 2004, and the current advisor arriving in 
April 2005. Landmine Monitor 2005 noted the resultant disruption in 
mine-risk education programming and included the point “several 
MRE operators told Landmine Monitor that the limited MRE activities 
during 2004 result from the lack of continuity, poor handover and 
gaps between advisors.”14  
 In subsequent Landmine Monitor reports, the mine-risk 
education sections describe growth in terms of the number of 
Sudanese mine-risk education organizations, as well as the number of 
people these organizations reach with the mine-risk education 
“message.” Thus, although global mine-risk education discourse 
increasingly emphasized community liaison, mine-risk education in 
Sudan was still largely measured by how widely “one-way” messaging 
spread. The tension here is similar to the one with surveying described 
in the previous chapter. On the one hand, there is a rhetorical shift 
towards community-centric mine action. On the other, the 
functionality of quantification fits within the regime of cost efficiency 
calculations that encourages one-way messaging. 
                                                 
14 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2005: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2005), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2005&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. During my fieldwork in Sudan, I was only 
able to have limited interactions with the then-current UNICEF mine-risk education 
coordinator but enjoyed a productive relationship with UNMAO’s regional mine-risk 
education coordinator. 
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In light of the persistent and relentless demand for information 
and assessments in mine action, such demands were written into the 
mine-risk education International Mine Action Standards and applied 
in Sudan as well. In 2004, Dan(ish)ChurchAid worked with North and 
South Sudanese NGOs to conduct an assessment in the central Nuba 
Mountains, and determined “adult men were found to be the most at 
risk, but some females admitted that they had been to dangerous 
areas. Children in families fleeing the war had a higher tendency for 
risk behavior. The assessment suggested four parallel curricula 
targeting children, adults, IDPs/refugees, and NGO and UN 
workers.”15 A similar assessment Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices and 
Behavior (KAPB) commissioned by Save the Children-USA reached 
similar findings: “that economically active adult males and children 
constitute 49 percent of the people at risk of mines/UXO in that area. 
Farming is reported to be the most dangerous activity in the area.”16 I 
discuss in the next section how mine-risk education efforts in Sudan 
responded to such findings. 
 
                                                 
15 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan,” in Landmine Monitor Report 
2004: Toward a Mine-Free World Annual Report (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 
2004), http://www.the-
monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2004&pqs_type
=lm&pqs_report=sudan&pqs_section=. 
16 Ibid. 
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Field Observations of Mine-Risk Education in Practice 
 Over the course of seven months as a participant-observer with 
UNMAO, I observed five mine-risk education sessions across Sudan in 
Khartoum, South Kordofan state, and Kassala state. In light of the 
“global” discourse shifts and how mine-risk education in Sudan was 
portrayed to outsiders, these first-hand observations and interviews 
provide both an opportunity to examine on-the-ground practices and 
the application of distant rhetoric to specific locales. I put “global” in 
quotations because while such discourse may be framed as such by 
those engaging in it (viz. the UN, GICHD, Europe-based international 
NGOs, but some national authorities from long-affected countries like 
Afghanistan and Lao as well), it is global in breadth rather than depth. 
Many voices are not heard in this discourse, despite the plethora of 
participants. My research material also allows me to examine the 
multiple and contested forms of expertise exhibited in mine action and 
trace how the construction and challenging of different experts reflects 
the regimes of perceptibility at play in mine action. 
My first exposure to mine-risk education “in the field”17 came in 
                                                 
17 I found throughout my research that “the field” as a designation is somewhat 
nebulous. At Cornell, it referred to anywhere beyond Ithaca, New York. In Khartoum, 
it referred to anywhere beyond the capital. In the three sub-offices located in either a 
UN compound or in the main urban area, it referred to the various task sites. But 
even those in Khartoum saw themselves in the field, relative to the colleagues in New 
York or Europe with whom they were in regular contact. That said, I have been able 
to conduct this dissertation research while “in the field” and upon my return from 
any field site. 
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early February 2011 while accompanying UNMAO’s Northern region 
program officer and one of the quality assurance (QA)/operations (Ops) 
officers to a village named Kauda in Southern Kordofan state. The 
QA/Ops officer needed to monitor one of the clearance teams in the 
area, and the program officer was gathering material for publicity, 
donor relations, and resource mobilization. 
 When we reached the village, we learned that many of the local 
community members had left the area temporarily in anticipation of a 
demolition by the clearance team being monitored. The village had 
been attacked with cluster munitions, and the international NGO 
assigned to the task was nearly ready to detonate the bomblets in situ 
(i.e. destroying the munitions where they were, rather than move them 
to one central location). 
 The international NGO did not have a dedicated mine-risk 
education team but attached a mine-risk education officer, Idris, to the 
clearance team. This officer’s responsibility was to help coordinate the 
clearance team’s work with the community’s daily life. In this case, the 
proximity of the bomblets to people’s homes led the mine-risk 
education officer to take several proactive steps. One was to utilize a 
USAID-established community radio station to broadcast public 
service announcements in three languages about the bomblet hazard. 
The other was to organize a daylong evacuation on the day of the 
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demolition. 
The program officer and I were unable to stay in Kauda for the 
actual demolition and were required to return to the UN’s compound 
before the community returned to their homes (we later learned that 
the demolition proceeded without any adverse consequences). On our 
way back to the helicopter landing spot to return to the UN camp, Idris 
offered to share the pictures from his digital camera for the program 
officer to use in funding proposals and other publications. I dutifully 
copied them as I was carrying my computer. 
When I examined the photos that evening, I noticed that even 
though Idris’s most recent experience with the community in Kauda 
conducting community liaison work was recent, the majority of the 
159 photos I copied depicted large audience mine-risk education 
sessions. There were several close-up images of various explosive 
remnants of war (sometimes next to a ballpoint pen to give an 
approximation of scale), but few, if any, images – however deliberately 
posed – showed engagement in a manner that suggested mutual 
exchange (Figures 12 and 13). These photos suggested to me that the 
rhetorical shift that the mine-risk literature described from one-way 
messaging to mutual collaboration through community liaisons did 
not necessarily correspond with how mine-risk education teams 
actually conducted their work on a day-to-day basis. 
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Figure 14: One of many photos given to me by a mine-risk education facilitator 
working in Southern Kordofan for the international NGO DanChurchAid. Photo from 
DanChurchAid. Taken in June 2010. 
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Figure 15: One of many photos given to me by a mine-risk education facilitator 
working in Southern Kordofan for the international NGO DanChurchAid. (The man 
with his back to the camera is wearing a cap then distributed in anticipation of 
South Sudan’s referendum and explicitly advocates a positive vote for secession.) 
Photo from DanChurchAid. Taken in June 2010. 
 
My next opportunity to observe mine-risk education came a 
month later when I accompanied a Sudanese UNMAO quality 
assurance officer to monitor a mine-risk education team conducting a 
session with a local community in Kassala, a state in Sudan’s east 
that borders Eritrea. UNMAO had tasked the NGO to conduct mine-
risk education in the area, and this quality assurance visit was 
required under the National Technical Standards and Guidelines for 
mine action in the country. UNMAO and the Sudanese NGO 
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coordinated this visit in advance, and we each took a vehicle to the 
village. The village was remote, accessible only by dirt roads that 
would quickly become a challenge during the summer rainy season. 
The strategy of following power lines for navigation failed here (and in 
many mine-affected areas), as there is no such infrastructure.  
A mine-risk education session follows an organization’s standard 
operating procedure, which conforms to both the UN’s International 
Mine Action Standards and Sudan’s National Technical Standards and 
Guidelines. UNMAO reviews each organization’s procedures before it 
accredits the organization to conduct the work. The mine-risk 
education sessions I observed were directed towards adults and 
followed similar lesson plans. After a team introduced itself to the 
audience, the session included segments on 
• recognizing mines/ERW, 
• unsafe behaviors with mines/ERW, 
• the physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects of 
mines/ERW, 
• identifying safe and dangerous areas, 
• learning about the different signs used to indicate 
mines/ERW, 
• what activities may be risky if mines/ERW are present 
(Figure 16). 
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Figure 16: A lesson plan for a mine-risk education session, observed by a UNMAO 
quality assurance office. Photo taken in March 2011. 
 
In this mine-risk education session, the team consisted of a 
male team leader, three female facilitators, and one male driver, all 
“local” staff (local in the sense of being Sudanese nationals, not 
necessarily from the Kassala region). While this team did have a male 
leader, mine-risk education is the only part of mine action in Sudan 
where women have leadership roles.18 In parts of Kassala, men and 
women do not interact openly (in some of the ultraconservative parts 
                                                 
18 One notable exception is an all-female clearance team in the South organized by 
Norwegian People’s Aid. Unfortunately, I did not have a chance to interact with this 
team, although their efforts were widely publicized online. 
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all men and women are segregated by a wall; the only brief interaction 
married men and women have is at night). NGOs are aware of these 
restrictions, hence the deliberately mixed gender teams.19 Because 
there were no women attending this mine-risk education session, both 
the male and female facilitators were able to conduct the session. 
However, if a mine-risk education session is for women in the 
community, men would not be allowed to be present, unless the 
community’s leader gave explicit permission. Given the smaller 
proportion of women facilitators, there are fewer mine-risk education 
sessions for women-only audiences. For the purposes of quality 
assurance monitoring, the UNMAO quality assurance officer said that 
while he is sometimes allowed to monitor these sessions, other times 
his presence is not allowed. Cultural norms largely dictate the QA 
officer’s presence, and beyond the UN’s operational requirements for 
quality assurance, these socio-gender norms directly shape what 
access people have to certain forms of mine-risk education. 
 The mine-risk education session began at 12:30 p.m. and lasted 
approximately an hour. About two dozen men from a Hadendawa tribe 
arrived. The mine-risk education session was conducted in Arabic, 
despite the fact Arabic is not the Hadendawa tribe’s first language. 
                                                 
19 J.B. Russell, “Staff Profile: Helping Women in Sudan,” Mines Advisory Group, 
August 18, 2011, http://www.maginternational.org/usa/news/staff-profile-helping-
women-in-sudan/?keywords=kassala. 
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Throughout the session, only a handful of the men in the audience 
engaged with the mine-risk education facilitators in Arabic, while the 
rest seemingly listened (though it was not obvious whether the whole 
group understood the presentation). Some of the exchanges prompted 
group laughter signifying comprehension; one facilitator joked about 
the region’s famed coffee making by saying “if you find unexploded 
ordnance, don’t put it in the fire to make coffee.” When I later brought 
up this question of linguistic comprehension, the UNMAO quality 
assurance officer and the mine-risk education team both claimed that 
mine-risk education can work through diffusion. Mine-risk education 
professionals reason that those who attended – and comprehended – a 
session could relay the information to others, included women in their 
homes and children who were unavailable at the time. While such 
diffusion could be aided with the variety of posters and printed 
materials, there did not appear to me to be a ready way to ensure or 
measure that such diffusion did in fact take place. 
The UN quality assurance officer listened to the content of the 
presentation, but he also was attentive to how the mine-risk education 
team presented the information. For example, facilitators ought to use 
a pointer to indicate the various photographed mines/ERW on the 
posters, rather than use their hand or fingers; the rationale was that 
using one’s own body to approach even a picture of a mine/ERW set a 
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negative example to the audience. Such quality assurance efforts not 
only ensure consistent and sanctioned information dissemination, but 
also they reinforce and refine such expertise performances. 
After the mine-risk education session, I spoke with the group, 
with the NGO team leader serving as my translator. They explained to 
me that this group of Hadendawa tribesmen had settled in the area 
only two years ago, having moved 5 kilometers (3.1 miles) away from 
their homes during the war between the Sudan Armed Forces of the 
North and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army of the South (aided by 
Eritrea). Some of the men in the group reported seeing both SAF and 
SPLA soldiers putting mines in the ground, and they described an 
accident four years ago that killed two men. This mine-risk education 
session was the first time they had received any such information on 
mines/ERW. 
The main idea they wanted to express to me, as a foreigner 
wearing the trappings of UN staff (ID badge, shirt with an emblazoned 
logo, riding in a white 4x4 vehicle; in contrast, the Sudanese UNMAO 
quality assurance officer had nothing that marked him as affiliated 
with the UN other than arriving in the same vehicle as me),20 was that 
                                                 
20 I can only infer that presenting myself as belonging to the UN was what motivated 
and structured out interaction and discussion on what this group of men said their 
community needed. It was by chance that the Sudanese QA officer did not have his 
badge with him that day, and as the UN did not have a compound in Kassala where 
the UNMAO office would be based, a badge was not required to complete daily job 
functions. 
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their concerns about mines/ERW in the area led them on a lengthy 
detour to collect water. As the community had not had an accident, it 
became clear that they had already established which areas they 
thought were dangerous. Their primary concern seemed less about 
clearing of the mines than the accessibility of functioning sources of 
clean water.21  
Later in a separate interview with this same mine-risk education 
team, I asked them about a part of their lesson I had heard in other 
mine-risk education sessions (including the one for new UN staff in 
country): “If you see one landmine, stop! Do not move any further, and 
do not try to retrace your steps. You are in a minefield! Call out a 
warning to any nearby for them to stop, and try to contact help.” The 
wording was almost identical in both contexts. 
 The response from the team (and other mine-risk education 
professionals) was that mine action is complicated, and one of the 
goals of mine-risk education was to simplify mine action’s message for 
non-experts. The intricacies of land release (discussed in chapter 
three) and the various negotiations involved in prioritization and 
resource allocation are all stripped out; the message becomes boiled 
down to “our job is to tell people if it is safe or not.” In this regard, 
mine-risk education lacks any element of community participation: 
                                                 
21 Any other UN assistance would most likely require some assurance or certification 
that the area did not have a mine/ERW risk. 
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organizations are unwilling and/or unable to spend the time and 
resources to explain the clearance work processes to communities and 
subsequently bring those communities into the clearance process. 
Moreover, this particular organization did not have UNMAO 
accreditation to do community liaison work, and its mine-risk 
education activities were limited to information sessions that draw less 
on the “technical” information that community liaison efforts engage 
and more on generalized, non-specific warnings. In an interview with 
another Sudanese UNMAO quality assurance officer, his expectation 
for proper mine-risk education was that these teams provide “general” 
rather than “technical” information.22 That’s it, khalas (a widely used 
Arabic idiom signifying finality; a more definitive expression of “that’s 
it”). Such a distinction by a UN official between general and technical 
knowledge – absolute safety being the metric of the former and relative 
risk of the latter – fits neatly within the existing idea of who is an 
expert and who is not. Perhaps more significantly, experts take it as 
obvious what the benefits are for communities to have their land 
cleared and used. Moving beyond that idea for the communities seems 
unnecessary, argue the experts. 
 At the same time, in mine-risk education and across mine action 
as a profession, practitioners argue that all mine action organizations 
                                                 
22 Wajdi Agrab, “Interview, Kassala, Sudan,” April 10, 2011. 
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“need” local communities. As one clearance team manager often 
repeated to me, “we only work with information.” Landmines and other 
explosive remnants of war are indeed victim-activated (viz. a victim’s 
often innocuous action – merely taking a step – is what causes the 
harm), but the lack of infrastructure in Sudan means that they are 
also largely victim-reported (i.e., a victim brings herself to the attention 
of relevant authorities). Moreover, mine action only “works” if local 
communities actually use the released land. A senior UN official stated 
what many other mine action actors often repeated to me:  “there’s no 
sense releasing land if people aren’t confident using it. That’s why you 
use community liaison or mine-risk education to balance between 
releasing land and community confidence.”23 Such an artificial 
separation of a key issue in mine-action – communities’ simple 
acceptance or rejection of land that outside organizations clear – 
serves mine-risk education professionals who subsequently offer their 
expertise as a means to resolve a complex impasse like community 
acceptance of cleared land. 
 The issue of expertise also emerges from this risk aversion, in 
part because it is not clear whether a mine-risk education team does 
in fact understand the contingencies involved in land release and is 
able to articulate them to local people. Reminiscent of Donald 
                                                 
23 Stephen Fantham, “Interview, Khartoum, Sudan,” April 28, 2011. 
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MacKenzie’s certainty trough,24 mine-risk education presents a firm 
certainty whereas other organizations in mine action emphasize “we 
don’t clear to 100%” or “in this business, you say ‘99.6%’.”25 Mine-risk 
education teams function in some ways as boosters for clearance 
activities, and in their “sell,” the caution – and even at times 
tentativeness – of articulating clearance fades in the effort to ensure 
community buy-in and acceptance. 
Later that month, I observed an international NGO’s mine-risk 
education team conducting informal briefings in Kassala. One briefing 
took place near a water well where women and children were filling 
their containers. Given the gender roles and expectations of the local 
people who lived in the area, the female team leader was the only one 
who approached the well while the other team members, who were all 
male, and I stayed with the vehicle at a distance (female leaders of 
mine-risk education teams are not uncommon, even in Sudan). The 
team leader carried a laminated book with large photos of common 
                                                 
24 Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: a Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile 
Guidance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990), 370. 
25 Steve Brown, “Mine Action - The Management of Risk,” The Journal of Mine Action 
3, no. 1 (Spring 1999), 
http://maic.jmu.edu/Journal/3.1/features/risk_brown/risk_brown.htm. Brown 
discusses why 99.6% and certainty in clearance are problematic. The figure 99.6% 
was a key feature of the early iterations/versions of mine clearance standards. 
99.6% is largely symbolic, meant to signify that clearance is never absolute but 
should be done to such a degree as to leave all parties highly confident that the area 
is now safe. 99.6% is no longer codified and has been replaced with the language of 
“all reasonable effort.” The mentality and notion of a lack of certainty or guarantee is 
one that still remains for many mine action actors. I will return to this issue of 
certainty in clearance in the next chapter. 
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mines/ERW in the area to illustrate her warnings and show what 
items ought to be brought to authorities or experts’ attention. During 
this briefing, some boys approached us, and the team members readily 
distributed posters (Figures 17 and 18). These posters depicted 
characters who resembled the “audience” in terms of physical 
appearance and clothing. 
 
 
Figure 17: A female mine-risk education facilitator approaches a group of women 
and children. This photo was taken at a distance, per cultural norms on gender 
interaction. Photo taken in March 2011. 
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Figure 18: A mine-risk education facilitator describes a culturally-adapted poster to 
a group of young boys before freely distributing additional copies. Note the poster 
character’s skin tone and clothing. The young girls in the previous figure who were 
in the area remained with their mothers and did not approach any of the men in the 
MRE team. Photo taken in March 2011. 
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After the conversations around the water well, the team 
encountered a gathering of Hadendawa men and offered a full mine-
risk education presentation. The female team leader discretely 
maintained her distance away from the men throughout the team’s 
interaction with the gathering. While this presentation was not 
planned and coordinated like most mine-risk education activities 
(although it is not uncommon for mine-risk education to be 
spontaneous and ad-hoc), the team proceeded with their well-
established and practiced lesson plan. 
It was not until the end of the mine-risk education session that 
day I observed the team functioning as the “eyes and ears” of clearance 
organizations and UNMAO/national authorities. When the team asked 
the crowd if they had ever seen any of the mines/ERW depicted on the 
various posters, two of the men mentioned a stray bomb several miles 
away. The team asked the men if they could direct the team to the 
munition, and with the two men in the passenger cab of the team’s 
pickup truck (and the rest of us riding in the truck bed), we drove for 
several minutes into a wide clearing where we indeed found a single 
piece of unexploded ordnance. The team took GPS readings of the 
lone, seemingly stray munition, and gathered rocks into a pile to spray 
paint them red. The location and item description went to the 
organization’s office and then to UNMAO. UNMAO would then at some 
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point in the future task a clearance organization to destroy or dispose 
of the munition. Given the munition’s remote location, seeming lack of 
impact on any community, and the mine-risk education team’s 
marking, such a task was a low priority. 
 
Figure 19: A mine-risk education team conducts community liaison work, noting the 
GPS coordinates of an explosive remnant of war and fashioning a warning marker. 
Photo taken in March 2011. 
 
In analyzing these various mine-risk education activities, 
anthropologist E. Summerson Carr’s point that “expertise is something 
people do rather than something people have or hold” reiterates a 
longstanding STS finding.26 In mine-risk education, “expertise requires 
the mastery of verbal performance, including – perhaps most 
importantly – the ability to use language to index and therefore 
                                                 
26 E. Summerson Carr, “Enactments of Expertise,” Annual Review of Anthropology 
39, no. 1 (2010): 18, doi:10.1146/annurev.anthro.012809.104948. 
  163
instantiate already existing inner states of knowledge.”27 
Nevertheless, even if such a verbal performance is supplemented 
with uniforms and other visual media (see figure 20 below),28 I want to 
highlight that such linguistic ability is necessary but ultimately 
insufficient for demonstrating recognized expertise. Mine-risk 
education teams in Sudan are indeed able to speak to an audience’s 
knowledge of long-lasting war and the mines/ERW that remain littered 
across the terrain, but most of the Sudanese population are already 
aware of the potential of mines/ERW to be a post-conflict concern. 
While communities returning to their homes after fleeing fighting may 
not know precise locations of mines/ERW that could potentially await 
their return, neither do mine-risk education teams. Thus, such a 
linguistic ability is insufficient in part because of an organizational 
hierarchy within mine action in which clearance organizations and the 
individuals with clearance experience challenge mine-risk education’s 
expertise, or even disregard such work. 
 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 19. 
28 Ibid. 
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Figure 20: A mine-risk education facilitator’ wears a pink smock emblazoned with a 
sponsoring organization’s emblem and uses a poster annotating pictures of warning 
symbols during a mine-risk education session. In a moment of reflexivity, I am aware 
of the glut of jargon and acronyms in my own work on this subject. Photo from 
UNMAS. Taken in June 2009. 
 
Critiques of Mine-Risk Education 
 Like the other dimensions of mine action, mine-risk education 
faces a fair amount of criticism and critique, primarily from within the 
field and not only from those slightly further away from its core 
activities or the audience to whom public relations and media staff 
direct their efforts (viz. donors). Such criticism centers on three 
separate but interrelated points: 1) competition between different 
forms of expertise; 2) the dominance of clearance’s paradigm in the 
hierarchy of mine action; and 3) uneven and unstable power dynamics 
of a postcolonial Sudan interacting with outside institutions. In the 
previous chapter on the Landmine Impact Survey, I discussed the 
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juxtaposition of nontechnical-technical work. This tension reemerges 
in mine-risk education as those who purport to be experts are 
challenged by others in mine action, namely those in higher social 
positions in the mine action field. 
The point of expertise that Carr and many others make is 
“enactment of expertise not only determines the value of cultural 
objects” – in this case mines/ERW – “it also confers value on those 
who interact with these objects, including the experts so enacted.” 
Taking Joseph Dumit’s concept of “expert objects” as objects that 
present occasions for the execution of expertise,29 the object for mine-
risk education is the environment whereas for clearance it is a more 
circumscribed area (ideally, the smallest possible one). Consequently, 
a crude demarcation between the primary object of mine-risk 
education and that of clearance is the former is about people, the 
latter about mines.30 Mine-risk education centers on an expertise in 
mine/ERW risk avoidance whereas clearance focuses on mine/ERW 
risk reduction (which some actors would frame as risk elimination). 
 The distinction between risk avoidance and reduction, arguably 
a false dichotomy, underpins Rae McGrath’s scathing critique of mine-
                                                 
29 Joseph Dumit, Picturing Personhood: Brain Scans and Biomedical Identity 
(Princeton  N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 16. 
30 While clearance has attempted to shift its base metric away from numbers of 
mines or square meters, these two quantities still largely define clearance work and 
remain the only common unit of analysis. Indeed, a common rhetorical question in 
mine action is “do you want to clear mines or do you want to clear land?” 
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risk education in his Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance: A 
Resource Book, published in 2000. While more than a decade old, 
much of the criticism is echoed in critiques of contemporary mine-risk 
education in Sudan.31 McGrath wrote: 
on the scale and in the format presently employed by many 
organisations are a damaging misuse of funds which could be 
put to better use surveying, marking and clearing minefields 
(emphasis in original)...they provide an opportunity for many 
organisations and individuals, with none of the engineering 
skills necessary to respond directly to landmines, to be involved 
in one of the major issues of our time...but understanding why 
the mine-awareness phenomenon happened does not change the 
fact that it is, in general, an inappropriate, wasteful and, often, 
paternalistic and culturally insensitive response.32 
 
McGrath offers the following hypothetical to illustrate how he views 
mine-risk education: “let me suggest a scenario where teams of 
educationalists and veterinarians (and perhaps butchers) from 
Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Angola [countries with long-standing 
mine/ERW contamination] had arrived in England at the height of the 
mad-cow disease crisis and launched similar awareness initiatives.”33 
                                                 
31 Rae McGrath co-founded Mines Advisory Group with his brother Lou (who only 
recently retired as chief executive of MAG due to health concerns), and MAG was an 
early part of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. When the 1997 Nobel 
Peace Prize was jointly award to Jody Williams and the ICBL, McGrath delivered the 
Nobel lecture on behalf of the ICBL. MAG has become one of the largest NGOs in 
mine action, although its presence in (North) Sudan was constrained by the 
Government of Sudan’s near categorical distrust of international NGOs. Moreover, 
the Government of Sudan consistently harassed and hampered such NGOs’ work 
and periodically confiscates (or steals, depending on one’s perspective) NGOs’ 
equipment and property. 
32 McGrath, Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance, 193. 
33 Ibid., 197. 
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His hypothetical draws upon an expected culture clash, between a 
group that has direct experience with the issue at hand (mines/ERW 
or mad-cow) and an outside group that purports expertise in a field 
that cannot offer a working solution (mine-risk educators or butchers). 
It is also important to note that mine-risk education organizations are 
far more likely than clearance organizations to be national (as opposed 
to international) and managed by national staff. Yet at the same time, 
McGrath’s invocation of Nicaraguans, Afghans, and Angolans 
attempting to provide unhelpful advice to English citizens is a reversal 
of what he currently sees in mine-risk education: wealthy foreigners 
telling local populations how to manage a humanitarian problem they 
already know and experience firsthand. It is this sort of imposition 
that leads McGrath towards charges of paternalism and cultural 
insensitivity (which I will address below). It also, on a very rudimentary 
level, highlights a particularly disparaging critique of mine-risk 
education from one of the world’s most prominent figures in mine 
clearance. 
Such critique is rooted in the question of mine-risk education’s 
inefficacy, the most consistent charge against mine-risk education 
organizations. “Knowledge, Attitudes, Practice” studies, a mainstay in 
evaluations of humanitarian work broadly construed, and surveys 
across other mine/ERW-affected countries reinforce mine-risk 
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education’s classification of the “forced” population sub-group: if an 
individual or group experiences a socio-economic pressure, they will 
knowingly take the risk of traveling through a suspected or confirmed 
hazardous area. In other words, no amount of mine-risk education can 
prevent people who deem the potential risk of being a mine/ERW 
victim to be less than the certainty of dehydration, starvation, or death 
by other means. Within Sudan, approximately half of all landmine 
survivors report having received mine-risk education (which is not a 
publicized fact but widely recognized within the mine action 
community). Fortunately, there are not a lot of landmine victims in 
Sudan (or globally, for that matter), relative to the total population 
size, extent of the civil wars, and other causes for severe illness and 
harm.34 And this 50% statistic is a far better outcome than 50% of 
people being victims/casualties. Put another way, a proportion of 
mine/ERW casualties will always include individuals who received 
mine-risk education; such is the nature of risk. The question remains 
how large or small that proportion is. 
Another critique of facing mine-risk education – and mine action 
more broadly – centers on the lack of “success” indicators, and related, 
                                                 
34 While UNMAO’s official figure of 1651 mine/ERW casualties and survivors from 
1964 through 2010 is certainly an underestimate, the orders of magnitude between 
this figure and the estimated two million dead and millions more displaced from 
their homes and communities are one context-shaping consideration constantly 
facing mine action efforts. See International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan”; 
Cockett, Sudan, 1. 
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the attribution problem whereby mine-risk education organizations 
cannot precisely attribute the observed results to their actions.35 Given 
that mine-risk education organizations conduct “activities which seek 
to reduce the risk of death and injury from mines and ERW,”36 they 
recognize there will nonetheless be some mine/ERW victims who did 
receive mine-risk education. At the same time, mine-risk education 
organizations are unable to respond to criticism with quantified 
metrics. Ted Paterson, head of the evaluation and policy research 
section of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining, wrote in a 2005 “state of the field” publication that 
If MRE is well targeted, it presumably is being delivered to the 
most vulnerable communities. In this case, we might find the 
numbers of accidents in communities receiving MRE has 
remained higher than those having no MRE, but we could not 
safely conclude that MRE is not working. This is termed the 
‘attribution problem’ – we cannot attribute the results observed 
                                                 
35 Perhaps the low costs of mine-risk education relative to clearance contributes to 
international donors’ willingness to continue funding mine-risk education regardless 
of clear, “evidence-based” indicators. Because clearance is a far greater expenditure, 
donors are more concerned with the efficacy and efficiency of how larger amounts 
are spent. According to UNMAO’s Multi-Year Work Plan from November 2010, which 
lays out the funding requirements to meet annual benchmarks/milestones for 
Sudan to meet its obligations under the Mine-Ban Treaty to be free of mines/clear 
known mines/ERW by 2014, mine-risk education has secured only 4% of the funds 
necessary for its work (US$260,000 of US$6,460,000). Compared to the 25% survey 
and clearance has secured (US$18,691,000 out of US$76,379,000), mine-risk 
education has a clear secondary position in mine action’s hierarchy. United Nations 
Mine Action Office, Sudan Mine Action Sector Multi-Year Work Plan 2010-2014 
(Khartoum, Sudan: United Nations Mine Action Office (Sudan), November 30, 2010), 
27. The pressure to provide success indicators stems large from within the mine 
action field and its on-going efforts to maintain its own professionalism. 
36 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 12.10 Mine/ERW Risk Education, 
Second Edition, 8. Emphasis added. 
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to the actions of the programme.37 
 
Mine-risk education’s “earlier” quantification efforts to tally the 
number of individuals who “receive” mine-risk education did not 
engage with questions of efficacy under the rationale of being an 
emergency effort (evidenced across a wide variety of international 
interventions and fields, including medicine). “Later” efforts towards 
qualitative community liaison work was a deliberate shift away from 
questions of quantification by working in such a way as to produce 
concise narratives illustrating mine-risk education’s work and leaving 
the inference that such work was generalizable and replicable if 
conducted by the same organization. 
While it may seem that mine/ERW clearance has ready 
measures of success – each mine/ERW found and destroyed is 
putatively a life saved – and mine-risk education lacks such measures, 
these two areas of mine action, while distinct, are not opposites. 
McGrath’s assertion of clearance’s primacy challenges the other 
dimensions of mine action. Other actors, including the UN quality 
assurance officer I accompanied on a quality assurance visit, discuss 
mine-risk education’s responsibility to give “general” rather than 
“technical” knowledge. This is possible because while mine-risk 
                                                 
37 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Mine Action: Lessons 
and Challenges, 332. 
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education’s main purpose is a rapid, less costly wide scale response, it 
ultimately assents to clearance, ceding authority. Mine-risk education 
organizations, teams, and individuals lay a claim to educational or 
liaison expertise, an expertise that does not remove the threat of mines 
but instead is based on how local people and communities can avoid 
the threats and risks. It is this point – that mine-risk education can 
not remove explosives – that critics of mine-risk education emphasize. 
McGrath et al’s hierarchy of capability speaks to Carr’s 
contention that “expertise emerges in the hoary intersection of claims 
about types of people, and the relative knowledge they contain and 
control, and claims about differentially knowable types of things.”38 
Mine-risk education hinges on populations that are ignorant of mines, 
and to an extent, this is accepted both in the mine action field and 
among local communities. Given the decades of protracted civil war 
between intractable belligerents, many civilian populations had very 
little agency or control over their lives and livelihoods for a significant 
portion, if not the majority, of their lives. With respect to mine action, 
there are few, if any, reports of local communities deliberately 
attempting to remove mines/ERW themselves.39 Discussions and 
sometimes disputes arise over mine locations, but not of the handling 
                                                 
38 Carr, “Enactments of Expertise,” 22. 
39 “Village demining” as it is termed within mine action is prevalent in Southeast 
Asian mine/ERW-affected countries. 
  172
and removing of the explosives. Mine-risk education reinforces this 
last point and becomes a means of reinforcing the expertise of 
clearance. 
Some Sudanese communities have also voiced their stronger 
preference for clearance over mine-risk education. During a mid-year 
status update meeting between UNMAO and Sudanese officials in early 
2011, one UNMAO official brought forward the point that communities 
in Kassala state “were sick of mine-risk education” and were 
responding to mine-risk education teams “to go ahead and clear our 
mines.” This was a marked departure from public media accounts of 
Sudanese communities that express gratitude for any mine action 
intervention, including mine-risk education. The UNMAO official made 
this point in part to suggest that UNMAO and Sudanese officials 
prioritize Kassala over the other two mine-affected states, Blue Nile 
and Southern Kordofan. Kassala had the greatest number of accidents 
in part because Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan were surveyed 
earlier and more thoroughly, with the dangerous areas demarcated 
longer. 
All of these concerns are couched within the legacy of 
colonialism. This legacy, to some degree, is perpetuated in McGrath’s 
account of cultural insensitivity embedded within mine action, and 
Sudan’s recent history as a colony of England and Egypt only 
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accentuates such concerns. While the specter of colonialism looms 
over the large international presence in Sudan in the form of the UN’s 
peacekeeping mission, African scholars and commentators also note 
local citizens and institutions have a role and responsibility in creating 
a viable state. As I discussed in the introduction, perhaps as equally 
pernicious as colonial subjugation is what Binyavanga Wainaina 
describes: “at some point you kind of start to understand that the soft 
power, the good of the NGOs, to some degree, allows the laxity of our 
own civil public, of our own institutions, of our own government to do 
the job they’re supposed to be doing.”40 Some of the failures of the 
modern Sudanese state can be linked back to the English-Egyptian 
“condominium” arrangement discussed in the introduction. Yet, at the 
same time, mine action organizations perpetuate, to an extent, the 
state’s failures to clear mines/ERW laid by government soldiers and 
local communities’ limited agency in potentially addressing such 
threats . 
A closer examination of the passages cited above also reveals a 
dominant primacy of universalist engineering: that military 
engineering expertise is the proper corrective to mine/ERW 
contamination. In effect, McGrath’s efforts at problem-simplification 
                                                 
40 Response to “How to Write About Africa” by Binyavanga Wainaina - Part 1 of 3, 
2008, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3d9qlHW8_3s&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
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allow only one type of response: namely a technical solution. The 
problem, for McGrath, is simply that there are mines/ERW in the 
environment, and the solution is obviously to remove them. There is 
little, if any, room to reform mine-risk education because of the 
primacy of removal. Accordingly, cultural paternalism is replaced with 
a calculating and “objective” engineering expertise which, in McGrath’s 
formulation (and many others), is both translatable and effective. Yet, 
as Anna Geltzer has shown in her analysis of evidence-based medicine 
in post-Soviet Russia, deploying such expertise and claiming an ability 
to speak on behalf of the evidence “reduce(s) the potential for conflict 
and mask(s) the power differential” between the expert and the non-
expert.41 However, such discourse does not wholly eliminate power 
differentials in these social relations,42 and there still a remains a 
space for mine-risk education to attempt another formulation of the 
mine/ERW problem. Thus, MRE issues a controversial challenge to 
the dominant clearance regime by expanding and complicating how 
this regime frames both the problem and the solutions. Articles by 
mine-risk education professionals such as Baaser et al explain mine-
risk education’s place in mine action as both awareness raising 
initiatives and a short-term response to mine/ERW accidents until a 
                                                 
41 Anna Geltzer, “Surrogate Epistemology: The Transition from Soviet to Russian 
Biomedicine (Ph.D Dissertation)” (Cornell University, 2011), 174. 
42 Ibid., 175. 
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clearance can be conducted; they also justify mine-risk education 
activities in part by pointing to its role in assisting clearance teams 
through community liaison work. 
Expanding and analyzing criticism of mine-risk education is not, 
for me as an analyst, to advocate a technologically deterministic 
perspective. While it is possible to read one part of McGrath’s criticism 
as arguing for engineering’s inherent superiority over mine-risk 
education, the main thrust of such criticism reflects the socio-
technical choices each group makes and how my actors understand 
and subsequently valorize what is “technical.” The choices mine-risk 
education organizations made had consequences for their work and 
place within mine action. Costs, speed of deployment, scope of 
intervention, required infrastructure, and other pragmatic concerns all 
factored into the decisions described above. The result of such 
decisions is that mine-risk education lost its ability to claim primacy 
in mine action. 
 
Conclusion 
 While the whole field of mine action publicly describes how 
different organizations and pillars work together to address the 
problem of mines/ERW, I have argued in this chapter that the power 
dynamics between different organizations have unintended 
  176
consequences on the ground. Mine-risk education is one technology, 
broadly defined, employed to address mines/ERW, but the challenges 
mine-risk education organizations and their teams face are not only 
because this technology is “social” while clearance is “technical.” 
Beyond the material aspects of explosives hidden in the ground, the 
way organizations and their teams enact and perform their expertise – 
and as stated earlier, thus exercise power – through mine-risk 
education has implications for what happens for local communities 
facing contaminated landscapes. With this chapter, I again illustrate 
that simply removing mines/ERW out of the ground is more 
complicated beyond any good intentions. At the same time, mine-risk 
education continues to privilege clearance, reinforcing some of the 
challenges I will discuss in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DOMINANCE OF CLEARANCE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Clear the whole area. All of it. Now. Someone could get hurt or 
killed. A kid. A woman collecting wood. Me. 
 I remember that train of thought the first time I accompanied a 
clearance team into a minefield to observe their work.1 On some level, 
the mandatory briefings at the team’s base – one for me as a visitor, 
and one by the team’s manager for his deminers – had been 
straightforward and were not any cause for alarm. Putting on personal 
protective equipment – a Plexiglas visor and Kevlar apron with my 
name, blood type, and insurance information visible from the front – 
seemed sensible as everyone else was doing it as well. But standing in 
the middle of a mined area with deminers working ever so carefully 
and deliberately started to make me anxious. Sure, I was in the same 
heat as everyone else, but all I was doing was standing in a cleared 
area next to a supervisor taking notes. I was not the one kneeling or 
putting my body a few inches away from a potential explosive. Hurry 
                                                 
1 “Minefield” is an imprecise term that describes any area of land that contains more 
than one landmine that may or may not be buried in a pattern. Thus, in Sudan and 
in other countries, minefields are wide swaths of land around a military installation 
with the mines laid in a systematic pattern as well as the shady area under a few 
trees along a footpath used by villagers. United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 
4.10 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations, Second Edition, 
2003, 25, 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/ima
s-international-standards/english/series-04/IMAS-04-10-Ed2-Am4.pdf. 
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up and make the area safe. Do what needs to be done. Be safe though. 
Lives are at stake. For many people, the idea of landmines and other 
explosive remnants of war hiding in a landscape is a terrorizing idea 
and leads to an understandable “get it out, now!” reaction.2 All of the 
“overly cautious” messaging in mine-risk education suddenly felt like it 
made a lot of sense. 
                                                 
2 “Get it out, now!” comes from The HALO Trust, one of the oldest and most 
established mine action organizations, based in the U.K. (HALO is an acronym for 
“High-risk Area Life-saving Organization”). HALO’s official motto is “GETTING MINES 
OUT OF THE GROUND, NOW.” While HALO does not work in Sudan for a variety of 
reasons (see Matthew Bolton, “Sudan’s Expensive Minefields: An Evaluation of 
Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance,” in Human Security 
and Mine Action Discussion Paper [presented at the Centre for the Study of Global 
Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 2008].), many key UNMAO officials spent a 
significant part of their mine action careers with HALO. HALO’s motto regularly came 
up in conversations, both as a deliberate invocation of the organization as well as an 
explanation for a particular course of action (doing something in order to “get mines 
out of the ground”). In some slightly humorous exchanges, the utterance “comma 
now” would indicate deliberateness and haste. 
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Figure 21: A Sudanese manual deminer. Photo from UNMAO. Taken in December 
2009. 
 
The figure above is one representation of mine/ERW clearance: a 
solitary figure (in the case of Sudan, always a man, usually with 
current or previous military training), wearing specialized protective 
equipment, scanning and probing the ground, inch by inch. While we 
may not consider the self-positioning of the deminer in front of a 
potential explosive to be wholly voluntary,3 the equipment denotes 
expertise and authority. His highly structured and ritualized motions 
                                                 
3 A deminer’s salary is approximately US$300 a month, a significant sum in a largely 
poor country where a falafel lunch is US$0.17 and a day’s worth of bread for a family 
costs less than US$0.50. 
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convey experience. 
The individual gestures of the deminer’s movements speak to the 
experience conveyed in his work are situated within what I have been 
describing throughout this dissertation as the clearance-oriented 
regime of perceptibility within mine action. Yet, this regime, while 
dominant, is far from static, and the clearance-oriented regime is 
comprised of many different ways of comprehending mines/ERW in 
the environment and the various subsequent reactions. Key among 
these is the international codification of “land release:” an effort to 
document clearance efforts performed by experts and to introduce 
evidence-based decision making through increased documentation of 
in-the-field choices towards clearance. 
Despite – or potentially given – this expertise, accidents during 
mine clearance occur regularly. Using accidents as analytical openings 
has long been a methodological mainstay of STS,4 and in the case of 
mine action, these accidents can be doubly unfortunate. The obvious 
misfortune for a deminer is apparent, but in some cases, what is 
revealed by the accident and subsequent investigation is also 
troubling. However, I argue that although mine/ERW accidents in 
                                                 
4 One exemplar of studying an accident to reveal the underlyind dynamics of the 
context surrounding the accident is Diane Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision: 
risky technology, culture, and deviance at NASA (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996). Accidents are one key subset of "controversy studies" within STS. See 
Pam Scott, Evelleen Richards, and Brian Martin, “Captives of Controversy: The Myth 
of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies,” Science, 
Technology, & Human Values 15, no. 4 (1990): 474–94. 
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uncleared areas are unfortunate, such incidents ultimately bolster 
UNMAO’s continued appeals for increased donor funds in an effort to 
minimize, if not eliminate, them. Far more troubling to donors, mine 
action organizations, and the people who use cleared land, however, 
are missed mines: mines/ERW found in an area deemed cleared that 
sometimes result in injuries and/or deaths. While such accidents 
could potentially derail and delegitimize UNMAO’s efforts, the brief 
history of UNMAO’s work in Sudan reveals that such incidents have 
not in fact halted or significantly challenged UNMAO’s ability to 
continue its work.5 In other words, accidents can both challenge and 
bolster UNMAO’s expertise and efforts. 
In examining the work and “expertise” of the UN Mine Action 
Office, I argue that such incidents are incorporated into several 
different aspects of the office’s efforts in such a way as to be 
normalized within the clearance-oriented regime of perceptibility. A 
recognition of nature’s agency and the power dynamics of geopolitical 
institutions all factor into how the mine action office manages 
potentially delegitimizing incidents. UNMAO has actively constructed a 
regime of perceptibility whereby these incidents are both anticipated 
and “explained away” in such a way that contingencies, rather than a 
systemic issue, is at fault. 
                                                 
5 I use incidents rather than accidents because not every missed mine resulted in an 
injury or death. Some missed mines have been discovered before any harm occurred. 
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My argument is not meant to detract from the laudable life-
saving efforts of UNMAO, other clearance organizations, and the 
people who undertake such work. Analyzing UNMAO’s efforts is a way 
of articulating how the life-saving efforts are highly contingent upon 
regimes of perceptibility that give primacy to what is familiar, 
technological, and material. In doing so, I address some of the less-
often asked questions about this large-scale technological endeavor: 
“whose goals do these clearance technologies serve? What political and 
economic interests shape the design and use of complex technological 
systems? And what assumptions about the natural world and human–
natural relations are embedded in these technologies?”6 
 
Institutionalizing Clearance in Sudan 
   
Official accounts of Sudan’s second civil war frame the conflict 
as spanning from 1983 to 2005 (with a ceasefire in place from 2002) 
with both the Northern and Southern militaries laying mines against 
the other side’s soldiers and civilians. While military engineers on both 
sides were trying to clear mines the other side was laying, such 
clearance was almost exclusively to achieve military objectives. It was 
not until 1996 when the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
declared a moratorium on landmines and the Northern government 
                                                 
6 Sara B. Pritchard, “An Envirotechnical Disaster: Nature, Technology, and Politics at 
Fukushima,” Environmental History 17, no. 2 (April 1, 2012): 221, 
doi:10.1093/envhis/ems021. 
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signed the Mine Ban Treaty a year later that humanitarian mine action 
efforts began. Each side then began to conduct its own clearance for 
civilians, but without explicit adherence to the International Mine 
Action Standards, their efforts were not recognized as effective by other 
mine action and international organizations, and the areas were 
resurveyed and recleared by later organizations. While some of these 
clearance efforts had some UN funding before the UN began 
conducting and coordinating clearance itself in 2002, the UN later 
deemed Sudanese clearance unacceptable and resurveyed those 
areas.7 
 The 2002 cease-fire agreement in place between the North and 
South enabled the UN’s World Food Programme to begin the UN’s first 
large-scale clearance efforts by contracting with MECHEM, a South 
African commercial mine action company, to clear the major roads in 
Sudan to facilitate food aid delivery. Mine action efforts steadily 
increased along with other humanitarian relief efforts, and the 2005 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement allowed the establishment of the UN 
Mission In Sudan (UNMIS), the UN’s most expensive peacekeeping 
mission to date. 
 As a part of the UNMIS, the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) was 
                                                 
7 I was unfortunately unable to find detailed information about these efforts as many 
of the Northern and Southern Sudanese organizations never kept detailed records 
and have dissolved due in part to the increasing role of international organizations. 
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responsible for all mine/ERW activities. With respect to clearance, 
UNMAO evaluated and issued accreditation to commercial 
organizations,8 nongovernmental organizations, platoons from various 
countries’ militaries that serve as peacekeepers in the UN Mission In 
Sudan, and Joint Integrated Demining Units (JIDUs), designed to be a 
combination of soldiers from the North and South working together to 
demine each other’s territory as a peacebuilding measure. One JIDU 
team operated independently while other JIDUs worked under the 
management of a commercial contractor. While I was unable to obtain 
specific figures on the proportion of Northern and Southern soldiers in 
these units, some of the JIDUs I encountered were comprised entirely 
of Northern Sudanese.  
In addition to these JIDU teams, several platoons of soldiers 
serving as “peacekeepers”9 from UNMIS also conducted humanitarian 
                                                 
8 The commercial contactors in Sudan include MECHEM, MineTech International 
(MTI), Minewolf, RONCO Consulting Corporation, and The Development Initiative 
(TDI). MECHEM is a wholly owned subsidary of South Africa’s Council for Scientific 
and Industrial Research (which partnered with NASA to operate one of its Deep 
Space Network stations during the Cold War). TDI split off from MTI as a separate 
company. RONCO was acquired by G4S, a global security services company, in 
2008. Interestingly, G4S also works as a commercial mine action company with its 
own UN contracts in South Sudan. Additionally, in 2008, G4S acquired ArmorGroup, 
another commercial mine action company with its own UN contracts in the South as 
well. Beyond its mine action business, G4S has contracts (some infamous) in the 
U.S. and across the globe to provide security to major international airports, 
government facilities, nuclear power plants, the London 2012 Olympics, and Cornell 
University’s Johnson Museum of Art. Like many other security companies, G4S has 
not escaped criticism and controversy on a wide variety of issues, although I did not 
encounter any specifically about its mine clearance work in South Sudan (not to say 
none exists). 
9 I use “peacekeepers” in quotes in light of their major failings to protect civilians. 
The most notorious case in UNMIS was in 2011 when Zambian soldiers remained in 
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mine/ERW clearance. These two groups, however, contributed a very 
small percentage of the cleared land in Sudan. (One task I performed 
for UNMAO was compiling a comparative cost-efficiency matrix of all of 
UNMAO’s implementing partners. UNMIS demining platoons’ paltry 
output could not be justified with claims of difficult operating 
conditions or particularly challenging tasks, and their costs were 
orders of magnitude greater than commercial contractors and NGOs.) 
Commercial contractors and NGOs conducted the majority of 
clearance in Sudan, which along with the military demining platoons 
cleared more than 5.8 square kilometers of mined/ERW-contaminated 
areas, destroying more than 7,500 antipersonnel and antitank mines 
and more than 7,000 ERW in 2010 using manual deminers, 
mechanical clearance tools, and mine detection dogs. UNMAO points 
to 2010 as bearing the successes of the land release policy, with cost 
per square meter at its lowest level, number of explosives cleared at an 
all-time high, and the number of hazardous areas deemed safe at an 
all time high as well. In light of these successes, the average ratio of 
                                                                                                                                            
the UN compound for 48 hours during Northern and Southern armed conflict in 
Abyei. “Scores” of civilians were killed, and thousands fled their homes. This follows 
a similar failing in 2008 when peacekeepers refused to allow civilians caught in 
Northern and Southern crossfire to seek refuge in their compound. See 
“EXCLUSIVE-UN Probes Peacekeepers’ Absence Amid Sudan Clashes,” Reuters, 
June 4, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/04/sudan-abyei-un-
idAFN0415698520110604; David Smith, “UN Admits Peacekeepers Failed in Sudan 
Clashes,” The Guardian, June 6, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/06/un-admits-sudan-peacekeepers-
failure. 
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explosive to amount of land cleared in 2010 was one explosive to 400 
square meters (or 4305 square feet, approximately 1/10 of an acre). 
This 1:400 ratio illustrates the powerful perception of hazard and risk 
a mine/ERW generates in that large tracts of land and roads remain 
unused by a relatively small number of explosives. In effect, there are 
three types of “mines”: those that are perceived to be in the 
environment but are not in fact present, those that are unpredictably 
positioned in that the explosive does not conform to standardized 
military practices or have inadvertently moved since placement, and 
those that largely conform to a clearance-oriented actor’s expectations 
of mines used in a deliberate and predictable manner by military 
forces. While in some mine/ERW-contaminated areas the explosives 
are patterned and systematic, other areas have random and 
haphazard contamination. Sometimes, patterned minefields can 
become slightly askew as torrential rains and strong sandstorms can 
move mines from their original positions or bury mines and other ERW 
under significant amounts of earth. According to modern Sudan 
historian Robert Collins, “there was little training of (Northern) 
government troops in guerilla warfare, and even less incentive to 
engage in it. The [Sudan Armed Forces of the North] was essentially a 
garrison army content to remain behind its fortifications in the main 
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towns protected by extensive minefields”10 (emphasis added). 
 
Figure 22: The yellow circle on the right indicates an Iranian copy of an Israeli No. 4 
antipersonnel mine which “protects” the Russian TM-57 antitank mine, circled in 
                                                 
10 Collins, A History of Modern Sudan, 253. 
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red. These mines were laid in a pattern by the North’s Sudan Armed Forces to 
protect a military camp set at the base of the small rocky mountains. While these 
systematically laid mines were easier to find, the sheer number of mines (several 
hundred antitank with twice as many antipersonnel, as two antipersonnel mines 
“guarded” each antitank mine), made this particular clearance task span several 
months. A single antitank mine is capable of destroying a vehicle. Photo taken in 
March 2011. 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 23: A mechanical asset using a flail attachment. Photo from UNMAO. Taken 
in November 2010. 
 
UN-sanctioned clearance operators in Sudan utilize three standard 
technologies: manual human deminers using metal detectors, mine 
detection dogs, and armored machines that my actors simply referred 
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to as “mechanical assets.” In South Sudan, one international NGO 
deployed an all-women team of deminers as a living example of equal 
employment in a traditional patriarchal society, but men do all of the 
clearance work in the North, where gender equality is far more distant. 
Manual human deminers wear personal protective equipment 
consisting of a Plexiglas visor and a Kevlar apron while sweeping a 
metal detector across a 1-meter wide lane. Every signal from the 
detector is investigated and treated as a potential explosive. While the 
majority of signals are false, when the deminer encounters an actual 
mine/ERW, he stops his work and calls a supervisor. All other 
deminers stop their work, and the supervisor decides whether to 
destroy the mine/ERW in situ (i.e., in place without any attempt at 
removal) or if the mine/ERW can be rendered safe enough for removal 
to a central collection location to be destroyed with any other items en 
masse. 
Mine detection dogs are trained dogs paired with a manual 
human deminer who serves as the dog’s handler. Dogs are attached to 
a long leash and walk back and forth in a “box” of ground demarcated 
with caution tape. When the dog detects an explosive’s scent, it 
indicates to its handler who then marks the approximate area from the 
box’s perimeter. After the dog has completed sniffing through the box, 
the handler investigates each signal from the dog with a metal 
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detector. Any mines/ERW discovered are handled as described above. 
Mechanical assets are armored machines that can till or plough 
through the ground to destroy and/or detonate mines. Different front 
attachments work with different types of terrain: some resemble 
tractors with fixed blades while others consist of several lengths of 
metal chains with “hammers” swung at the end. Additionally, different 
mechanical assets have varying degrees of durability: some are 
equipped for both antipersonnel and antitank landmines while other 
smaller machines can only handle the former. These machines move 
across the land until they encounter an explosive. Depending on how 
many are estimated in the area, the machine may continue or if 
numerous mines/ERW are present, manual deminers may be used. 
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Figure 24: A mine detection dog on a long leash held by a handler who has clearance 
and animal training. Photo from UNMAO. Taken in October 2010. 
 
In addition to IMAS, the Sudanese government’s National 
Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) and each organization’s 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) govern the requirements, 
practices, and guidelines at a given site for clearance (and all other 
mine action activities). This three-level structure is analogous to 
legislation based on federal (IMAS), state (NTSG), and local (SOP) laws 
and points to how international authority in mine action looms over 
such operations in Sudan. The most direct form of such authority 
comes from UNMAO quality assurance officers conducting a “desk 
review” of each organization’s SOP. The SOPs are reviewed both to 
ensure compliance with IMAS and NTSG and to reflect the conditions 
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facing the organization. The many organizations in working across 
Sudan may have varied casualty evacuation options, for example. In 
addition, certain practices are universally adopted across Sudan 
without being codified in IMAS, NTSGs, or SOPs. For example, a 
typical day for a clearance team begins before dawn, bringing all 
necessary equipment and moving from a campsite where the team 
stays to the worksite. The high temperatures call for starting work by 
sunrise to allow an adequate number of working hours before the heat 
becomes a legitimate safety hazard. 
 The team’s manager and leader give an overview briefing to the 
deminers outlining the day’s plan, and each deminer takes a turn to 
ensure his metal detector is calibrated properly. A key feature of a 
clearance team is a clear chain of command structure with prescribed 
communication channels and operating procedures, not unlike a 
military hierarchy. Managers were almost exclusively white 
expatriates, generally from Europe, Zimbabwe, or South Africa, while 
their subordinates, starting with the team leader, deputies, and then 
the deminers, were Sudanese men of varying ages. Some of the 
Sudanese deminers had military experience (not necessarily with 
engineering or explosive ordnance disposal), while others were civilians 
who sought the relatively well-paying employment that working on a 
clearance team offered them. 
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 Once in the work area, deminers work in linear lanes spaced 
several meters apart, both to reduce the risk of multiple explosions 
and casualties as well as interference from neighboring metal 
detectors. The physical work of searching for mines/ERW requires a 
deminer to sweep his metal detector from one side of his one meter 
wide lane to the other twice before he can progress incrementally with 
a predefined amount of overlap between forward moving sweeps. 
UNMAO officials tend to use as a rule of thumb an efficiency rate of 40 
square meters per day per deminer in light of – or arguably, despite – 
the wide variety of conditions that deminers face (40 square meters is 
430 square feet, approximately the size of a studio apartment). 
Different types of terrain (e.g. flat desert, high rocky hills, lush 
equatorial forests), high concentration of metal scraps, various 
densities of minefields, extreme seasonal weather patterns, and a 
whole host of other challenges associated with operating far from 
urban centers and built infrastructure all work against clearance 
teams. While individual deminers would not necessarily be punished 
for lower productivity, UNMAO quality assurance officers and 
managers could investigate with a team manager for explanations in 
variable productivity. 
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Figure 25: A deminer in the foreground has begun clearing a 1 meter wide lane while a team leader instructs another deminer as 
to where he should begin clearing his 1 meter wide lane. Photo from January 2011. 
  195
 
Figure 26: Pieces of metal a deminer stores in a standard issue bucket used to hold 
all non-explosive scrap encountered during clearance. Photo from January 2011. 
 
When a deminer’s metal detector emits a signal, the deminer 
must proceed as if the cause of the signal is in fact a mine. More often 
than not, the source of the signal is not a mine but innocuous scrap 
metal that remained from earlier human activity (e.g. empty food 
containers, broken equipment, etc.). However, until the deminer can 
visually verify what causes the detector’s signal, he must proceed as if 
he will encounter a mine/ERW. If a mine is found, the deminer will 
signal to a supervising member of the team. Depending on the type of 
mine, its position in the ground, and its location relative to the larger 
clearance area, mines can be defused and then manually moved to a 
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central location for later destruction with other mines. If a mine 
cannot be defused safely and removed, the whole team will stop its 
work until the located mine is destroyed in situ with other explosives.1 
In the example illustrated in Figure 22, manual deminers removed the 
antitank mines for a later combined detonation with other antitank 
mines and left the antipersonnel mines in the ground to be detonated 
and/or destroyed by the mechanical asset. After the mechanical asset 
(in this case, a Soviet-era tank with its turret removed and retrofitted 
with a front attachment equipped to fit either flails or a tiller) has 
neutralized the antipersonnel mines, either manual deminers or mine 
detection dogs will double-check the land. 
With both clearing land for the first time or double-checking a 
mechanical asset, a deminer’s tools include a metal detector as well as 
repurposed gardening tools: shears, clippers, and “probes” which are 
metal picks to poke through the ground horizontally. These tools are 
used to clear vegetation and tripwires that if pulled could detonate an 
explosive. Given the generally low number of mines relative to the 
amount of area cleared, some mine action actors describe manual 
clearance as gardening or archeology. Without encountering 
                                                 
1 One type of mine found in Sudan is a “No. 4” originally manufactured in Israel but 
copied by other countries including Iran. No. 4 mines were involved in numerous 
deminer accidents during clearance, which led one UN quality assurance officer to 
issue a written recommendation that No. 4 mines always be destroyed in situ rather 
than lifted from the ground. See Andy Smith, “Mines Israel No.4,” DDAS: Database of 
Accident Records, accessed October 7, 2012, 
http://www.ddasonline.com/minesIsraelNo4.htm. 
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explosives, manual deminers carefully comb through the earth as one 
imagines an archeologist uncovering ruins or a skeleton. Cutting 
vegetation and searching for tripwires that could detonate a mine 
could be mistakenly interpreted as an attentive gardener, if it was not 
for the Kevlar apron and Plexiglas visor that offer protection from 
explosions. Many deminers state – both in public settings such as 
interviews and websites as well as in private conversation – that they 
are proud of the work they do to help humanitarian efforts; other 
deminers do not deny such a feeling but they also point out – in public 
and in private – the danger, physical discomfort, heat, boredom from 
meticulous tedium, and the dangers of complacency. 
This manual work is the most time and resource consuming, but 
it is generally perceived in the mine action community as the most 
effective and trustworthy technology in mine action. Such effectiveness 
and trustworthiness come with costs, primarily in terms of time but 
potentially financial as well, and these costs have led some mine 
action organizations to highlight other available means in the mine 
clearance “toolkit.” 
 Mine detection dogs (MDDs), it should be noted, are not 
clearance technologies per se in that the dog can only indicate whether 
it perceives the scent of an explosive. A deminer must still do the work 
of finding the precise location of the mine and then neutralize the 
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explosive. In Sudan, MDDs are used for area reduction, i.e., sniffing 
the perimeter of a large Suspected Hazardous Area/Confirmed 
Hazardous Area/Dangerous Area until an explosive is located to 
decrease the area a deminer has to clear. MDDs are also used to verify 
that no explosives remain after a mechanical asset has processed an 
area. The National Technical Standards and Guidelines in Sudan 
stipulate that if an MDD is the first technology used to investigate an 
area for mine/ERW contamination, the area covered by the MDD must 
be verified by another MDD. 
Mechanical assets are used as in conjunction with manual 
deminers and MDDs as they can detonate and destroy antipersonnel 
and antitank mines (depending on the specifications of the asset). 
Using a mechanical asset to determine that an area does not have 
mines/ERW is the quickest method of releasing the land, and in some 
cases where mines/ERW are patterned, a mechanical asset can 
quickly find where the mine lines start so that manual deminers spend 
less time processing uncontaminated areas. At Haldet Sharq in 
Kassala state, the JIDU clearance team discovered the pattern of 
mines in the area and manually removed the antitank mines while 
leaving the antipersonnel mines. Patterned minefields are usually near 
a military installation or camp as the mines serve a defensive rather 
than offensive purpose; in my experience in Sudan, the mines/ERW 
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that affected local communities away from military bases were rarely 
predictably organized in a way that facilitated “easier” clearance. All 
areas processed by a mechanical asset must be verified either with 
manual deminers or an MDD (MDDs must wait several days before 
conducting verification as the mechanical asset may have “kicked up” 
the scent of explosives that may confuse the MDD).2 
Given Sudan’s extreme heat, both MDDs and mechanical assets 
cannot work as many hours as a deminer: MDDs are long-haired 
breeds that cannot withstand high temperatures, and mechanical 
assets can readily overheat and break down. Other conditions, such as 
wind speed, which may interfere with a MDD’s sense of smell, or hilly 
and rocky terrain that precludes the use of a mechanical asset, can 
impede the rate of clearance. Manual deminers, on the other hand, are 
generally expected and have proven able to conduct clearance for the 
NTSG-required six hours a day, with a 10-minute break every hour. 
 Collectively, these three technologies constitute a critical part of 
the clearance regime of perceptibility: a demonstrable materiality 
manifested only through visual evidence, not local suspicion. Indeed, 
clearance sites – much like laboratories and other settings for STS 
analyses – are “disciplined spaces, where experimental, discursive, and 
                                                 
2 United Nations Mine Action Office, National Technical Standards and Guidelines 
Sudan, Edition 10, Version 1 (Khartoum: United Nations Mine Action Office, 
September 1, 2010), 347, http://www.sudan-
map.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=41&Itemid
=39. 
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social practices were collectively controlled by competent members.”3 
Across the sites are markers, an attempt at order and systemization, 
established and enforced by social groups in mine action. These 
attempts, however, span landscapes that have a lower concentration of 
mines/ERW than initial estimates suggest.  
 
Standardizing Clearance and Developing Land Release  
“Land release isn't 100% perfect, but it gets hazards reduced 
and people gain confidence. Yes, mistakes can happen, but 50 million 
square meters released with one mistake…”4 
 
 This quote is from Mohammed Eltayeb, Sudan’s National Mine 
Action Center’s regional operations coordinator. He is responsible for 
overseeing day-to-day operations of the three sub-offices, and we were 
discussing the subject of “land release” in mine action. In the audio 
recording of our conversation, Eltayeb’s voice trails off at this point, 
and his silence speaks to the power of “mistakes” in mine action. For a 
government or UN official, a mine/ERW that remains in the ground 
can be a “mistake.” But for the man, woman, or child who steps on 
that mine/ERW, that mistake is a lifetime of hardship not only for 
him- or herself, but also the wider social network of family members, 
relatives, and neighbors. 
                                                 
3 Shapin and Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump, 39. 
4 Mohammed Eltayeb, “Interview, Khartoum, Sudan,” May 5, 2011. 
  201
 Such “mistakes” in mine action are particularly poignant for 
people in the field who have experienced the codification of “land 
release” into the International Mine Action Standards in 2009 and its 
subsequent adoption across all mine/ERW clearance work. The 
definition of land release is at first glance broad and generic. It is 
defined as “the process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, or 
better define, Confirmed Hazardous Areas and remove all suspicion of 
mines/ERW through non technical survey, technical survey and/or 
clearance,” with “all reasonable effort” defined by national authorities.5 
While the codification of land release is a recent global 
development across all of mine action, UNMAO’s Deputy Programme 
Manager Leonie Barnes made the claim in a 2010 presentation on the 
subject that “land release is a term used for something that was done 
instinctively in the past – in some cases better than others and in 
some cases not at all well and in some cases not at all.”6 Of particular 
concern to the mine action community, for whom donor funding and 
foreign aid are its limiting factors, is that 
in the past, the practice of releasing land was based on a 
                                                 
5 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 4.10 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, 
Definitions and Abbreviations, Second Edition, para. 3.155. 
6 Leonie Barnes, “Mine Action and Technology - Mechanical Clearance and Land 
Release” (presented at the Mine Action Technology Workshop 2010, Geneva, 
Switzerland, September 20, 2010), 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/technology/Technology-Workshop-2010/K-
7Sept2010-LR-Sudan-TechWS.pdf; 
http://www.gichd.org/operations/technology/mine-action-technology-
workshops/third-mine-action-technology-workshop-6-8-september-2010/overview/. 
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subconscious and subjective decision-making process by 
demining organizations in the field. There is, in principle, 
nothing wrong with informal decision-making, but when it 
causes excessive clearance, and subsequently a waste of 
resources, there is a need to reflect on whether current practices 
are efficient and if they should be challenged.7 
 
In other words, when an area with a large perimeter was entered into a 
database, that entry was subsequently taken at face value by data 
entry staff and experienced supervisors, who are required to ensure 
that all data are verified with the findings from the field. In light of 
Sudan’s large land area, one senior UNMAO official pointed out to me 
“you cannot poke and prod your way from Khartoum to Juba” (the 
capitals of Sudan and South Sudan, respectively, are 750 miles apart, 
approximately the same distance as Ithaca, New York to central South 
Carolina). Thus, determining and demarcating which areas need to be 
cleared is just as important as the actual clearance itself. These 
decisions are made both in the field and behind a desk in front of 
computer screens.
                                                 
7 Bach, “Clearing Areas Right; Clearing the Right Areas.” 
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Figure 27: An example of mapping the smallest area of land deemed to require clearance. The outer dotted circle was the 
perimeter of an area initially thought to be contaminated. The inner polygon – marked with turning points labeled TP1, TP2, etc. 
– marks the area where mines/ERW were found. The remaining land was classified as “canceled” with no evidence of 
mines/ERW, and no mines/ERW have subsequently been found. Diagram from GICHD. Published in April 2011.1 
                                                 
1 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Guide to Land Release: Technical Methods, 15. 
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The establishment of land release into the lexicon and 
operations of mine action emerged in part from the evolving 
understanding of what constitutes “clearance.” While 1997 was a 
watershed year for mine action with the Mine Ban Treaty coming into 
being and the UN General Assembly establishing immediately 
thereafter the UN Mine Action Service as a global focal point for the 
field, it wastwo years for a first draft of the International Mine Action 
Standards to be published. Moreover, it was another two years after 
that before these standards were ratified and accepted by the Mine 
Action Service. 
 One reason for this lengthy process was the IMAS Review Board 
– the officially designated body responsible for drafting and overseeing 
the International Mine Action Standards – struggled with how to define 
“clearance.” One of the longest serving members of the IMAS Review 
Board recalls, “central to the standards was an agreed definition of 
what "Clearance" actually meant. It did not refer to mines, it referred 
to areas. It did not mean removing most mines from an area. It meant 
clearance of ALL explosive hazards to an agreed depth over that area.”1 
The broader implications of these initial standards was the premise of 
“mine-free” nations, the desired end-state for mine action within the 
                                                 
1 Andy Smith, “The Death of the International Standards,” Landmines and 
Humanitarian Mine Action, November 2011, 
http://www.nolandmines.com/Death_of_IMAS.htm. 
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activist-oriented regime.  
In addition, the International Mine Action Standards contain 
several distinctions regarding the various end states of Suspected 
Hazardous Areas, Confirmed Hazardous Areas, and Dangerous Areas 
(all of which have specific, codified definitions). While the glossary for 
all of the professional jargon spans 44 pages, some key terms are 
worth noting. The most recent definition of clearance took effect in 
2009 and states “in the context of mine action, the term refers to tasks 
or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine 
and ERW hazards from a specified area to the specified depth.”2 
Consequently, cleared land is “an area that has been physically and 
systematically processed by a demining organisation to ensure the 
removal and/or destruction of all mine and ERW hazards to a specified 
                                                 
2 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 4.10 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, 
Definitions and Abbreviations, Second Edition, para. 3.35. Manual demining is the 
only method under IMAS and most mine affected countries’ national authorities that 
fully satisfies the requirements of clearance. See also Benjamin Wang and Rae 
McGrath, “a Plethora of Photos,” Facebook, July 16, 2011, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10100137545868804&set=a.89522119
7414.2528675.3301289&type=3&theater. Andy Smith, a former member of the IMAS 
Review Board who is responsible for two prominent mine action websites, 
www.NoLandmines.com and www.DDASOnline.com (which stands for Database of 
Demining Accidents) has published sharp critiques of the current IMAS and 
codification process. While DDASOnline contains as many demining accident records 
as he can procure, NoLandmines is a personal forum for Smith to describe many 
shortcomings of mine action, particularly the UN’s role in Sudan (and later Libya). 
Among his many criticisms of the top-down control exerted by UNMAS and GICHD 
(which he parodies as “GiHAD”), Smith points to IMAS revisions that allow for 
mechanical demining to constitute clearance, which coincided with UNMAO’s 
increasing reliance on mechanical clearance and the few international organizations 
capable of operating such machines. Smith’s contention is that UNMAS and GICHD 
are colluding to allow clearance organizations to profit from demining contracts. 
While I did not learn of Smith’s critiques until after I returned from Sudan, his views 
are worth noting as one perspective of a former “insider.” 
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depth.”3 Thus, even a decade after the first standards and aspirations 
for “mine-free” nations, the International Mine Action Standards – as a 
baseline for all large-scale clearance efforts – are still focused on the 
“mine-free” ideal advocated within the activist-oriented regime. The 
implications of this ideal for land release is a continual pressure for all 
areas to be cleared, whether mines are there or not. 
 What is central to these dimensions of clearance is the act of 
removal and/or destruction of a mine/ERW that was materially 
present. This may seem obvious, but it is a clear contrast to a 
“cancelled” area. “Cancelled” is an official IMAS designation for “an 
area of land previously recorded as a hazardous area which 
subsequently is considered, as a result of non-technical and technical 
surveys, not to represent a risk from mines and ERW.”4 While a 
cleared area and a cancelled area may both be the same end state of 
an area previously perceived as containing a hazard, the process by 
which such end states are reached is significant. A cancelled area is 
the result of expert judgment that a previous designation of hazard 
lacks any credible evidence. The IMAS definition for cancelled area 
contains the note “this change in status [from hazardous to cancelled] 
will be the result of more accurate and reliable information, for 
                                                 
3 United Nations Mine Action Service, IMAS 4.10 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, 
Definitions and Abbreviations, Second Edition, para. 3.36. 
4 Ibid., para. 3.29. 
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example from non-technical survey, and will normally only be 
authorised by the [National Mine Action Authority], in accordance with 
national land release criteria. The documentation of all cancelled areas 
shall be retained together with a detailed explanation of the reasons 
for the change in status.” 
A critical part of the International Mine Action Standards 
definition of land release is the clause “all reasonable effort,” and one 
key element of “all reasonable effort” is that such efforts are “evidence-
based.” Of course, “evidence-based” begs for unpacking, and 
“objective” evidence comes from subjective clearance operators and the 
technologies they employ to create such objectivity. It is also worth 
noting that according to IMAS, a “community’s fear of mines/ERW or 
residual contamination does not constitute evidence.”5 Instead, 
evidence comes from those with expertise in mine action organizations 
that follow IMAS and other top-down standards and requirements. 
Indeed, The Journal of ERW and Mine Action dedicated its 
August 2009 to land release in what was one of the first public 
discussions of the new addition to the International Mine Action 
                                                 
5 Håvard Bach, “Land Release: Purpose, Principles and Practice,” n.d., 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/1/Land%20Release-
%20Purpose%2C%20Principles%20and%20Practice%20Havard%20Bach.ppt. 
“Roller” and “large loop” are two easily deployable mine/ERW detection techniques. A 
roller resembles a steamroller that moves across the ground. A large loop is a metal 
detector in the shape of a rectangle made of thin pipes held by straps between by two 
deminers. The deminers walk at a measured pace and are able to scan the ground 
between them. 
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Standards. One GICHD official made the point in an article that  
if the local population still suspects mines after land has been 
released by survey, this skepticism should not prevent release; 
rather it compels a need for more confidence-building, preferably 
through better explanation of why the land can confidently be 
released or, at worst, by applying some degree of physical 
confidence-building (roller, large loop, etc.).6 
 
Indeed, the phenomenon of landscapes contaminated after a conflict 
“come(s) into being through multiple histories that did not all agree on 
the terms by which [mine/ERW placement] could be shown to have 
happened or not.”7 It is the physical material in the environment that 
socio-technical responses address, and these responses are successful 
if they can demonstrate either the absence of mines/ERW or “proof” of 
their removal. 
Returning to the question of what constitutes evidence, mine 
action organizations working within the clearance-oriented regime 
point to physical indicators such as abandoned military outposts or 
animal carcasses as well as local accounts of fighting and the presence 
of either Sudanese soldiers or South Sudanese rebels. By focusing on 
the “evidence,” the person or organization making such a 
determination has effectively – although perhaps unintentionally – 
removed himself and his judgments from view. Moreover, the person or 
organization tacitly imbues “evidence” with a particular context that 
                                                 
6 Bach, “Clearing Areas Right; Clearing the Right Areas.” 
7 Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, 8. 
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also remains out of view when such evidence justifies a particular 
course of action. I will return to this issue, but it is worth noting here 
that the international community’s requirement for “evidence” as a 
basis for interventions functions as a justification for UNMAO 
accepting either a clearance organization’s decision to clear or not to 
clear an area. However, such evidence is not a certification that the 
area is free of all mines/ERW. In fact, clearance organizations have 
deliberately adopted a regime of perceptibility that is incommensurable 
with certifying an area as free from mines/ERW. The clearance 
regime’s concerns about efficient use of limited financial resources and 
its acknowledgement of natural and material contingency – namely 
mines/ERW that move and shift after rain and sand storms – preclude 
providing certification that all mines/ERW are gone. 
This inability to certify complete mine/ERW removal serves to 
demonstrate what is possible within the clearance regime given a 
particular constellation of interests, priorities, and available 
technologies. The people who act on these interests and priorities with 
the technologies available to them also lay claim to technical expertise; 
as the origins of mine/ERW clearance suggest, such expertise draws 
from military engineering experience. While there is a distinction 
between clearance of mines/ERW for military operations on one hand 
and humanitarian aid on the other, such a distinction is one of degree, 
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not kind. Humanitarian clearance is military clearance to a more 
thorough degree and a lower acceptable risk for civilian populations 
instead of soldiers. 
UNMAO and clearance organizations recognize the constraints of 
their technology and of their regime of perceptibility by virtue of having 
limited financial resources. While UNMAO and others do not use 
language and discourse along the lines of “the limits of available 
technologies and the agency of nature,” these two dimensions very 
directly shape UNMAO’s work. Furthermore, the use of evidence to 
justify “all reasonable effort” is noteworthy, especially as it is a lesser, 
weaker requirement from guaranteed clearance that was characteristic 
of much of the early rhetoric of mine action. “All reasonable effort” 
succeeds the arbitrary and symbolic figure of 99.6% clearance which 
had a short life in official discourse; just as clearance organizations 
deemed 100% clearance impossible because of environmental and 
material factors beyond their control, 99.6% was impossible because 
there was no way to calculate what that figure meant in each 
clearance task. 
The phraseology of the “all reasonable effort” requirement in 
land release still readily allows for on-the-ground decisions by 
clearance team managers in consultation with UNMAO officials in the 
field (and to a limited extent with Sudanese authorities’ involvement). 
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In one respect, moving away from an absolute standard of clearance in 
which every mine/ERW is found and destroyed reflects a change in 
how clearance professionals constructed their regime of perceptibility: 
several years of experience in various countries revealed the limits of 
the various clearance technologies in the face of dynamic and variable 
environmental conditions. 
Equally important as an outside expert’s judgment is what 
information local communities offer to the clearance organizations 
(and indirectly, national mine action authorities). Given the emphasis 
on efficiency and “clearing mines, not land,” clearance organizations 
will not generally clear land that communities are already using or 
people say they feel safe using and traveling across. Current land use 
by locals is stronger evidence for clearance organizations than local 
communities’ suspicions of contamination. Put another way, clearance 
organizations will readily accept land usage as evidence for deciding 
not to clear an area, but they do not treat local suspicions as 
“evidence” and instead investigate and interrogate such claims. The 
rationale is not that usage implies a lack of mines; rather, usage 
indicates community willingness and/or trust in an area to have an 
acceptable/tolerable level of risk. However, on the other hand, if 
communities express suspicions about contamination, these claims 
are suspect and require readily identifiable evidence to 
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substantiate/justify any “technical” measures such as technical 
survey or full clearance. If these field managers decide on a limited 
intervention as a material demonstration of their belief against the 
presence of mines/ERW, such actions reinforce their authority and 
power position. There is thus a significant asymmetry in clearance 
organizations’ perceptions of local views: these organizations willingly 
accept a community’s land usage as “evidence” that justifies land 
release while simultaneously dismissing the same community’s 
suspicions of mine/ERW presence if those suspicions do not conform 
to “expert” expectations. Such asymmetry highlights how such 
organizations prioritize efficiency and efficacy over lengthy, exhaustive 
clearance.8 
Indeed, Sudan’s National Mine Action Center’s regional 
operations coordinator Mohammed Eltayeb spoke to this very point in 
the conversation I cited at the beginning of this section. When his 
voice picked up again, he continued: “[land release] doesn't mean you 
are free of mines. You can miss mines during technical survey; even 
during 100% clearance you can miss mines because of limited depth 
[requirements].” For Eltayeb, he managed the inherent uncertainty in 
mine/ERW clearance by telling me “we can't be sure of 100% 
                                                 
8 This is not to say that clearance is always rapid and minimal, but the emphasis of 
clearance is to clear no more than necessary to satisfy the standards and 
requirements in place. 
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clearance, but we are doing our best to release land in the proper way. 
Alhamdulillah (Praise to God), we have a low (accident/casualty) 
rate.”9 
 
When accidents happen 
UNMAO officials and other mine action actors whose experience 
is based on working in a variety of mine-affected countries maintain 
that the extent of Sudan’s landmine contamination problem is not 
particularly severe relative to other countries’ and considering the 
scope of Sudan’s civil war and the size of the country. By the end of 
2010 (the last available figures available), UNMAO and national 
authorities recorded at least 1,651 mine/ERW casualties 
(approximately 30% of which were fatalities). In 2010, UNMAO and 
national authorities recorded 67 individual casualties (22% fatal) up 
from 40 casualties in 2009. In more than half of the accidents (37), the 
cause was unknown. Only four casualties were directly attributed to 
antipersonnel mines. In countries like Sudan, UNMAO and Landmine 
Monitor believe that such figures are too low; the lack of infrastructure 
and marginalization of much of Sudan means it is almost certain that 
some accidents go unreported. 
 Mine/ERW accidents are the results of several situations: 
                                                 
9 Eltayeb, “Interview, Khartoum, Sudan.” 
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 A person or animal encountering a mine/ERW in an area not 
designated or known to be suspected or hazardous; 
 A person or animal encountering a mine/ERW in an area 
designated or known to be suspected or hazardous, but not 
yet cleared or released; 
 A person or animal encountering a mine/ERW in an area 
designated or known to be suspected or hazardous and 
cleared or released (referred to as a “missed mine”); 
 A deminer being injured or killed in the process of working at 
a task site. 
 
While UNMAO and Sudanese authorities will investigate any reported 
accident, the last two events result in more thorough inquiries 
involving a greater number of investigators as such events imply 
negligence or wrongdoing. In this section, I focus on the third situation 
– missed mines – which is the most troubling to mine action 
organizations and communities alike. Beyond asking how such 
accidents happen, I utilize UNMAO’s investigations as an opening into 
what such accidents say about disciplining an environment and the 
efforts of centralized and professional bureaucracy in contaminated 
landscapes. What is taken for granted and what is the subject of 
inquiry reveals UNMAO’s regime of perceptibility and how one form of 
order emerges. 
 
Accident #1 
 
In August 2010, after UNMAO had been in Sudan for more than 
five years (but three months before my arrival in the country), a local 
farmer in the town of Al Lafa in Kassala state in the eastern region of 
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Sudan detonated an antitank mine while plowing his field with a 
tractor. Remarkably, the farmer only had minor injuries. The antitank 
mine was most likely a Belgian manufactured PRB M3 Anti Tank 
mine.10 
 When UNMAO learned of the accident, the office realized that 
the area of the accident had been previously cleared.11 An initial 
investigation team examined the site of the accident and visibly 
identified two additional PRB M3 Anti Tank mines. When another 
clearance team cleared an area with a radius of 20 meters from the 
accident site, they found a third PRB M3 Anti Tank mine and a PRB 
M35 Anti Personnel mine. UNMAO then convened a higher-level board 
of investigation inquiry upon these findings because they called 
entirely into question the earlier “clearance” and “release.” 
However, over the course of the board of investigation, the 
                                                 
10 “PRB M3 and PRB M3A1 (Belgium),” Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance, 2011, 
http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Mines-and-Mine-Clearance/PRB-M3-and-
PRB-M3A1-Belgium.html. 
11 This section draws in part from a publicly distributed “Lessons Learned” document 
issued by UNMAO to all of its implementing partners and the mine action 
community. This document is an anonymized summary of UNMAO’s  formal board of 
inquiry investigation; the findings of such investigations are as a matter of practice 
internal and confidential. After the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Sudan concluded 
in June 2011, UNMAO handed over all of its records to the Sudanese national 
authorities in the National Mine Action Center (NMAC). Upon my request, NMAC 
provided me a copy with their Information Management System for Mine Action 
database, which ought to contain every mine action report produced. However, as 
discussed in chapter 1 of this dissertation, “data quality management” has not been 
uniformly and consistently employed. Thus some reports are mislabeled and 
uniformity and consistency is lacking. While it may be possible to fill in the gaps and 
provide a more identifying account of the Lessons Learned documents, such de-
anonymization is not necessary for my purposes here. 
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investigators found that the clearance organization’s documentation of 
its work was woefully inadequate. As Steve Fantham, UNMAO’s deputy 
chief of operations states, “this made it very difficult for the [Board of 
Inquiry] team to determine the extent of the cleared area, mine lines 
worked on, technical survey completed to ‘fade out’ the task, etc.”12 
Normally, when a clearance organization completes its task, it 
designates an easily identifiable point as a fixed benchmark. Such a 
benchmark – a blue spray-painted rock with the letters “BM” in white 
– serves as a reference for turning points that delineate the perimeter 
of the cleared area. This clearance site, though, lacked a benchmark, 
and several turning points were more than 100 meters apart with one 
at 212 meters apart. This is problematic as such large distances 
between turning points makes it more challenging to “connect the 
dots” and allows a higher degree of uncertainty in establishing if an 
area has been cleared or not that could pose dangerous. 
Moreover, records that would give an indication of how the 
clearance organization worked were missing: “there was also no daily 
work sheets, daily work completed, detector testing, site map, visitors 
log, etc Note: the Mine Action office accepted this at the completion 
                                                 
12 Steve Fantham, BOI 2010/03 INVESTIGATION INTO MISSED MINE AT AL LAFA 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Khartoum, Sudan: United Nations Mine Action Office, 
November 23, 2010), 1. 
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and hand-over of the task”13 (emphasis in original, indicating not just 
emphasis but a critical tone). This last sentence is indeed alarming, 
and Fantham continues by pointing out that “the lack of on site visits 
and quality assurance (QA) checks contributed to the poor paperwork 
of the clearance organisation.” 
In his concluding paragraph, Fantham writes  
We would all admit that we have made errors with 
documentation in the past. All contractors, NGO’s and the 
UNMAO as the coordinating agency should be aware that this is 
unacceptable. It is all very well to pull mines out of the ground, 
but if the documentation is not there to support it, we are 
wasting our time (emphasis added). Make a commitment now to 
place a greater emphasis on accurate reporting and procedures. 
 
For mine action actors, documentation of measurements and 
calculations are critical to sustaining their donor-funded work, and 
such documentation allows mine action to maintain one of the 
trappings of a modern profession. Moreover, UNMAO’s documentation 
functions as a literary technology as Steven Shapin articulates,14 
allowing any readers to virtually witness the environment and – 
UNMAO expects – its decision-making process. These two reasons are 
interrelated, as donors need to justify to their overseers dispersing 
funds to qualified organizations and efforts. While some mine action 
actors – notably donors – have often made the point that community 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Shapin, “Pump and Circumstance.” 
  218
confidence and land usage after clearance is what redeems the costs 
and expenditures of clearance, Fantham’s equating of clearance’s 
value with documentation is a markedly different formulation. 
Community confidence and subsequent land usage speak to the 
acknowledged multi-faceted understanding of mines/ERW: that is, 
beyond the material considerations of the explosives, there is also the 
social perception of mines/ERW that in itself is capable of doing work. 
As one function of a landmine (and less intentionally other ERW) is to 
deny land and prevent an area from being used or traveled, the 
perception of a landmine is sufficient without the material artifact. 
Thus, physical clearance – or other physical interventions such as 
technical surveying – not only clears mines or notes the lack of their 
presence, but establishes the presence or absence of mines/ERW as a 
collectively agreed upon “matter of fact.” 
What Fantham claims, however, is that clearance is for the UN – 
and to a lesser extent, the Sudanese National Mine Action Center – 
and local communities are one degree removed, if not ignored. Thus, 
for an area to be free from the impact of mines/ERW, it is not 
sufficient that the area be materially/physically cleared; the UN must 
say it is cleared and have records tracing and documenting the 
process. Fantham’s admonition for documentation is not for all 
documentation, but qualified experts’ documentation. Moreover, Idris 
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Hamdeen, Sudan’s NMAC operations officer in Kassala, recalled, a 
mine-risk education team had been tasked to the area after the second 
clearance efforts. Their objective was to inform the community’s that 
“we clear the area to make sure, 100%, there is nothing left.” The 
reification of documentation and record keeping, and the subsequent 
communication of such efforts, however, produces an equally 
challenging issue for clearance in mine action that plays out in other 
accidents and UNMAO’s investigations. 
 
Accident #2 
Later in 2010, UNMAO would convene another Board of 
Investigation, this one in South Sudan.15 The accident that instigated 
this investigation involved a civilian contractor’s large road grader (a 
construction machine that pushes a long blade to create a level 
surface) on the Juba – Nimule road, a 119-mile stretch that connects 
the South Sudanese capital to Uganda, through which most of South 
Sudan’s trade and commerce occurs. The road’s strategic location and 
significance in the most contested part of Sudan during the decades of 
civil war made it a prime location for repeated mine laying by both 
sides of the conflict. Thus, the road was one of UNMAO’s highest 
clearance priorities, and the office has tasked multiple organizations to 
                                                 
15 Steve Fantham, BOI 2010/02 INVESTIGATION INTO MISSED MINES ON THE 
JUBA-NIMULE ROAD, SOUTHERN SUDAN (Khartoum, Sudan: United Nations Mine 
Action Office, January 5, 2011). 
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clear the road, initially in 2006 at a width of 8 meters (4 meters on 
each side of the center of the road, a width which has been termed the 
“humanitarian corridor” to allow one lane of traffic in each direction), 
and then several years later to 26 meters to allow increased traffic and 
a road shoulder (13 meters on each side of the road’s center). 
The contract for modernizing the Juba-Nimule road by leveling 
the surface and adding tarmac went to the Louis Berger Group (a 
major international consulting firm), funded by US$225 million from 
USAID. The Louis Berger Group sub-contracted a commercial 
clearance organization, The Development Initiative (TDI), to confirm 
that all cleared areas were in fact safe for construction to continue. In 
July 2010, TDI located three antitank mines in areas that were tasked 
to be cleared, supposedly cleared, and then accepted as cleared. The 
first mine was found 28.3 meters from the center line, a second 19.5 
meters from the center, and a third just 8.2 meters. While the first 
mine is outside of the 26-meter width, the Board of Investigation 
reports the last two mines lay within an area that was deemed cleared, 
although it was not clear where the mines came from.16 
The BOI determined that the first contractor who had missed the 
mines (the identity of whom was kept anonymous, although most of 
                                                 
16 While it is not uncommon for areas to be cleared outside of the 26 meter width if 
such areas appear well-traveled, the discovery of multiple mines in an area that was 
not required to be cleared but presented as such could be framed not merely of gross 
negligence but outright deception. 
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the mine action community could readily infer which organization was 
culpable) was grossly negligent and recommended that all of the areas 
deemed cleared by the management team responsible for these three 
missed mines be re-cleared by the negligent contractor.17 This errant 
contractor was also responsible for another instance of missed mines, 
also along the Juba – Nimule road, which, unlike this instance 
resulted in an UNMAO quality assurance officer losing his leg below 
the knee while conducting a clearance completion survey.18 
One common theme from these incidents on the Juba – Nimule 
road and the tractor detonation in Al Lafa, Kassala (two completely 
distinct areas in terms of their geography on opposite ends of Sudan, 
topography, people, culture, etc.) is again the issue of documentation. 
This second BOI noted “there were limited records of work carried out 
                                                 
17 Matthew Bolton makes the argument that “differing understandings of security, 
constituent organizations and contractural relationships (produce) differing 
outcomes” with commercial contractors clearing larger areas for lower financial costs 
than NGOs but at a reduced quality and safety level, Bolton, Foreign Aid and 
Landmine Clearance, 145. For a more thorough discussion replete with quantitative 
analyses, see Ibid., chap. 5: Comparing the Performance of Tenders and Grants. 
18 The quality assurance officer was Steve Fantham. Upon his recovery and 
rehabilitation, he returned to work at UNMAO in Sudan as the acting chief of 
operations (the previous chief assumed a UN position in New York). UN News Centre, 
“From the Field: True Grit in the Minefields of South Sudan”, February 22, 2011, 
https://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Cr1=sudan&NewsID=37584&Cr=mine. 
Based on UNMAO’s BOI, Fantham and his wife sued the commercial contractor 
RONCO Consulting Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia. The case was settled out of court. See “Ronco Consulting Sued for 
Negligence by United Nations Mine Action Employee,” Overseas Civilian Contractors, 
June 7, 2011, https://civiliancontractors.wordpress.com/2011/06/07/ronco-
consulting-sued-for-negligence-by-united-nations-mine-action-employee/; “Ronco 
Consulting Settles Fantham Lawsuit Before Bothering to Respond,” Overseas Civilian 
Contractors, January 10, 2012, 
https://civiliancontractors.wordpress.com/2012/01/10/ronco-consulting-settles-
fantham-lawsuit-before-bothering-to-respond/ 
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and no available records from the contractor involved or UNMAO 
relating to accreditation,” and “it was unclear whether the complete 
clearance history of the DA [Dangerous Area] had been handed over to 
the contractor from UNMAO at the time the Task Dossier (TD) was 
issued. The contractor’s representative’s signature on the TD was not 
identifiable.”19 
If there is no documentation, UNMAO cannot construct its 
reality of what is cleared and what is not. Yet, at the same time, 
Fantham noted the BOI’s recommendation that 
“there should be a system in place to ensure a suitable follow up 
procedure for the implementation of BOI recommendations. 
There should be a record of indicating the follow up steps taken 
after the completion and dissemination of a BOI report this is 
detailed in the NTSG’s but may not be being implemented 
(sic).”20 
 
Thus, if there is no documentation, a reality can still in fact be 
constructed, albeit one at odds with what UNMAO already knows from 
its BOIs. Indeed, in 2011, the Northern region’s quality assurance 
officer Jihad Samhat publicly distributed a summary of every accident 
and incident from the 2010 calendar year. Moreover, the report details 
how the issue of residual liability for any potential future accidents in 
previously cleared areas had not been addressed more than five years 
after UNMAO began operations.  
                                                 
19 Fantham, BOI 2010/02 INVESTIGATION INTO MISSED MINES ON THE JUBA-
NIMULE ROAD, SOUTHERN SUDAN, 1. 
20 Ibid., 2. 
  223
Accident #3 
On March 28, 2011, a pickup truck with six Sudanese men 
drove over an antitank mine approximately one hour away from the 
village of Rasai in Kassala state. One passenger died immediately, and 
another on the way to the only hospital in the area located in the main 
city of Kassala several hours away (Kassala is the also the name of the 
only major city in Kassala state). Three other passengers were critically 
wounded and required hospitalization, one requiring amputation of his 
right leg. The sixth passenger was treated and discharged the same 
day. 
The UNMAO sub-office in Kassala learned of the accident when 
the victims/survivors arrived at the hospital on the evening of March 
28 (a Monday) and began preliminary fact-finding and an 
investigation. I played a small but not insignificant role in this 
particular investigation as a participant observer. I was directly 
involved in brief interviews with two of the survivors on Tuesday, 
March 29 and was one of several people taking photographs during the 
field investigation at the accident site. On Wednesday, March 30, I was 
a part of a team of UNMAO and NMAC officials who departed Kassala 
in two vehicles to locate the accident site and continue our 
investigation.  
The next day, the team – now accompanied by two deminers, 
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their supervisor, and an ambulance all temporarily seconded from a 
nearby clearance team – located the destroyed pickup truck with the 
assistance of a local herder who was gathering water from a nearby 
well. The herder had heard the explosion from the accident and led the 
team to the general area of the accident where the burned out vehicle 
was readily spotted.
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Figure 28: A deminer is supervised by a team leader as he used a metal detector to find a clear path to the destroyed vehicle. 
Photo from March 2011.
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Figure 29: The destroyed truck. Note the blue gas containers on the right which 
exacerbated the explosion after the truck hit the antitank mine. Photo from March 
2011. 
 
The team began taking numerous photographs and readings (e.g., GPS 
coordinates, explosion crater size, distance between the crater and the 
pickup truck, etc.). What was notable was the homogeneity of the 
landscape; aside from the sun, stars, and moon, there were no 
physical signs to indicate direction or location. The absence of hills, 
waterways, large rocks, and trees in the figures reveals the vastness of 
the desert. Moreover, there was no built infrastructure anywhere near 
the vicinity of the accident. The lack of any physical evidence of 
mines/ERW in the area and negative results from two deminers doing 
a “fade-out” search (searching a radius around the explosion site) led 
the team to conclude informally that the antitank mine was a 
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“hamseen,” which is Arabic for the number fifty. During the civil war, 
the Southern Sudan People’s Liberation Army would pay individuals 
50 Sudanese pounds to plant one mine randomly against the Northern 
Sudanese Armed Forces. The mine that caused the accident remained 
in the road for an untold number of years after the conflict. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: The explosion crater. Note the many sets of tire tracks around the crater 
and the lack of other craters in the area. Photo from March 2011. 
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Gathering all available information took one hour. In the course 
of the investigation, the team learned from local herders that the site 
of accident was on an older “road,” which is basically a gravel path 
nearly indistinguishable from the “road” the team drove 100 meters 
away. The latter road, according to the herders, was newer road. Both 
roads led to a main paved highway that connected Kassala to Port 
Sudan, the country’s only port on the Red Sea. Upon returning to the 
sub-office in Kassala later that day, the UNMAO operations officer 
wrote a report for the main Khartoum office. In his report, the 
operations officer described the seemingly imperceptible difference 
between the old road where the accident occurred and the newer road 
which appeared safe upon driving on it. 
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Figure 31: The view from the accident scene to the convoy vehicles. The UNMAO 
official reported the convoy vehicles were what one local herder described as “the 
new road.” Photo from March 2011. 
 
The report’s final section lists three recommendation: 
1. UN organizations, NGOs and local residents shall be informed of 
the condition of this road and advised to identify and use 
alternative routes while traveling by vehicles. They should also 
take particular caution, look out for and report any signs of 
mines/UXO in the area. 
2. The road should be marked as (a) Dangerous Area, clearly 
marked from the village and be closed for all vehicle movements 
until it is verified/cleared. 
3. All adjoining road networks in the area should be earmarked for 
verification at the earliest opportunity to provide a lasting 
solution to the identified threat to humanitarian operations.1 
                                                 
1 United Nations Mine Action Office, Kassala Sub-Office, MINE ACCIDENT REPORT 
RASAI - EASTERN STATES - 28TH MARCH 2011 (Kassala, Sudan: United Nations 
Mine Action Office, March 31, 2011), 3. 
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According to IMSMA records as of November 2011, there are no 
Dangerous Areas listed near Rasai. 
 It is plausible that the recommendations have not been 
implemented because of human oversight. However, in light of the 
larger dynamics that I discussed above that factor into the 
circumstances of this particular accident, UNMAO’s recommendations 
must be considered within a more challenging context. Given the 
regular usage of the road for several years and the lack of any visible 
evidence, the Rasai accident was unforeseen. As the second 
recommendation signals, the accident recast this area of the 
environment as hazardous. At the same time, Michelle Murphy points 
out the process by which “objects were rendered perceptible was in the 
same gesture intrinsically linked to a delineation of what was 
imperceptible.”2 The accident made the travelers in the pickup truck, 
the members of their community that were waiting for them at the 
hospital where they were treated, herders in the area, and UNMAO all 
aware of the risk of mines/ERW in an area that no one previously 
considered hazardous. Yet, no one was in a position to define the risk 
in such a way that the risk could be addressed and managed. 
Designating a whole landscape as a Dangerous Area does not help 
drivers or herders who need to travel, nor does it help UNMAO who 
                                                 
2 Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, 9. 
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does not have the financial means to clear all the land to the horizon. 
To designate a whole swath of visually identical land a Dangerous Area 
creates a mind-numbing holism; seeing a whole area as a hazard 
necessarily requires not seeing the distinctions between different 
constituent parts of that larger area. Labeling a whole area risky does 
not change behavior or create an alternative. As such, this accident 
has thus become folded into UNMAO’s ready narrative about the 
threat of mines/ERW in Sudan and another example for why UNMAO’s 
work ought to be supported. 
 
 
Figure 32: The view of “the new road” from the lead convoy vehicle. The small shapes 
to the right of center are estimated to be several miles away. Photo from March 2011. 
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Conclusion 
 
These accidents, regularly occurring but not numerous, 
highlight a challenge within the clearance-oriented regime and how 
this regime within mine action shapes – and sometimes physically 
disfigures – those who are affected by mines/ERW. The constellation of 
detection and clearance technologies employed within this regime are 
constrained not only by financial resources but by the expectations of 
a professional international organization attempting to meet the 
requirements of varied social groups. While there is a demonstrable 
material benefit delivered to communities across Sudan from this 
regime’s work, ultimately UNMAO works as an international 
organization from the global North ought to work. In no small part, 
this enables UNMAO to continue receiving donor support. This is 
qualitatively different from activist-oriented regime efforts and 
subsequent presentation of such efforts to donors. 
One aspect of UNMAO’s work which illustrates this point is the 
office’s issue with residual liability: establishing responsibility and 
proscribed procedures for accidents in previously cleared areas. Even 
in the office’s last year of operations, no such regulations and 
guidelines existed.3 Nor was psychological counseling required to be 
                                                 
3 Jihad Samhat, Board of Inquiry Summaries and Recommendations into Accidents 
and Incidents Throughout the Sudan-MAP Programme AOR 2010 (Khartoum, 
Sudan: United Nations Mine Action Office, n.d.), 7. 
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available to any mine action personnel involved in accidents. 
Conducting empirically effective clearance across the country without 
establishing or codifying residual liability or having personnel well-
being fully addressed symbolizes how the different parts of UNMAO 
operate within distinct regimes of perceptibility. 
To reiterate a critical point about the clearance-oriented regime, 
mines/ERW are “brought into existence in multiple, often conflicting 
circumstances – the results of not just specific environments but also 
new arrangements of technologies and practices.”4 Through such 
circumstances, various social groups apprehend the explosive 
contamination in the landscape, yet oftentimes issues like residual 
liability do not neatly fit within a given regime of perceptibility. For the 
clearance-oriented regime, residual liability challenges the technical 
expertise that underpins this regime. 
Returning to a key point from the beginning of this chapter, the 
majority of UNMAO’s clearance activities do not produce missed mines 
or accidents during and after clearance. At the same time, some of the 
accident investigations and Boards of Inquiry contained 
recommendations that were never implemented. At a systemic level, I 
have shown how the reports from these investigations and boards have 
normalized risks and negative outcomes as a generally unspoken but 
                                                 
4 Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, 8. 
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inevitable outcome within the clearance-oriented regime.5 
 Such a regime is situated within sometimes-conflicting 
perspectives. While clearance organizations have maintained that 
“Sudan doesn’t have a mine problem” (in other words, mine 
contamination is not heavy or widespread), such organizations 
simultaneously present themselves as the only group able to mitigate 
and remove a potentially omnipresent threat. While the contamination 
may not be widespread, determining where it exists and subsequently 
clearing it requires a thorough investigation. Over the course of such 
investigations and clearance, mine action groups engage with some 
audiences who are in some proximity to the details of clearance that 
such work is about “risk management.” On the other hand, mine 
action presents a simple dualistic/binary discourse to the people and 
communities most affected by mines/ERW: “before we came the land 
was unsafe; now it is clear.” UNMAO’s work of clearance – of 
(re)constructing environmental knowledge – fills the space between 
these two accounts, leaving little room for other ways to frame Sudan’s 
contaminated landscapes.
                                                 
5 For a discussion of normalized risks, see Vaughan, The Challenger launch decision, 
195. 
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CONCLUSION: AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND WHAT MAY COME 
 
 
Shortly after I left Sudan at the end May 2011 and one month 
before the UN Mission in Sudan concluded its peacekeeping 
operations, armed hostilities broke out between the North and newly 
independent South. What was once a civil war had become a smaller 
scale-war, and the most mine impacted states of Southern Kordofan 
and Blue Nile State were once again the sites of conflict. Beyond the 
inevitable ERW from weapons used by the opposing soldiers, there 
were reports of the North and South reverting to laying landmines 
once again. Landmine Monitor’s most recent update of Sudan at the 
end of 2011 read in part, 
both the SAF and the SPLA are reported to have laid anti-
personnel land mines in strategic areas of Kadugli town [capital 
of South Kordofan state]. In particular, the SAF is reported to 
have mined the Kalimo neighbourhood and the SPLA is reported 
to have laid land mines in areas around the deputy governor’s 
residence.1 
 
Landmine Monitor based its reporting on reports obtained from 
various UN agencies including the Department of Safety and Security 
and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, with the 
latter “(estimating in July 2011) that mines or unexploded ordnance 
contaminate more than one third of Kadugli, including three schools.”2 
                                                 
1 International Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Sudan.” 
2 Ibid. 
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Equally troubling is while the Sudan Armed Forces continue its 
denials, reports of cluster munitions strikes in Southern Kordofan’s 
Nuba Mountains appeared in both Sudanese and international media.3 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 “Cluster Bomb Found in Sudan’s South Kordofan,” Sudan Tribune, May 25, 2012, 
http://www.sudantribune.com/Cluster-bomb-found-in-Sudan-s,42704; “Sudan’s 
Army Denies Using Cluster Munitions in South Kordofan,” Sudan Tribune, May 28, 
2012, http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-army-denies-using-cluster,42728. 
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Figure 33: A box of No. 4 antipersonnel landmines, ready to be armed and laid in the 
Nuba Mountains region by the North’s Sudan Armed Forces. The writing on the crate 
is in English with metric units. This photo was taken by documentary filmmaker 
Peter Moszynski and uploaded to Facebook on March 3, 2011. Moszynski’s photos 
gained wide exposure after Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Jody Williams posted a link 
on her Facebook page to this photos and the others included here. Photo from 
Facebook from March 2012.4 
                                                 
4 Peter Moszynski, “Wall Photos,” Facebook, March 3, 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=101505800015846120&set=a.5794229
1119.81905.586966119&type=1. 
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Figure 34: A cluster munition from an attack by SAF in the Nuba Mountains region. 
Photo from Facebook from March 2012.5 
 
                                                 
5 Peter Moszynski, “Wall Photos,” Facebook, March 3, 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10150580015826120&set=a.57942291
119.81905.586966119&type=1. 
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Figure 35: Moszynski describes the photo as a burning home in Taroji (also 
anglicized as Trogi by the UN), a village in the Nuba Mountains region, evidence of a 
SAF air raid. UNMAO had cleared the mines/ERW from Taroji approximately on year 
earlier, and the Landmine Impact Survey community map in chapter 1 is of this 
area. Photo from Facebook from March 2012.6 
 
Sudan’s return to belligerency despite its reduction in size 
precludes the type and scale of mine action activities and research 
that temporarily reshaped the country from the signing of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 to the secession of South 
Sudan in 2011. It is not clear at the present if mine action activities on 
the same scale as pre-Southern independence will be possible or at a 
scale to make Sudan free from the impact and threat of mines/ERW in 
the foreseeable future. 
                                                 
6 Peter Moszynski, “Wall Photos,” Facebook, March 3, 2012, 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10150580030036120&set=a.57942291
119.81905.586966119&type=3&theater. 
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Nevertheless, the span of nearly a decade with significant, large-
scale, internationally backed mine action activities in Sudan still 
provide insights worth considering. For science and technology 
studies, researching mine action offers for consideration a different 
perspective on “local knowledge” and its value in certain top-down, 
outsider driven enterprises. 
While the location and quantity of mines is at times contested 
between mine action organizations, local communities, Sudanese 
authorities, and mine action donors, how those mines are cleared is a 
largely settled question. As I have shown in this dissertation, actors 
within the activist-oriented regime black-box mines/ERW: these 
explosives were placed by someone, either the North’s or South’s 
soldiers, but sometimes from unknown sources; they are hazardous; 
others should and shall remove them. Unlike chemical exposures, side 
effects from vaccines, or the efficacy of a therapeutic treatment, 
mines/ERW are the subject of less contestation, and what 
contestation does exist is less critical. While Michelle Murphy makes 
the thought provoking point that the question “do chemical exposures 
exist or not” is the product of particular histories and politics, and 
reveals much about any who answer that question, such a question in 
mine action also has particular histories, but not one that is 
adversarial as the ones Murphy delineates. 
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In light of this relative lack of contestation over how to clear 
mines/ERW, one question facing policy and decision makers involved 
in mine action is should there still be continued support for mine 
action? The overwhelming majority of mine/ERW victims, some of 
whom survive, are innocent civilians rather than the soldiers that were 
ostensibly the target of these weapons. Yet, to reiterate figures from 
the introduction, approximately 5,500 mine/ERW casualties occur 
annually across the globe. While large-scale delivery of humanitarian 
relief like food relief require mine/ERW-free roads, distribution 
centers, and paths for people to travel, the large swaths of land cleared 
by manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and mechanical assets in 
Sudan typically reveal no mines/ERW even after the codification of 
land release. For some policy and decision makers, along with groups 
more directly in mine action, such mine/ERW clearance efforts at an 
average cost of US$10/meter ought to be directed towards other 
humanitarian concerns. 
Thus, one recommendation for UNMAO and other mine action 
organizations who may operate within a similar constellation of 
circumstances is to continue clearance efforts under the current “land 
release” policies. The materiality of mines/ERW – or more specifically 
in certain areas, the lack thereof – justifies the prioritization of finding 
mines/ERW in the most likely locations, i.e., places where soldiers in 
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one of the military forces in Sudan’s civil wars would lay mines or fire 
weapons. Even as all mine action actors point to the significantly 
higher costs of clearance over impact surveying and mine-risk 
education, and clearance critics point to a seeming disconnect between 
the cost to clear a square meter and the apparently few mines/ERW 
uncovered, it is important to remember that it is through and after 
clearing an area that statements can be made about the few number of 
mines/ERW. Moreover, prioritizing clearance as the clearance-oriented 
regime does enables mine action to address the materiality that 
underpins the whole profession in a way the activist-oriented regime 
does not. This point about the two regimes of perceptibility in mine 
action can illuminate the different kinds of work that occur within a 
field like mine action that to outsiders seems unified. 
By highlighting how the activist-oriented regime and the 
clearance-oriented regime shape and order Sudan’s contaminated 
landscapes – and more importantly for policy and decision makers, 
present options for addressing mines/ERW – this dissertation presents 
the opportunity for policy and decision makers to decide what their 
strategy and end state is for this issue in Sudan. While the activist-
oriented regime prioritizes programs like socio-economic impact 
surveying and mine-risk education, the clearance-oriented regime for 
the most part eschews local communities’ involvement for targeted 
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removal of mines/ERW. 
There is no a priori reason why these two regimes cannot co-
exist, and indeed, one of the strengths of STS has been to show 
heterogeneity where isolated monoliths were thought to exist. This 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all regimes ought to be 
weighted equally. As Michelle Murphy argues, “in an uneven world, 
some ways of perceiving inevitably overshadow others, and some ways 
just work better, more consistently, and are useful to a wider range of 
actors.”7 Thus, if policy and decision makers are under perpetual and 
potentially increasing financial constraints, they may have to be 
strategically selective about what their resources can support. Using 
regimes of perceptibility can not only illuminate the different options 
for action within a field or profession, but also illuminate where those 
options originated. 
Moreover, the concept of regimes of perceptibility in this 
dissertation has highlighted how individual actors, groups, and 
organizations largely look to and accept outside expertise to address 
the threat of mines/ERW in Sudan. While some mine action 
organizations draw local communities’ knowledge into an activist-
oriented regime of perceptibility, the mine action efforts within this 
regime – namely, the Landmine Impact Survey and mine-risk 
                                                 
7 Murphy, Sick Building Syndrome and the Problem of Uncertainty, 177–178. 
  244
education – do not garner the same support from outside experts and 
donors as the mine/ERW removal work done through the clearance-
oriented regime. For the communities who face the threat of 
mines/ERW, local knowledge cannot address the material hazard as 
effectively. Although activists and STS scholars often valorize local 
knowledge, the outsider expert’s knowledge and the larger clearance-
oriented regime are not exempt from scrutiny, as I demonstrated in 
chapter three.  
The complexity of mine/ERW-contaminated landscapes and the 
different regimes of perceptibility at work addressing these landscapes 
highlights the challenging task both outside experts and local 
Sudanese communities face now and unfortunately in the foreseeable 
future. 
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New York, NY, December 2009 
 
Takuto Kubo, United Nations Mine Action Service 
 
New York, NY, January 2010 
 
Sharif Baaser, UNICEF 
 
Takoma Park, MD, February 2010 
 
 Robert Eaton, Survey Action Center 
 
Takoma Park, MD, March 2010 (via phone) 
 
 Robert Eaton, Survey Action Center 
 
Washington, DC, March 2010 
 
 Emma Smith, U.S. Department of State 
 
John Stevens, U.S. Department of State 
 
Sibenik, Croatia, April 2010 
 
Frank Abel, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining 
 
 Ashley Williams, MECHEM 
 
Manchester, England, May 2010 
 
 Adam Komorowski, Mines Advisory Group 
 
 Phil Halford, Mines Advisory Group 
 
Geneva, Switzerland, May 2010 
 
Erik Tollefsen, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining 
 
Sharmala Naidoo, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining 
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Inna Cruz, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
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Debrezyno, Poland, May 2010 
 
 Chris Clark, United Nations Mine Action Service 
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 Rune Andresen, Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
 Vanessa Finson, Norwegian People’s Aid 
 
Khartoum, Sudan, November 2010 
 
 Leonie Barnes, United Nations Mine Action Office 
 
Kassala, Sudan, March 2011 
 
 Ahmed Mohammed Ahmed Gassim, Elder of Shalalob 
 
 Ibrahim Mohammed Adil, Chief of Shalalob 
 
Kassala, Sudan, April 2011 
 
Miriam Hajaj Karar, Friends of Peace and Development 
Organization 
 
Amouna Ali Dirar, Friends of Peace and Development 
Organization 
  
 Babiker Jamel, Friends of Peace and Development Organization 
 
 Idris Hamdeen, National Mine Action Center (Sudan) 
 
 Graham Rees, RONCO Consulting 
 
 Wajdi Agrab Ahmed, United Nations Mine Action Office 
 
Elfadil Ismail Koura, Friends of Peace and Development 
Organization 
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Khartoum, Sudan, April 2011 
 
 Stephen Fantham, United Nations Mine Action Office 
 
 Armen Harutyunyan, United Nations Mine Action Office 
 
Khartoum, Sudan, May 2011 
 
Mohamed Eltayeb, National Mine Action Center (Sudan) 
 
Boutros Hobeika, United Nations Mine Action Office 
 
UNMAO quality assurance officer, (anonymous)
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